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The idea that humans are prone to widespread and systematic biases has dominated 
the psychological study of thinking and decision-making. The conclusion that has 
often been drawn is that people are irrational. In recent decades, however, a number 
of psychologists have started to call into question key claims and findings in research 
on human biases. In particular, a body of research has come together under the 
heading of adaptive rationality (henceforth AR). AR theorists argue that people 
should not be assessed against formal principles of rationality but rather against the 
goals they entertain. Moreover, AR theorists maintain that the conclusion that people 
are irrational is unsupported: people are often remarkably successful once assessed 
against their goals and given the cognitive and external constraints imposed by the 
environment. The growth of literature around AR is what motivates the present 
investigation, and assessing the plausibility of the AR challenge to research on 
human biases is the goal of this thesis. My enquiry analyses several aspects of this 
suggested turn in the empirical study of rationality and provides one of the first 
philosophically-informed appraisals of the prospects of AR. First and foremost, my 
thesis seeks to provide a qualified defence of the AR project. On the one hand, I 
agree with AR theorists that there is room for a conceptual revolution in the study of 
thinking and decision-making: while it is commonly argued that behaviour and 
cognition should be assessed against formal principles of rationality, I stress the 
importance of assessing behaviour against the goals that people entertain. However, I 
also contend that AR theorists have hitherto failed to provide compelling evidence in 
support of their most ambitious and optimistic theses about people’s rationality. In 
particular, I present a great deal of evidence suggesting that people are often 
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unsuccessful at achieving prudential and epistemic goals and I argue that AR 
theorists have not made clear how, in light of this evidence, optimistic claims about 



















0. 1 The subject matter 
 
What a piece of work is a man, how noble in reason, how infinite in faculties, in form 
and moving how express and admirable, in action how like an angel, in 
apprehension how like a god: the beauty of the world, the paragon of animals.  
William Shakespeare 
 
We must further observe that while our inferences from experience are frequently 
fallacious, deduction [...] cannot be erroneous [...]. My reason for saying so is that 
none of the mistakes which men can make (men, I say, not beasts) are due to faulty 
inference; they are caused merely by the fact that we found upon a basis of poorly 




Rationality is currently a hot topic in scientific research!and a particularly difficult 
one too. Aristotle famously defined human beings as rational animals, and even 
today few people would openly describe themselves as irrational. In fact, to many 
people the idea that human beings are rational may sound like a platitude. But the 
assumption that we are rational agents has been popular in scientific domains too!in 
particular, it has been central to theorizing in the social sciences. In the domain of 
social policy, for example, the rationality assumption has often been used to support 
the idea that it is not necessary to protect people against the consequences of their 
choices.  
 
In recent decades, however, the assumption that people are rational has been 
empirically tested. And the results of many years of scientific research on human 
rationality seem to pose a number of challenges to optimistic assumptions about 
human rationality. More precisely, in the 1970s researchers started to show that 
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human beings commit systematic and widespread reasoning errors. As a result, the 
view that our capacities for reasoning and decision-making are severely flawed has 
become dominant in the psychology of judgment and decision-making. Notably, 
bleak assessments of human rationality have travelled fast outside the field of 
decision science and into other disciplines concerned with human behaviour, such as 
marketing science or behavioural finance, where the view that human beings are 
irrational now figures prominently in popular handbooks.  
 
Science moves fast, however, and the proposition that people are irrational has 
recently attracted fierce criticism too. In particular, a new strand of research has 
come together under the umbrella term “adaptive rationality” (henceforth AR), and 
this framework has been presented as a radically alternative approach to mainstream 
empirical research on human rationality. These theorists suggest that scientific 
research into human rationality has been led astray: the findings suggesting human 
irrationality that have been reported by researchers in the field of judgement and 
decision-making should not in fact be seen as indications of human irrationality, but 
rather as a result of applying the wrong experimental formats and!more 
importantly!the wrong normative standards. In particular, AR theorists argue that 
people should not be assessed against norms of logic, probability theory, and 
decision theory, but rather against the goals they entertain. They also maintain that 
the conclusion that people are irrational is unsupported: people are often remarkably 
successful once assessed against their goals and given the cognitive and external 
constraints imposed by the environment. The AR project has been often presented as 
attempting to show ‘how people are able to achieve intelligence in the real world’ 
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(Todd and Gigerenzer 2012, 3), and provocative book titles such Adaptive thinking: 
Rationality in the Real World (Gigerenzer 1999) or Ecological Rationality: 
Intelligence in the Real World (Todd and Gigerenzer 2012) illustrate quite clearly the 
general aims of their project. In arguing for such claims, AR theorists attempt to 
restore optimistic assumptions about human rationality, although they do not do so 
by restating the so-called “Normative Man” hypothesis, namely the idea that human 
reasoning and decision making can be roughly modeled by Expected Utility theory 
(Edwards 1954). Rather, they do so by putting forward a new normative perspective 
on human rationality.  
 
The growth of this literature and trend is what motivates the present investigation, 
and assessing the plausibility of this challenge is the very goal of this thesis. My 
enquiry analyses several aspects of this suggested turn in the empirical study of 
rationality and provides one of the first philosophically-informed appraisals of the 
prospects of the challenge from AR. 
 
This thesis aims to provide a qualified defence of AR. On the one hand, I agree 
with AR theorists that there is room for a conceptual revolution in the study of 
thinking and decision-making: while it is commonly argued that behaviour and 
cognition have to be assessed against formal principles of rationality, I stress the 
importance of assessing behaviour against the goals that people entertain. However, 
contra AR theorists, I also present a great deal of evidence suggesting that people are 
often unsuccessful at achieving prudential and epistemic goals. I argue that AR 
theorists have not made clear how, in light of this evidence, optimistic claims about 
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human rationality could be defended. I therefore conclude that, while AR theorists 
have pushed the “rationality debate” forward, they have also failed to provide 
compelling evidence or reasons in support of their most ambitious theses.  
 
Before I begin to articulate my argument in detail, there are a few important tasks 
I wish to accomplish in this introductory chapter. In sections 0.2 and 0.3, I will 
introduce the main characters of this investigation!viz. mainstream research on 
human rationality and the framework of AR. In section 0.4 I will discuss the 
methodology, originality, and limitations of the present work. The final section (0.5) 
will also provide a plan of action as well as further details on the structure of the 
arguments I offer here.   
 
0. 2 A pessimistic view of human rationality   
 
Man is a rational animal!so at least I have been told. Throughout a long life, I have 
looked diligently for evidence in favour of this statement, but so far I have not had 
the good fortune to come across it, though I have searched in many countries spread 
over three continents.  
Bertrand Russell 
 
The task of this section is to introduce the target of AR’s attack, and to outline the 
first character of our investigation. Painting with a broad brush, here I will refer to 
this target as “mainstream bias research” (henceforth, MBR). This tag refers mainly 
to research carried out in the heuristics-and-biases tradition (e.g., Gilovich, Griffin 
and Kahneman 2002; Nisbett and Ross 1980), which constitutes one of the most 
successful research projects in the cognitive sciences, as well as the key polemical 
target motivating the AR theorists’ reactions and claims. However, it would be 
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reductive to associate the claims that I present here with research in such tradition 
only. Here I wish to present a set of beliefs and contentions that are supposed to 
capture the key assumptions and premises of much experimental work in social and 
cognitive psychology. In the remainder of this section I look at the views of scholars 
working in several different research projects, all concerned with biases affecting 
human rationality. This should help to show that I am not tilting at windmills here.  
 
With this clarification in place, let me carefully introduce MBR. It is important 
that we fully understand the concept of bias, since the debate over human rationality 
revolves around whether and to what extent people are prone to bias. In 
psychological research, the term bias has been used to refer to systematic deviations 
from normative standards.1 But the question that arises at this point is which 
normative standards should count as the “right” ones. This seems to be a difficult 
question and choosing the right norms poses a daunting task. 
 
First, it is important to stress that researchers in MBR seem to emphasize the 
connection between rationality and adaptive and successful behaviour.2 Notably, 
most researchers engaged in the empirical study of human rationality subscribe to an 
instrumental view of rationality, and seem to believe that what determines whether 
cognition and behaviour are “good” is whether they are conducive to people’s goals.3 
These researchers seem to be interested in whether people’s behaviour and cognition 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 For a useful discussion of several different uses of the term “bias” in different disciplines, see, e.g., 
Hahn and Harris (2014). 
2 This is more controversial in the philosophical literature, and in Chapter 3 we will discuss some 
attempts to problematize the connection between rational and adaptive behaviour.  
3 The perspective of instrumental rationality is often associated with Hume’s work. While exegesis 
goes beyond the scope of this dissertation, it is useful to highlight that it is debatable to what extent 
such attribution is accurate (cf. Broome 1999; Sugden 2006). 
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lead to the achievement of goals and desired outcomes. For instance, Herbert Simon 
offers an explicit statement of this view when he points out that ‘reason is wholly 
instrumental. It cannot tell us where to go; at best it can tell us how to get there. It is 
a gun for hire that can be employed in the service of any goals we have, good or bad’ 
(1983, 7–8).4 However, as David Over points out, the commitment to instrumental 
rationality is almost universally held in empirical research on human rationality; he 
tells us that ‘almost all discussions of rationality in cognitive psychology and 
cognitive science presuppose this instrumentalist understanding of rationality’ (2004, 
5). Unsurprisingly, even contemporary researchers working in the tradition of 
research in the heuristics-and-biases project have offered clear expressions of these 
commitments. For instance, cognitive psychologists Keith Stanovich and Richard 
West claim that ‘adaptive decision making is the quintessence of rationality’ and that 
‘to think rationally means taking the appropriate action given one’s goals and beliefs’ 
(2014, 81). Importantly, a distinction is often made between instrumental rationality 
(actions that maximize the probability of success) and epistemic rationality (belief 
formation that is accurate and truth tracking), and the idea that behavior and 
cognition are successful is typically taken to refer to practical success (achieving 
one’s desires), excluding cognitive aims. While the relationship between 
instrumental and epistemic rationality is controversial (e.g., Kelly 2003), it is 
important to stress that, in empirical debates on human rationality, epistemic 
rationality is often seen as a species of instrumental rationality, namely instrumental 
rationality in the service of one’s cognitive and epistemic goals.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Notably, scholars in different traditions (both MBR and AR theorists) have presented Simon’s work 
as a main source of inspiration. 
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Second, besides this general commitment to instrumental rationality and such 
interest in adaptive behaviour and cognition, MBR researchers have generally 
declared that rational behaviour has to be assessed against norms of first-order logic, 
probability theory, and rational decision theory. Given the popularity of this view, 
such norms are often taken to constitute what is referred to as the “standard picture 
of rationality” (Stein 1996, 4; henceforth SPR). Notably, Edward Stein writes that, 
according to SPR: 
 
To be rational is to reason in accordance with principles of reasoning that are 
based on rules of logic, probability theory and so forth. If the standard picture of 
reasoning [rationality] is right, principles of reasoning that are based on such 
rules are normative principles of reasoning, namely they are the principles we 
ought to reason in accordance with. (1996, 4) 
 
It is worth noting, however, that on some occasions other labels have been used 
when referring to this normative perspective on rational behaviour and cognition. For 
instance, Chase, Hertwig and Gigerenzer use the expression “classical view” and 
write that this view ‘equates rationality with adherence to the laws of probability 
theory and logic [and] has driven much research on inference’ (1998, 206). Here I 
will, at least provisionally, start by referring to Stein’s (1996) SPR, since this label 
has become very popular and is still widely used.5 I should stress that, for the 
purpose of this chapter, the characterization of SPR offered by Stein seems to fit the 
descriptions of methodology and commitments that researchers in the field of 
judgement and decision-making typically offer. Take, for example, the view of 
Jonathan Baron, who wrote that  ‘the major standards come from probability theory, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5!While Stein refers to this normative perspective as the “standard picture of rationality” (1996, 4) and 
Chase, Hertwig and Gigerenzer (1998) use the expression ‘”classical rationality”, Evans and Over 
(1996) seem to characterize this view in terms of “impersonal rationality”, Chater and Oaksford 
(2000, 99) as “formal rationality” and Kacelnik as “axiomatic rationality” (2006).!
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utility theory, and statistics. These are mathematical theories or “models” that allow 
us to evaluate a judgment. They are called normative because they are norms’ (2004, 
19). Moreover, consider the words of Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, pioneers 
in the heuristics-and-bias tradition, who describe their project as relying on the 
normative rules of ‘the modern theory of decision making under risk’ (1986, S252), 
encompassing transitivity of preferences, dominance, invariance, and cancellation. 
Finally, it seems that Nisbett and Ross had such picture in mind when writing that 
they ‘follow the conventional practice by using the term “normative” to describe the 
use of a rule when there is a consensus among formal scientists that the rule is 
appropriate for the particular problem’ (1980, 13).  
 
Unsurprisingly, in light of these statements, cognitive errors and biases are 
explicitly presented in the literature as violations of the norms of SPR. 
Representative of this trend is the characterization of research on bias offered by 
Wilke and Mata: 
 
First, participants were presented with a reasoning problem to which 
corresponded a normative answer from probability theory or statistics. Next, 
participants’ responses were compared with the solution entailed by these 
norms, and the systematic deviations (biases) found between the responses and 
the normative solutions were listed. (2012, 53) 
 
 
Notably, also philosophers commenting on the “rationality debate” seem to accept 
this characterization of bias research. For instance, Samuels, Stich and Bishop, when 
discussing research in the heuristics-and-biases tradition, write that these researchers 
‘appear to be in the business of evaluating the intuitive judgements that subjects 
make against the standard picture of rationality’ (2002, 247). Moreover, Sturm, in a 
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more general discussion of MBR, writes that ‘a massive amount of the psychological 
literature from the last decades has applied the following procedure: pick a particular 
norm […] and see how many experimental subjects apply it correctly’ (2012, 68).  
 
Third, according to a popular view, following the rules of SPR is tantamount to 
pursuing adaptive behaviour and cognition, and violating such norms leads to 
unsuccessful behaviour and cognition.6 To appreciate this idea, consider how the 
norms of SPR are often justified. In particular, consider how the importance of the 
transitivity axiom!perhaps the core pillar of the “standard picture of rationality” 
!is typically explained. If one satisfies the transitivity axiom, one cannot become a 
“money pump”. Suppose a person prefers option A to B, B to C, and C to A, thus 
violating transitivity. We can provide this person with option A and then ask, ‘Would 
you pay me a very small amount if I were to replace A with your preferred item C?’ 
If the person agrees, one can then make the same offer concerning the replacement of 
option C with B, then B with A, then A with C, ad infinitum. In this way, the 
argument goes, a person with intransitive judgment thus becomes a “money pump” 
who can be exploited by a series of offers. Notably, researchers in the field of 
judgment and decision-making have often appealed to pragmatic justifications of 
those norms to defend their reliance on traditional normative requirements.7  For 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 It should be noted, however, that some scholars adopting SPR were only motivated by a desire to 
offer accurate descriptions of human judgment and decision-making and to give insight into 
underlying mechanisms and processes. 
7 This does not mean that pragmatic justifications of such norms are the only justifications available 
(cf. Hansson and Grüne Yanoff 2006). In fact, it is worth noting that, especially in other bodies of 
literature, such as in philosophical treatments of decision theory, these justifications are less popular 
(cf. Grüne Yanoff 2012). Specifically, it is often argued that it would be misguided to assume that 
pragmatic considerations provide justifications. Instead, examples such as the Money Pump elicit 
intuitions, and normative judgments arise directly through human intuition, guided by reflection, and 
these intuitions, rather than pragmatic considerations, constitute the grounds for normative judgments. 
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instance, this seems to capture what Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman have in 
mind when they write that ‘a common argument for transitivity is that cyclic 
preferences can support a “money pump”, in which the intransitive person is induced 
to pay for a series of exchanges that returns to the initial option’ (1986, S253). 
Moreover, Keith Stanovich, a cognitive psychologist who has been developing key 
themes of research in the heuristics-and-biases tradition, seems to have a similar idea 
in mind when he points out that:  
 
Precisely the reason why people should want to follow the axioms of utility 
theory (transitivity, etc.) as normative models is that failure to follow them 
means that a person is not maximizing utility. They should want to avoid 
becoming a money pump. (2011, 269) 
 
The general idea behind these justifications is that only if!and as long as 
!following the norms of SPR is conducive to successful behaviour and cognition, 
do these norms have normative force. This is clearly stated by Jonathan Baron, who 
points out that: 
 
If it should turn out that following the rules of logic leads to eternal happiness, 
then it is “rational thinking” to follow the rules of logic (assuming that we all 
want eternal happiness). If it should turn out, on the other hand, that carefully 
violating the laws of logic at every turn leads to eternal happiness, then it is 
these violations that should be called rational. (2000, 53) 
 
Fourth, researchers in MBR tend towards the view that people frequently and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
However, it is also the case that justifications of norms of rationality that rest on people’s intuitions 
only have been criticized recently (e.g., Baron 2001; Kahneman 1981). For instance, Weinberg, Stich 
and Nichols (2001) criticize such approach to the justification of normative principles of reasoning, 
although the focus in their paper is mainly on some alleged shortcomings of research in traditional 
analytic epistemology. Specifically, these scholars take issue with what they dub “intuition driven 
romanticism”, viz. the attempt to derive normative claims from epistemic intuitions. They claim that 
‘perhaps the most familiar examples of intuition-driven romanticism are various versions of the 
reflective equilibrium strategy’ (433), where reflective equilibrium is sometimes presented as a 
method for the justification of normative principles (cf. Goodman 1965). 
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systematically violate the norms of SPR. But this point needs to be further clarified. 
It is true that, in some seminal empirical explorations of human rationality in the 
field of judgement and decision-making, researchers licensed only moderate verdicts 
about human irrationality. For instance, research in the 1960s examined the revision 
of beliefs in light of new evidence. This line of research typically used “bookbags” 
and “pokerchips”, that is, bags containing varying compositions of coloured chips 
(e.g., 60% red and 40% blue in one bag, 40% red and 60% blue in the other). 
Participants saw samples being drawn from one of these bags and indicated their 
new, revised, degree of belief in the composition of chips in that bag (e.g., that the 
bag had predominantly blue chips). This line of research allowed researchers to 
careful assess the extent to which participants’ belief revision matched the 
prescriptions of Bayes’ rule as a norm for updating beliefs (e.g., Peterson and Uleha 
1964; Philips and Edwards 1966; see Peterson and Beach 1967, and Slovic and 
Lichtenstein 1971 for reviews). The main result of such research was that people 
responded in qualitatively appropriate ways to evidence, but!quantitatively!did 
not revise their beliefs as frequently as the normative prescription of Bayes’ rule 
demands. These systematic deviations from optimal responses did not, however, 
result in researchers forming negative conclusions about human rationality. In fact, 
the conclusion was that probability theory, taken to provide optimal models for 
making inferences under conditions of uncertainty, offers ‘a good first approximation 
for a psychological theory of inference’ (Peterson and Beach 1967, 42). 
 
Things quickly changed, however, with the development of the heuristics-and-
biases approach to judgment and decision-making, pioneered by Kahneman and 
! 21 
Tversky. A major element of this approach was the idea that people’s cognition is 
characterized by the use of heuristics or rules of thumb. But if providing a 
characterization of the notion of bias is complicated, offering an explication of the 
notion of heuristic can prove to be more complicated still. The term “heuristic” is of 
Greek origin and means ‘serving to find out or discover’; but the original meaning of 
the term does not seem to be what Kahneman and colleagues have in mind. 
Kahneman and Frederick (2002) propose that heuristics are shortcuts that people use 
in making judgements and decisions.8 Whatever the original intention, this approach 
has led to the view that heuristics and biases are inseparable twins, to the point that 
coming up with descriptive models of heuristics has been taken as tantamount to 
explaining bad reasoning. For instance, in one of the most celebrated studies in the 
heuristics-and-biases tradition inaugurated by Tversky and Kahneman, subjects were 
presented with a description of some fictional person: 
 
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in 
philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of 




Subjects were then asked to rank the following statements from most to least 
probable:  
 
(a) Linda is a teacher in elementary school  
(b) Linda works in a bookstore and takes yoga classes 
(c) Linda is active in the feminist movement  
(d) Linda is a psychiatric social worker  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8!But see Chow (forthcoming) for an interesting critical discussion of different uses of the term 
“heuristic”.!
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(e) Linda is a member of the League of Women Voters  
(f) Linda is a bank teller  
(g) Linda is an insurance sales person  
(h) Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement 
 
Strikingly, almost 90% of “naïve” subjects rated (h) more probable than (f), and 
almost the same pattern has been found among “sophisticated” subjects. This means 
that a major portion of the subjects rated the probability of the conjunction (a & b) as 
higher than that of the single event (a), despite the fact that this violates the 
conjunction rule in probability theory. Most people accept that P (a & b) > P (a), 
whereas probability theory states that P (a & b) ≤ P (a) and P (a & b) ≤ P (b): Linda 
simply cannot be a feminist bank teller unless she is a bank teller. People’s behaviour 
has been explained by appealing to the representativeness heuristic, which refers to 
making a judgment on the basis of ‘the degree to which it is (i) similar in essential 
properties to its parent population and (ii) reflects the salient features of the process 
by which it is generated’ (Kahneman and Tversky 1972, 431). 
 
Research in this tradition has documented a huge number of pitfalls that seem to 
prevent our cognition from being optimal. Another striking case in which people’s 
cognition seems to be characterized by errors and biases comes from research on so-
called framing effects, which occur when alternative frames of essentially the same 
decision problem lead to predictably different choices. Let us focus here on the Asian 
disease problem, analysed by Tversky and Kahneman (1981). Experimenters asked 
test subjects to make two choices with respect to a scenario in which the outbreak of 
a disease threatens the lives of 600 people.  
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In the first choice subjects were asked which of the two options would be 
preferable:  
 
a) 200 people are saved 
b) There is 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved and 2/3 probability 
that nobody will be saved 
 
You may think that the value of saving 200 lives is not equivalent to 1/3 of the value 
of saving 600 lives. However, the choice can also be framed the following way: 
 
c) 400 lives are lost 
d) There is a 1/3 probability that no lives are lost and 2/3 probability that 
600    lives are lost 
 
The only difference between a/c and b/d is in how the choices are framed: the first 
choice presents the outcomes in a positive light, whereas the second presents them 
negatively. However, participants in the study displayed inconsistent patterns of 
preference: 72% preferred a) to b), while 78% preferred d) to c). There seems to be 
something going wrong with people’s preferences, as the only difference between a/c 
and b/d is in how the outcomes are framed. A requirement of SPR is therefore being 
breached. More precisely, the researchers in this study refer to a violation of the 
principle of invariance, which they characterize in the following terms: 
 
An essential condition for a theory of choice that claims normative status is the 
principle of invariance: different representations of the same choice problem 
should yield the same preference. That is, the preference between options 
should be independent of their description. Two characterizations that the 
decision-maker, on reflection, would view as alternative descriptions of the 
same problem should lead to the same choice!even without the benefit of such 
reflection. (Tversky and Kahneman 1986, 253) 
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These are two better-known examples of studies seemingly showing that people fail 
to reason according to SPR. But they are by no means the only studies with results 
along these lines. For instance, people also commit the gambler’s fallacy, believing 
that the probability of some event (e.g., that a coin will come up heads next time it is 
tossed) is somehow influenced by a certain pattern of previous occurrences (its 
having come up tails the previous five tosses). So, too, there is base-rate fallacy, a 
clear violation of Bayesian probability calculus: asked to estimate the probability that 
a given patient has some disease, given a positive result on a test with such-and-such 
an incidence of false positives, people ignore the information they are explicitly 
presented with, in this case about the prevalence of the disease in the general 
population (Casscells, Schoenberger and Graboys 1978). More examples could be 
offered. But enough has been said to make it at least understandable why, according 
to several scholars, people are prone to systematic and widespread bias.  
 
Fifth, given the allegedly strong link between adaptive behaviour and cognition 
and SPR, it should come as no surprise that biases have been taken to be responsible 
for key cases of unsuccessful and maladaptive behaviour. For instance, biases have 
been linked to unsuccessful performance in a number of domains, such as human 
resource decisions (e.g., Highhouse 2008) or health-related decisions (e.g., Reyna 
and Brainerd 2008). Rather explicitly, Stanovich writes that ‘empirical and 
theoretical work in behavioural finance, much of it using normative approaches, now 
constantly appear in media articles attempting to explain aspects of the 2008/2009 
financial crisis’ (2011a, 268-269). Also Milkman, Chugh and Bazerman (2009) 
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express the view that biases are conducive to maladaptive behaviour. According to 
these authors: 
 
Errors induced by biases in judgment lead decision makers to undersave for 
retirement, engage in needless conflict, marry the wrong partners, accept the 
wrong jobs, and wrongly invade countries. Given the massive costs that can 
result from suboptimal decision-making, it is critical for our field to focus 
increased effort on improving our knowledge about strategies that can lead to 
better decisions. (379) 
 
But similar claims about the costs of biased thinking and decision-making are not 
hard to find. For instance, Johnson and Levin write that: 
 
In an ideal world, people would tackle major crises such as global climate 
change as rational actors, weighing the costs, benefits and probabilities of 
success of alternative policies accurately and impartially. Unfortunately, human 
brains are far from accurate and impartial. Mounting research in experimental 
psychology reveals that we are all subject to systematic biases in judgment and 
decision-making. […] In today’s world of technological sophistication, 
industrial power and mass societies, psychological biases can lead to disasters 
on an unprecedented scale. (2009, 1593) 
 
At times, researchers in MBR have also tried to link specific biases to more specific 
instances of maladaptive behaviour. For instance, Johnson and Fowler claim that 
‘overconfidence has been blamed throughout history for high-profile disasters such 
as the First World War, the Vietnam war, the war in Iraq, the 2008 financial crisis 
and the ill preparedness for environmental phenomena such as Katrina and climate 
change’ (2011, 317). Interestingly, the fact that these violations of SPR seem to lead 
to poor outcomes explains why concrete measures have recently been taken to 
improve people’s strategies and behaviour: noting that widespread and systematic 
errors are conducive to maladaptive behaviour, researchers have claimed that ‘the 
time has come to move the study of biases in judgment and decision making beyond 
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description and toward the development of improvement strategies’ (Milkman et al. 
2009, 379). In particular, the claim that people are prone to costly biases has been 
used to justify public interventions to de-bias them.9 These interventions!called 
“nudges”!have been increasingly important in public policy, especially in the UK, 
with initiatives such as the “Behavioural Insights Team”!a team of behavioural 
economists who advocate non-coercive policies (Cabinet Office Behavioural Insight 
Team 2010; Dolan et al. 2011).10   
 
In light of these considerations, we can now understand why psychologists such 
as Nisbett and Borgida write that the prospects for human rationality might be rather 
‘bleak’ (1975, 935). Humans, as such theorists see it, are irrational, since people are 
prone to systematic and widespread bias. Notably, ‘bleak’ assessments of human 
rationality are now widespread, and the scientific impact of research on human bias 
was formally recognized in 2002 when the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics was 








9 For a comprehensive list of “nudges”, see: 
www.stir.ac.uk/media/schools/management/documents/economics/Nudge%20Database%201.2.pdf. 
10 It is worth noting, however, that, whilst nudges are typically defended by pointing out that errors 
and biases are widespread and costly, one may accept that people are prone to costly errors and still 
argue against the use of nudges. For instance, one might appeal to one particular line of criticism, 
according to which these policies are not libertarian (cf. Hausman and Welch 2010, Grune-Yanoff 
2012).     
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0. 3 The challenge from adaptive rationality 
 
People are not logical, they are psychological. Anonymous 
 
A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and 
philosophers and divines. With consistency, a great soul has simply nothing to do.  
Ralph Waldo Emerson 
 
This perspective on human rationality adopted in MBR, which I outlined above, has 
been dominant for many years. This does not mean, however, that it has not attracted 
criticism. While providing a history of challenges to bleak assessments of human 
rationality goes beyond the scope of the present work, it is worth mentioning that 
such criticisms have been rather fierce. For instance, Lopes (1991) claimed that ‘the 
view that people are irrational is real in the sense that people hold it to be true. But 
the reality is mostly in the rhetoric’ (1991, 80).11 Only recently, however, have a 
number of researchers started to articulate a new and alternative framework for the 
study of rational behaviour and cognition: a number of cognitive psychologists and 
evolutionary behavioural scientists have argued for a paradigm shift in the study of 
human rationality.  
 
Whilst in several corners of research on judgement and decision-making it is 
business as usual, one perspective that is becoming more and more popular takes 
organisms to be matched to the demands of their environments. In much the same 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 The reader can find some useful discussions of classical arguments against MBR in Stich (1990), 
Stein (1996), Evans and Over (1996), Hastie and Dawes (2001), and Samuels, Stich and Bishop 
(2002). 
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way that biological devices are matched to their niches, decision-making 
mechanisms are also matched to particular kinds of task. As in the case of biological 
fit, the suitability of these cognitive mechanisms is predicated on the structure of 
their environment. For instance, in a recent paper, evolutionary psychologists Hugo 
Mercier and Dan Sperber wrote that ‘human reasoning is not a profoundly general 
mechanism; it is a remarkably efficient specialized device adapted to a certain kind 
of information at which it excels’ (2011, 72). Against MBR, it is now frequently 
contended that ‘the frequent labelling of behaviours as irrational, anomalies or biases 
assumes a particular perspective on rational norms’ (Stevens 2008, 295) and that 
‘many common biases and heuristics reflect a deeper adaptive rationality’ (Kenrick 
et al. 2012, 23). Unfortunately, whilst the idea of “adaptive rationality” is now 
becoming quite popular in the literature as a new perspective on rational behaviour 
and cognition, these attacks on MBR are rarely spelled out in detail.  
 
Here I will focus on the arguments, claims, and challenge put forth by Gerd 
Gigerenzer, Ralph Hertwig, and their co-workers at the Centre for Adaptive 
Behaviour and Cognition (ABC) and at the Centre for Adaptive Rationality (ARC), 
since they have articulated the perspective in most detail. I will henceforth refer to 
this relatively close-knit group of researchers when using the term AR.12 At the same 
time, it is important to note that the discussion here might have broader implications 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 It is important to note that what I call AR is often referred to as “ecological rationality” (e.g. Todd 
and Gigerenzer 2012; Rich 2014). However, I am not alone in preferring the label “AR” to 
“ecological rationality” (cf. Schurz 2014; Lin 2014, 667). Two reasons for this preference seem to be 
the following. First, the label “ecological rationality” is often used to refer to the study of the match 
between decision mechanisms and the environment, which is not clearly a normative project. Second, 
other researchers outside AR (e.g., Smith 2003) have appealed to the notion of “ecological rationality” 
to refer to normative views that differ from those I associate here with AR theorists.  
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for the “rationality debate”, since a growing number of researchers seem to share 
such an optimistic perspective on human rationality (e.g., Cosmides and Tooby 1994; 
Mercier and Sperber 2011). 
 
Notably, AR researchers stress that ‘we need not worry about human rationality’ 
(Gigerenzer 1999, 280). The AR project has been often presented as attempting to 
show ‘how people are able to achieve intelligence in the real world’ (Todd and 
Gigerenzer 2012, 3), and provocative book titles such Adaptive thinking: Rationality 
in the Real World (Gigerenzer 1999) or Ecological Rationality: Intelligence in the 
Real World (Todd and Gigerenzer 2012) illustrate quite clearly the general aims of 
their project. This optimistic view is motivated, in part, by the contention that 
behaviour and cognition have been assessed in rather abstract contexts, which are not 
representative of the real world. More importantly, however, researchers in MBR are 
charged with assessing behaviour against the wrong normative standards. Here I will 
try to clarify the nature of the AR theorists’ concerns with the SPR and to localize 
the conflict between MBR and AR.  
 
First of all, it is important to stress that AR scholars highlight the importance of 
adaptive behaviour and cognition and embrace an instrumental view of human 
rationality.13  For instance, it is claimed that: 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13  Note, however, that this is a contentious point. Stanovich and West (2003) have charged 
evolutionary psychologists and AR theorists with departing from instrumental rationality and focusing 
only on the question of whether behaviour is evolutionarily adaptive. Whilst this seems to be true for 
several evolutionary psychologists, the objection does not seem to apply to AR theorists. And this is 
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The rationality naturalized by our psychological research program picks out one 
specific sense of rationality, albeit an important one. We start from a kind of 
means-ends rationality!the “default” notion of rationality. (Gigerenzer and 
Sturm 2012, 245)14 
 
This is clearly an important commitment that AR seems to share with MBR. It is also 
interesting to note that this is a non-trivial assumption. In fact, in philosophical 
debates in particular, it has been argued that this sort of rationality is overly limited. 
For many, the key question a theory of rationality has to answer is what ends we 
ought to pursue and which goals it is rational to have. To give an example, according 
to instrumental rationality a person who wants to drink a can of paint and chooses the 
best means towards this! opening the can in the appropriate way! is acting 
rationally. However, to many there is nothing rational about someone who efficiently 
goes about drinking paint (e.g., Richardson 1994; Korsgaard 1997). The general 
point is that genuine rationality requires the adoption of rational ends, such that the 
choice of means is not sufficient. What is worse, according to critics of instrumental 
rationality, is that the most interesting aspect of rationality is simply missing from 
theories of instrumental rationality. Here I will not seek to defend the commitment to 
instrumental rationality. Rather, I will simply note that this commitment is not what 
marks the contrast between AR and MBR: key figures engaged in psychological 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
one reason for my focusing on the challenge mounted by AR theorists here. Specifically, while it is 
true that AR theorists have often appealed to evolutionary considerations, they have done so mainly to 
account for the performance of people’s heuristics, and not to find new benchmarks of rationality. In 
fact, AR theorists have explicitly distanced themselves from this position, stressing that ‘the study of 
ecological rationality […] should not be confused with the biological concept of adaptation’ 
(Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011, 458) and explicitly endorsing the perspective of instrumental 
rationality (cf. Gigerenzer and Sturm 2012). In the following chapters, I seek to show that AR 
theorists do not merely pay lip service to instrumental rationality, but seem to be genuinely interested 
in people’s ability to achieve their goals (not only evolutionary goals). 
14 Notably, AR theorists make clear that they do not only care about the fulfilment of desires, but also 
about the achievement of epistemic goals (cf. Gigerenzer and Sturm, 2012, 254). 
!
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research on thinking and decision-making have traditionally been concerned with the 
achievement of goals.  
 
Instead, what sets the AR project apart from MBR is the idea that following the 
norms of SPR is functional to the pursuit of adaptive behaviour and cognition, and 
that violating the tenets of SPR leads to maladaptive behaviour. Specifically, AR 
theorists reject the key claim of MBR, namely that the norms of SPR should be used 
as benchmarks of rational behaviour and cognition. In fact, AR theorists stress that: 
 
Looking at the relation of heuristics to environments is often normatively more 
useful than evaluating reasoning and decision-making according to the standard 
norms of probability or decision-theory. (Gigerenzer and Sturm 2012, 254–255) 
 
At other times, AR theorists present their perspective as more explicitly being ‘in 
stark contrast to classical definitions of rationality’ (Rieskamp and Reimer 2007, 
273). This does not mean that, according to AR theorists, following the norms of 
SPR is wrong in all contexts. But in several contexts it is: what this means is that 
behaviour departing from the norms of SPR is successful in a number of domains, 
and that as a consequence these norms should not be used as benchmarks of rational 
behaviour and cognition.15   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Besides the questions of how to assess behaviour alongside the question of whether human 
behaviour and cognition are adaptive, there is the question of how this adaptivity could be achieved. 
With regard to this last question, AR theorists have articulated a framework known as “adaptive 
toolbox”, according to which decision-makers will select among a set of strategies, and different rules 
describe the actual information integration mechanisms. While in Chapter 3 I will present and 
critically discuss the “adaptive toolbox” framework, there are alternative hypotheses and a huge 
literature on the plausibility of single-mechanism and multi-strategy accounts that I will not be able to 
discuss in this work. The reader can refer to Glöckner et al. (2014) for an up-to-date assessment of the 
framework of the “adaptive toolbox” and a comparison with alternative hypotheses.   
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0.4 The methodology and scope of the project 
!
!
This thesis provides one of the first philosophically-informed appraisals of the 
prospects of the AR project.16 But this claim needs to be qualified. In fact there are 
several ways in which one might look at this debate from a philosophical 
perspective. After all, rationality is central to our self-conception, and claims about 
human rationality figure prominently in philosophical theories concerned with 
human action, such as ethics, where theories are often constructed with a specific 
kind of agent in mind, namely the rational agent.17   
 
Here I will not discuss all the philosophical issues underlying the empirical debate 
on human rationality or raised by it. Instead, I will look at the key claims and 
arguments made by MBR and AR theorists, and try to reconstruct them as accurately 
as possible, assessing them against the empirical evidence already available. In so 
doing, I will call on evidence from scientific disciplines such as social and cognitive 
psychology, economics, and evolutionary biology. Overall, the present work will be 
an instance of what is often referred to as “empirical philosophy” (Prinz 2008), 
where this refers to using empirical facts in one’s philosophical theorizing. More 
specifically, what I will do here is to attempt to contribute to scientific theorizing by 
providing some novel hypotheses and original speculations, by synthesizing swath of 
empirical and theoretical works, and by suggesting empirical research.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 For other philosophically-informed discussions of some aspects of AR, see, e.g., Arnau et al. 
(2014), Bortolotti (2011; 2014), Hurley (2005) and Samuels et al. (2001).  
17 For example, an interesting discussion of the implications that empirical research on human 
rationality can have for ethics can be found in Brännmark and Sahlin (2010). 
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But more has to be said in order to clarify the nature of my approach. In 
particular, it is important to highlight that my contribution to the “rationality debate” 
departs in important ways from other philosophical treatments. First, too often 
philosophers discussing the AR project have either failed to focus on key normative 
issues arising from the AR challenge or have mischaracterized the AR project. More 
precisely, several philosophers have focused on descriptive or methodological 
aspects of the challenge and left key normative considerations aside (e.g., Sterelny 
2003; Schulz 2011a).18  On some other occasions, a number of philosophers have 
explicitly claimed that the debate between AR theorists and researchers in MBR rests 
on minor nuances rather than genuine disagreements. A very clear example of this 
trend can be found in Samuels, Stich and Bishop’s article Ending the Rationality 
Wars: How to Make Disputes about Human Rationality Disappear (2002), which has 
been well received in the literature (cf. Burns 2004, 326; Grüne-Yanoff 2007, 554; 
Rysiew 2008, 1172; Sinnott Armstrong et al. 2010, 249). According to these authors, 
the clashes between these two different perspectives and interpretations are mainly 
due to a failure to distinguish between the ‘core claims’ and the ‘rhetorical 
flourishes’ of the competing research programs. As soon as this distinction is 
recognized, it is possible to realize that there is no real disagreement in the debate. In 
particular, according to these authors, there are no genuine disagreements at the 
normative level between the two parts in this dispute, as researchers in MBR as well 
as AR theorists ‘typically presuppose what Edward Stein has called the standard 
picture of rationality’ (2002, 253). And while scholars in these different research 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 It is worth mentioning, however, that other authors have focused on a rather narrow set of issues 
arising from the normative challenge mounted by AR (Vranas 2000). 
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programs have made rather different claims about human rationality, the overly 
optimistic or pessimistic claims about human rationality expressed by AR theorists 
and MBR researchers respectively should be classed as mere ‘rhetorical flourishes’. 
Following this interpretation offered by Samuels et al. (2002), Rysiew claims that 
‘the divisive rhetoric of the rationality wars masks what is in fact a deeper significant 
agreement’ (2008, 1172).19  The approach adopted in this thesis is radically different. 
I take the challenge mounted by AR theorists to be the most radical and sophisticated 
challenge to MBR currently available, and dedicate the key chapters of this work to 
an assessment of AR theorists’ normative claims, as AR theorists’ normative 
perspective departs from MBR researchers’ commitment to SPR.20  
 
But there is a second popular trend in philosophy from which I would like to 
distance my work. Specifically, philosophers interested in rational behavior and 
cognition have typically focused on a priori arguments.21 Consider, for instance, the 
so-called “interpretationist argument” typically attributed to Davidson (1984) and 
Dennett (1987). According to this argument, considering people as rational is a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 Yet this tendency to reduce the “rationality debate” to marginal or superficial disagreements has 
also extended beyond the philosophical literature. For instance, cognitive psychologist Burns writes 
that the ‘differences between the heuristics-and-biases approach and the adaptive approach are 
minimal’ (2004, 49). 
20 Interestingly, AR theorists themselves often lament that their perspective has been misrepresented. 
For instance, Gigerenzer writes that ‘the story is told that there are two personalities among 
psychologists, optimists and pessimists, who see the glass as half full or half empty, respectively. 
According to this legend, people like Funder, Krueger, and myself are just kinder and more generous, 
whereas the pessimists enjoy a darker view of human nature. This story misses what the debate about 
human irrationality is about. It is not about how much rationality is in the glass, but what good 
judgment is in the first place. It is about the kinds of questions asked, not just the answers found’ 
(2004, 26).!
21 It is worth noting, however, that things have been gradually changing, as a growing number of 
philosophers are now taking empirical research on judgement and decision-making very seriously. For 
instance, Lisa Bortolotti writes that ‘when philosophers address traditional questions such as: ‘Are 
humans rational?’ […], they can benefit from paying attention to research in cognitive science’ 
(Bortolotti 2011,  297).  
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precondition of crediting them with intentional states and engaging in reasoning. For 
another case, consider the argument offered by Cohen (1981), who stresses that 
human irrationality cannot be experimentally demonstrated. Specifically, according 
to his argument, our views regarding rationality should be reached through a process 
of adjustment between our intuitions about the rightness of particular inferences and 
our assessment of proposed general principles of rationality, with the goal being to 
obtain a systematization of the latter. In this process, there is no higher court of 
appeal than humans’ intuitions about various principles and cases. In Cohen’s own 
words ‘a normative theory of rationality must be based ultimately on the data of 
human intuition’ (321). The outcome, according to Cohen, is that the reasoning 
errors people seem to make must be considered as mere performance errors, which 
do not impugn the reasoning competence that all normal humans possess (321).22  
 
Such an emphasis on a priori arguments seems to mark, at least to some degree, a 
difference in attitudes exhibited by philosophers and psychologists interested in the 
study of human rationality. But this focus on a priori rather than empirical issues has 
also resulted, in turn, in another interesting difference between the two approaches. 
By focusing on a priori arguments, a number of philosophers have taken MBR to 
provide little insight into people’s alleged irrationality. Notably, as Botterill and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 These arguments have been extremely influential in the philosophical literature, but!perhaps 
unsurprisingly!experimental researchers have not taken them equally seriously. For instance, Shafir 
and Leboeuf write that ‘the status of the rationality assumption is ultimately an empirical question 
(but see Cohen 1981, Dennett 1987). Consequently, the field of experimental psychology has been at 
the forefront of the modern rationality debate’ (2002, 492). For discussions of the abovementioned 
philosophical arguments, see Stich (1990) and Stein (1996). Moreover, interesting criticisms of 
Cohen’s (1981) argument can be found in the commentaries on his BBS paper. Bortolotti (2005) 
offers some criticism of the “interpretationist argument”. In addition, for an empirically-informed 
discussion of the plausibility of Dennett’s and Davidson’s views on people’s attribution of mental 
states, see, e.g., Nichols and Stich (2003) and Goldman and Mason (2007).  
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Carruthers (1999, 105) have pointed out, the disciplinary division between 
psychologists and philosophers marks two different attitudes because psychologists 
seem to find only grounds for pessimism about human reasoning and decision-
making, whereas philosophers appear far more confident about human rationality. 
Botterill and Carruthers’ insight is, at least to some extent, correct, since the 
irrationality thesis is more widely held among psychologists than among 
philosophers.23   
 
Contrary to this trend, in this work I assume that there are a number of empirical 
findings that are worthy of attention and likely to have a bearing on the plausibility 
of attributions of (ir)rationality. Here I focus on evidence concerning the relationship 
between following the norms of SPR and achieving successful and adaptive 
behavior, as I take these findings to be the most relevant and important. But there are 
other empirical findings besides those I discuss here that might have a bearing on the 
“rationality debate”. For instance, AR theorists have recently given other evidence in 
support of their case, stressing, in particular, the puzzling fact that mental 
abnormalities seem to be associated with conformity to SPR (Hertwig and Volz 
2013). More precisely, !individuals with mental illnesses or damage to specific brain 
regions are more likely than healthy individuals to adhere to SPR. For example, 
patients with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) are more 
coherent in their preferences in a consumer choice context (Koenigs and Tranel 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 Yet, as one might imagine at this point, a number of psychologists have also started to embrace 
rather optimistic views on human rationality. In addition to the literature already mentioned, Osman 
(2014) has recently articulated a perspective on how we might guide behavior change that is more 
optimistic than those suggested by recent books like Nudge (Thaler and Sunstein 2008) and 
Predictably Irrational (Ariely 2009).  
! 37 
2008). Likewise, they do not seem to fall prey to the correspondence bias, which 
means they are less likely to assume that outcomes are caused by dispositional 
factors, e.g., a person’s constitution or personality, even when the actual cause is due 
to situational factors (Koscik and Tranel 2013). Moreover, there are other empirical 
challenges and puzzles for MBR that do not come from the AR project. For instance, 
some scholars have pointed out that there appears to be a striking (and puzzling) 
dissociation between human perceptuo-motor and cognitive decision-making 
performance. Specifically, whilst human high-level cognitive decisions appear to be 
sub-optimal, paradoxically, perceptuo-motor decisions appear to be nearly optimal 
(e.g., Jarvstad et al. 2014; Trommershäuser, Landy and Maloney 2006; 2008). As 
Trommershäuser, Landy and Maloney point out, for example, ‘in marked contrast to 
the grossly sub-optimal performance of human subjects in traditional economic 
decision-making experiments, our subjects’ performance was often indistinguishable 
from optimal’ (2006, 987). Finally, a number of researchers are now challenging 
claims made by researchers in MBR by appealing to considerations from cognitive 
modeling. In particular, a number of theorists have tried to model human cognition 
according to quantum probability theory,24 arguing that the latter predicts many of 
the standard anomalies discussed by researchers in MBR and raising some 
fundamental questions about the value of SPR (Pothos and Busemeyer 2013; 2014; 
Wendt 2015, chap. 8).   
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 Quantum probability is a formal theory of probability and an alternative to classical probability 
theory. Specifically, quantum probability refers to the mathematics for assigning probabilities to 
events from quantum mechanics, without the physics. 
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Whilst findings from other research programs might turn out to be interesting, it 
seems that only in AR do we already have a fully-fledged alternative picture of 
rationality and a project that seeks to replace both the methodology and the 
traditional normative standards of MBR. This is why, despite the existence of several 
empirical challenges to MBR, this enquiry focuses only on that from AR. Note, for 
instance, that while authors such as Mercier and Sperber (2011), Johnson and Fowler 
(2009) and Johnson et al. (2013) have mainly focused on the confirmation bias and 
on the overconfidence bias respectively, the attack mounted by AR researchers is 
supposed to apply to research on biases more generally. In addition, while other 
projects are trying to open up new fronts in the “rationality debate”, suggesting, as 
we have seen above, that human cognitive processes might obey quantum rather than 
classic (Bayesian) probability theory (Pothos and Busemeyer 2013), those 
scholars!unlike AR theorists!are generally more reluctant to argue in favor of a 
wholesale replacement of SPR (e.g., Pothos and Busemeyer 2014). 
 
0.5 Plan for action 
 
“Begin at the beginning,” the King said, very gravely, “and go on till you come to 
the end: then stop.”  
 Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland 
 
Having provided a description of this dissertation!delineating what it is and is not 
about!and having presented the questions that motivated this work, the time is now 
ripe for introducing my argument in more detail. The most original ideas put forth by 
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this project can be stated as follows. AR theorists have successfully shown that 
formal principles of rationality cannot and should not be used as universal 
benchmarks of rationality for the study of adaptive behaviour and cognition, and that 
researchers should try to assess behaviour against the goals people entertain. 
However, accepting this claim, which amounts to a conceptual revolution in the 
study of human judgement and decision-making, does not imply that we should draw 
optimistic verdicts about human rationality. In fact, there is a great deal of evidence 
suggesting that people are often unsuccessful at achieving prudential and epistemic 
goals. I argue that AR theorists have not made clear how, in light of this evidence, 
optimistic claims about human rationality could be defended. Thus, my thesis 
provides only a qualified defence of the challenge from AR. 
 
This dissertation, which contains seven chapters, an introduction and a 
conclusion, is structured as follows.  
 
In Chapter 1, I critically discuss the claim that biases disappear in the “real 
world”. AR theorists have stressed on a number of occasions that many violations of 
SPR found in the lab are not representative of behaviour in the real world. I 
challenge their criticism of MBR and show that concerns about the external validity 
of findings in MBR do not warrant the rejection of pessimistic assessments of human 
rationality. More specifically, I make a three-pronged attack. First, the evidence 
about the robustness of the effects discussed by AR theorists is mixed. Second, the 
contexts that AR theorists class as unrepresentative of the real world are!at least to 
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some extent! representative of it. Third, many instances of biased behaviour have 
been studied in the wild, not just in the laboratory. Overall, it seems that the claim 
that biases disappear in the real world is unsupported: people indeed seem to commit 
systematic violations of SPR in the real world.  
 
However, the conclusion of Chapter 1 might seem to be at odds with evolutionary 
considerations. The idea, in brief, is that if we were prone to systematic and 
widespread biases, we would then fail to navigate the world successfully and thus 
would not have evolved. Since!arguably! evolution cannot be questioned, this 
consideration seems to be problematic for MBR. Chapter 2 discusses this 
evolutionary puzzle and shows that the conclusion of Chapter 1 is not necessarily at 
odds with evolutionary considerations, and that we can provisionally retain the 
conclusion of Chapter 1. In particular, I appeal to the fact that natural selection is not 
the only cause of evolution and, more importantly, that inaccurate reasoning can be 
evolutionarily adaptive. 
 
However, the fact that cases of inaccurate reasoning can be evolutionarily 
adaptive raises a set of questions about the value of the norms of SPR traditionally 
endorsed in MBR. Chapter 3 addresses a number of concerns in this vein, and seeks 
to show that, at least in a significant number of domains, behaviour that departs from 
the norms of SPR can be adaptive and successful. This result seems to be 
problematic for scholars in MBR, since they have advocated that such norms should 
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be treated as universal benchmarks of rationality for the study of adaptive and 
instrumentally rational behaviour.  
 
While Chapter 3 reveals that the claims of AR theorists have weight, in Chapter 4 
I prompt AR theorists to build their challenge on more solid conceptual grounds. In 
particular, AR theorists have sought to explicate their normative challenge to MBR 
by appealing to Hammond’s distinction between coherence and correspondence 
criteria of rationality. But this chapter shows that this distinction does not best 
explicate the challenge AR theorists are talking about, and that a distinction between 
rule-based and goal-based rationality should be preferred.  
 
Chapter 5 discusses a possible objection to the account of AR I present in this 
work. It might seem that I have overlooked a crucial worry shared by AR theorists, 
viz. that the norms of SPR, or what I call “rule-based rationality”, are too demanding, 
because of our cognitive limitations. Interestingly, commentators on the “rationality 
debate” have typically appealed to versions of the ought-implies-can principle to 
account for the normative relevance of research on human cognitive limitations. This 
chapter shows that the framework of AR offers a way of interpreting the normative 
significance of literature on cognitive limitations without being committed to 
versions of the ought-implies-can principle.  
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In Chapter 6 I reconstruct and assess a defence of rule-based rationality and, in 
turn, of MBR. It is currently popular to claim that findings on individual differences 
in judgement and decision-making challenge the plausibility of the AR project. Here 
I reconstruct and discuss two arguments based on such research. First, reported 
heterogeneity in the use of heuristics seems to be at odds with the adaptationist 
underpinnings of the AR project. Second, the existence of correlations between 
cognitive ability and susceptibility to bias suggests that rule-based rationality is, after 
all, normatively adequate. I argue that, as things stand, neither of these arguments is 
compelling.  
 
While my treatment towards AR has been sympathetic so far, in Chapter 7 I also 
argue that there are reasons to reject its most ambitious claims. Specifically, even if 
we agree with AR theorists on the importance of assessing behaviour against the 
goals that people entertain, their claim that people are generally successful at 
achieving their goals seems problematic. This chapter challenges their rather 
optimistic claims about human rationality, and to do so, I begin by noting that, while 
it seems true that behaviour that violates rule-based rationality can be successful 
when measured against goal-based rationality, this result holds only for some 
contexts. More importantly, however, I show that many families of biases reported in 
MBR seem to be instances of unsuccessful behaviour measured against prudential or 
epistemic goals, and I argue that AR theorists have not made clear how, in light of 
this evidence, optimistic claims about human rationality could be defended. 
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The concluding chapter provides a summary of the main claims and conclusions 


















Chapter 1: Cognitive biases in the “real world” 
 
As we have seen, scholars in MBR have argued that human beings are prone to 
systematic and widespread biases. In particular, these researchers often point to 
evidence showing that people’s intuitions about probability deviate dramatically 
from the dictates of probability theory (e.g., Gilovich et al. 2002). However, while 
scholars in MBR have claimed on several occasions that human beings are ‘a species 
that is uniformly probability-blind’ (Piattelli Palmarini 1991, 35), others have 
expressed worries about the robustness of such biases. AR theorists have offered 
empirical evidence to support their claim that biases tend to disappear in the “real 
world”. Here I first introduce the line of argument offered by AR, and then show that 
this version of the challenge to MBR is not as yet particularly convincing. More 
precisely, although this work on the part of AR researchers is important, their 
arguments hardly support the claim that biases disappear in the real world. I 
articulate a three-pronged reply to their argument. First, biases are more robust than 
AR theorists suppose. Second, the experimental contexts used in MBR are more 
representative of the real world than AR theorists suppose. Third, evidence about the 
existence of biases comes from “field experiments” as well, and not only from 
laboratory studies, and thus seems to be less vulnerable to AR theorists’ objections 
than AR theorists believe. I will begin in sections 1 and 2 by offering a careful 
introduction of AR theorists’ concerns over the robustness of findings in MBR. 
Later, in sections 3, 4, and 5, I will then articulate my replies to the AR theorists’ 
argument in detail. I will conclude in section 6. The reader more familiar with 
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general concerns about the robustness of biases can skip sections 1 and 2 and move 
directly to section 3.  
 
1. An ecological perspective on thinking and decision-making 
 
AR theorists take issue with the methodology used in MBR. But their criticisms 
reflect a more general concern they have with large areas of psychological research. 
Specifically, they seem to be attacking a widely shared picture, according to which 
psychological processes can be explained and studied largely in isolation from their 
environment. According to such a view, inputs and outputs of a psychological 
process are located in the environment, yet the explanation of psychological 
mechanisms is a story about internal activity. Just as an explanation of the 
mechanisms of a personal computer is typically given irrespective of the 
environment in which the computer is located, so the explanation of the mechanisms 
of human psychology should be given largely irrespective of the environment in 
which the organism is located.25 This picture makes psychological science especially 
apt for laboratory work and analyses that abstract psychological processes from their 
natural environment.26 
 
However, this picture has recently come under attack. AR theorists have explicitly 
attacked this general tendency to ignore ecological factors in psychological research. 
They stress that: 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 For a defence of methodological solipsism, see Fodor (1980). 
26 See Chirimuuta and Gold (2009, Chap. 9).!
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Ecological perspectives are still rare in cognitive science aside from a few 
exceptions, such as the perspectives of Brunswik, Gibson, Shepard, and 
Anderson and Schooler. Most theories are about mental processes only: neural 
networks, production rules, Bayesian calculations, or dual-systems notions 
(Gigerenzer 2008, 22). 
 
Ignoring ecological considerations is highly problematic because the organism and 
the environment are strongly interacting systems. Whilst the AR theorists’ target is 
not confined to MBR, their concerns apply in particular to research on biases. To 
articulate their perspective, AR scholars often appeal to Herbert Simon’s scissors 
metaphor, according to which ‘human rational behaviour is shaped by a pair of 
scissors whose two blades are the structure of task environments and the 
computational capabilities of the actor’ (1990, 7). Just as we cannot understand how 
scissors cut by looking at one blade, we will not be able to understand human 
reasoning by studying either the individual agent or the environment alone. 
According to AR theorists, the problem with MBR, therefore, is that its scholars have 
focused on people’s heuristics and on the cognitive limitations of the human mind, 
without taking seriously the nature of the environments people inhabit.  
 
In articulating such concerns, AR theorists have also looked at Egon Brunswik’s 
work on perception (e.g. 1957),27 which they explicitly mention as a source of 
inspiration (Gigerenzer, Hoofrage, Kleinboelting 1991). For Brunswik, the basic 
problem for psychology was the way in which an organism adapts to its 
environment. To address this question, Brunswik maintained that psychology must 
view the organism and the environment as interacting systems that, when considered 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 For a thorough presentation of Brunswik’s work, see Hammond and Stewart (2001). 
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relationally, have the essential characteristic of a ‘coming to terms’ (Brunswik 1957). 
Brunswik was critical of the typical design of experimental psychology. Specifically, 
his work can be seen as an attack on the external validity of much psychological 
research of his time (although the label ‘external validity’ was first used by Campbell 
only in 1957, and came to define the experimental vocabulary in psychology in the 
following decades).28⁠ The design typically used in psychological research was one of 
betting on internal validity, that is, on the sound demonstration that a causal 
relationship exists between two or more variables, rather than on external validity, 
which refers to the generalizability of the causal relationship between the 
experimental contexts. After all, the logic goes, if internal validity is not guaranteed, 
no conclusions can be drawn about the effect of independent variables. Brunswik 
introduced the notion of “representative design” to refer to an experimental design 
that aims at a veridical representation of the environment in which organisms 
naturally perform. According to Brunswik, researchers must ensure ‘that the habitat 
of the individual, group or species is represented with all of its variables, and that the 
specific values of these variables are kept in accordance with the frequencies in 
which they actually happen to be distributed’ (1944, 69). For Brunswik, the key 
concern was being able to generalize results to the person’s natural habitat. This 
matters rather a lot, on Brunswik’s view, since people’s cognition can be rather 
accurate in the natural environment in virtue of the exploitation of regularities in that 
environment. On the other hand, cognition might look flawed in the laboratory, but 
only because the controlled laboratory setting destroys these regularities. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 It is important to note, however, that as the discussion about this threat has started to disseminate 
into other social sciences, new terms have been used to define the problem. “External validity”, 
“extrapolation”, “parallelism” and “ecological validity” have been used in various fields. In the 
philosophical literature, however, the terms “external validity” and “extrapolation” are those most 
frequently used (e.g., Guala 2005; Steel 2008). 
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Drawing on these Brunswikian themes, AR theorists claim that MBR has 
mistakenly studied cognition without paying attention to the actual environments 
where thinking and decision-making occur and, as a consequence, that the 
experimental findings suggesting human irrationality that are celebrated in MBR 
cannot be generalized to the real world. According to these theorists, the biases 
reported in the literature are, at least in significant part, attributable to the use of 
artificial and unrepresentative settings. AR theorists look at Brunswik’s work on 
perception to explicate their concerns about the external validity of findings on 
biases:29 it is vital to assess whether in the experimental context the habitat of the 
individual is represented in an accurate way. Researchers should thus be careful 
when making generalizations about people’s irrationality, in order to not mistake 
exceptions due to the use of unnatural contexts for the rule. In the words of AR 
theorists: 
Just as vision researchers construct situations in which the functioning of the 
visual system leads to incorrect inferences about the world, researchers in the 
heuristics-and-biases program select problems in which reasoning by cognitive 
heuristics leads to violation of probability theory. However, the conclusions 
they draw from such unrepresentative designs often differ sharply from those 
drawn by researchers of perception. Vision scientists do not conclude from the 
robustness of the Müller-Lyer illusion, for instance, that people are generally 
poor at inferring object lengths. However, many advocates of the heuristics-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29!!It should be noted, however, that AR theorists have also attacked the internal validity of findings 
from MBR on some occasions (cf. Gigerenzer 2007). For instance with regards to the conjunction 
fallacy, they sometimes subscribe to Fiedler’s concerns that ‘the [conjunction] fallacy may represent a 
verbal misunderstanding of the probability concept. [...] The prevailing statistical interpretation of 
probability (as relative frequency) does not appear to apply to colloquial language because everyday 
experience is seldom based on semantic frequency counts. Rather, the usual interpretation of 
“probability” may come close to such subjective criteria as “believability”, “degree of confidence”, 
“imaginability” or “plausibility”’ (1988, 123–124). There is a huge literature on these concerns (e.g., 
Politzer and Noveck 1991; 2004; Schwarz 1994) that I do not discuss in this work, but see, e.g., Moro 
(2009), for a very clear discussion of some of these arguments and concerns.  
!
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and-biases program conclude from the cognitive illusions found in laboratory 
tasks that human judgment is subject to severe and systematic biases that 
compromise its general functioning. (Chase, Hertwig and Gigerenzer 1998, 
206) 
 
 This criticism of MBR is also explicitly voiced in the following passage:  
These phenomena have been described as cognitive illusions, and these 
demonstrations of irrationality are explained in terms of heuristics on which 
people, equipped with limited resources, need to rely when making inferences 
about an uncertain world. [...] However, concerns about whether studies 
demonstrating irrationality preserved an isomorphism between environmental 
and experimental properties have given rise to a Brunswikian perspective. 
(Dhami, Hoffrage and Hertwig 2004, 972) 
 
At this point, it should be quite clear that the AR theorists’ project seems to be an 
attempt to extend Brunswik’s approach to the study of rational behaviour cognition. 
It is worth noting, however, that the considerations offered by AR theorists are also 
consonant with recent trends in philosophy and cognitive science, although they 
themselves do not acknowledge this point. For instance, consider that there have 
recently been important shifts in the philosophy of mind towards a view of cognition 
as (to cite the current slogan) ‘embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended’. Andy 
Clark, for example, has argued that a proper assessment of human cognitive 
competence cannot overlook environmental factors, for ‘advanced cognition depends 
crucially on our ability to dissipate reasoning: to diffuse achieved knowledge and 
practical wisdom through complex social structures, and to reduce the loads on 
individual brains by locating those brains in complex webs of linguistic, social, 
political and institutional constraints’ (1997, 180). On this view, as well as in the 
view of AR theorists, ignoring environmental factors carries the risk of missing the 
bigger picture of human cognition. For instance, Clark emphasized the importance of 
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considering the environment in which cognition takes place by referring to the so-
called “007 principle”:  
 
In general, evolved creatures will neither store nor process information in costly 
ways when they can use the structure of the environment and their operations 
upon it as a convenient stand-in for the information-processing operations 
concerned. That is, know only as much as you need to know to get the job done. 
(1989, 64) 
 
As this quote suggests, there are interesting parallels between the AR theorists’ 
project and recent trends in embedded and extended cognition.30 In fact, some 
authors have recently highlighted the existence of these connections (Arnau, Ayala 
and Sturm 2014). At the same time, while proponents of embedded and externalist 
accounts of cognition have typically sought empirical support from research on 
memory (Clark and Chalmers 1998; Sutton et al. 2010) and perception (Wilson 
2010), the literature does not typically focus on thinking and decision-making (but 
see Clark 2001). In this sense, this aspect of the AR project can be seen as 
complementary, since they focus on higher cognition and, more precisely, on rational 
judgement and decision-making.  ⁠  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 It is important to note, however, that, unlike AR theorists, a number of scholars within the broad 
framework of situated cognition tend to make quite radical and revolutionary claims about the nature 
of the cognitive processes that lead to adaptive behaviour. As AR theorists Henry Brighton and Peter 
Todd point out, ‘the approach we advocate here is conservative in comparison with other more radical 
situated positions. […] Ecologically rational heuristics are uniformly described in terms of symbolic 
process models operating on representations. These processes draw on the classical notions of search, 
satisficing, and decision rules. In contrast to more radical positions, the concept of ecological 
rationality is agnostic with respect to, for example, issues of antirepresentationalism (Slezak 1999; 
Varela, Thompson and Rosch 1991), dynamic systems theory (van Gelder 1995), or more 
philosophical rethinkings of the nature of cognition (Winograd and Flores 1986)’ (2009, 298).  
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2. AR theorists’ case against MBR  
 
So far I have introduced the main reasons for AR theorists’ concerns with the 
external validity of findings in MBR. After this presentation, I will now introduce the 
attack mounted by AR theorists in more detail. I will begin by unpacking the AR 
theorists’ claim that the irrationality discovered in the lab is due to the use of 
experimental formats that are unrepresentative of the real world. On closer 
inspection, it seems that the attack relies on two main claims:  
   
a) The experimental settings used by researchers in MBR are not representative 
of the target system. 
          b) The difference between target and laboratory system is causally relevant. 
 
To be fair, it would be misleading to present AR theorists as the only or first 
researchers to question the robustness of findings in MBR and to commit to a) and 
b). For instance, within the literature on economics, studies in MBR have been 
criticized because they used selected subjects and did not provide appropriate 
monetary incentives. Specifically, it is often claimed that, unless subjects are offered 
an incentive, their responses will not represent what they would do if presented with 
the task ‘for real’ (Wilcox 1993; Harrison 1994).31 It is worth mentioning, however, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 Incentives are thus generally used to help emulate real-world decision-making: it is claimed that 
people’s performance in experiments often fails to represent their competence because they are 
unwilling to do their best when they are insufficiently compensated for doing so. For instance, in 
some cases it is argued that incentives alter what the agent perceives to be her goals, at other times 
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that many experiments have been conducted to assess the impact of monetary 
incentives, showing that the biases remained and that the field of economics was 
required to explain them (cf. Grether and Plott 1979). Specifically, an important 
result was that incentives never eliminate anomalies, although they are more likely to 
decrease than to increase them (Camerer and Hogarth 1999).  
 
Also AR theorists have stressed the importance of monetary incentives on 
occasion. For instance, in a much-discussed paper, AR theorist Ralph Hertwig and 
his colleague Andreas Ortmann (2001) suggest that also psychologists should use 
incentives whenever possible, because ‘the benefits of being able to run many studies 
do not outweigh the costs of generating results of questionable reliability’ (394). Yet, 
the AR theorists’ main concern is with the format of the information used in 
psychological studies, and here I will focus on their work on the use of natural 
frequencies in probability judgments more specifically, since this is arguably one of 
their most famous and celebrated empirical contributions to research on judgement 
and decision-making.  
 
One important caveat here is that I will not discuss all of the arguments offered by 
AR theorists that question the external validity of studies on biases. For instance, 
experimental research has shown that people tend to express confidence in their 
judgments that exceeds the accuracy of those judgments, but AR theorists have 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
that incentives induce the agent to think longer or harder (for a critical discussion of these views, see 
Read 2005). 
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claimed that people’s reported overconfidence is due to an inaccurate selection of 
items, which turn out to be unrepresentative of common contexts.32 Suffice it to say 
that, whilst AR theorists have offered other arguments to question the external 
validity of findings on human irrationality, their research on the ameliorative effect 
of switching from single probability formats to natural frequencies, which I discuss 
in this chapter,!represents their flagship achievement. However, as I will emphasize 
below, it can also be argued that some of the conclusions I draw in the present 
chapter apply beyond the case of “frequency effects” and have more far-reaching 
implications.  
 
With this clarification in mind, let us now present in detail the empirical case 
mounted by AR theorists. Specifically, these scholars have argued that recognizing 
the distinction between single-event probabilities and frequencies ‘unearths the 
reasonableness hidden by the perspective of the heuristics-and-biases program’ and 
allows for making ‘several apparent cognitive illusions disappear’ (1994, 141-2). 
Simply stated, ‘How many subjects who test positive for the disease do actually have 
the disease?’ is an instance of communication in terms of frequency formats. In 
contrast, ‘What are the chances that a subject found to have a positive result actually 
has breast cancer?’ is an example of communication in terms of probability formats. 
Now, with regard to claim a), AR theorists stress that MBR scholars have studied 
people’s probabilistic reasoning using single-probability formats instead of natural 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32  For instance, AR theorist Gigerenzer has criticized the questions used to explore people’s 
overconfidence. According to him, ‘if the general knowledge questions were a representative sample 
from the knowledge domain, zero overconfidence would be expected. However, general knowledge 
questions typically are not representative samples from the domain of knowledge, but are selected to 
be difficult or even misleading’ (1993, 304).  
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frequencies formats. The latter are representative of the “real world”, as we are 
usually provided with information about risk in a frequency format. On the contrary, 
single probability formats are not representative of the human environment. With 
regard to b), AR theorists stress that violations of the norms of SPR are mainly due 
to the use of probability formats: when these are replaced, people turn out to follow 
the norms of SPR.33  
 
I will now focus on two biases, often presented in MBR as indications of 
irrationality, whose external validity has been criticized by AR theorists: the 
conjunction fallacy and the base rate fallacy.  
 
2.1 The conjunction fallacy 
 
One of the most well known biases explored in MBR is the conjunction fallacy, 
which I presented in the introductory chapter. Let us briefly recall the classic 
scenario used to elicit the conjunction fallacy, called Linda’s problem: 
 
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken and very bright. She majored in 
philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of 




33  Interestingly, AR theorists claim that single-event probabilities and natural frequencies are 
mathematically equivalent. For instance, they stress that ‘mathematically equivalent representations of 
information can entail computationally different Bayesian algorithms’ (Gigerenzer and Hoffrage 
1995, 679). While I will not discuss this claim here, it is worth noting that the view that these 
statements are mathematically equivalent is controversial (e.g., Hàjek 1996; 2009). 
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Now, rank the following claims according to their probability. 
 
a) Linda is a bank teller 
"b) Linda is a bank teller and she is active in feminist movement 
 
As we have already seen, a large majority of subjects rate the probability of the 
conjunction as higher than that of the single event, despite the fact that this violates 
the conjunction rule in probability theory. What AR theorists are eager to emphasize 
is that performance seems to significantly improve when subjects deal with natural 
frequencies instead of single probabilities. In particular, AR theorists appeal to the 
work of Fiedler (1988), who has reported that the rate of fallacies can be reduced by 
presenting Linda’s problem with frequency formats, which are taken to be more 
representative of natural contexts. After presenting the description of Linda, Fiedler 
asked his subjects (Fiedler 1988 126):  
 
There are 100 people that fit this description.  
Rank how many of them are: 
a) Bank tellers " 
b) Bank tellers and active in the feminist movement. 
 
In this case, only a minority of the tested subjects answered that there would be more 
feminist bank tellers than bank tellers. Therefore, the use of frequency formats 
appears to reduce the rate of biases. The robustness of this effect, despite being 
variously interpreted, is usually taken for granted. For instance, Fiedler (1988) 
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reported 73% conjunction violations in the probability representation and 23% in the 
frequency representation. Moreover, Tversky and Kahneman (1983) found 58% and 
25% conjunction violations in the probability and frequency tasks respectively.   
 
2.2 Base rate fallacy 
 
Another important bias discussed and allegedly mitigated by AR theorists is known 
as base rate fallacy. Consider the following problem from Casscells, Schoenberger 
and Grayboys (1978, 999) and presented by Tversky and Kahneman (1982b, 154) to 
demonstrate the generality of the phenomenon: 
 
If a test to detect a disease whose prevalence is 1/1000 has a false positive rate 
of 5%, what is the chance that a person found to have a positive result actually 
has the disease, assuming you know nothing about the person’s symptoms or 
signs? 
 
Sixty students and staff at Harvard Medical School answered this medical diagnosis 
problem. Notably, almost half of them judged the probability that the person actually 
had the disease to be 0.95 (modal answer), the average answer was 0.56, and only 
18% of participants responded 0.02, where the latter is the correct answer. A 
common interpretation of such findings is that people are prone to neglect 
information about base rates. 
 
But what happens if we rephrase the medical diagnosis problem in a frequentist 
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way? In seminal studies on “frequency effects”, Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) and 
Cosmides and Tooby (1996) tried to answer this question. They compared the 
original problem (above) with a frequentist version, in which the same information 
was given:  
 
1 out of every 1000 Americans has disease X. A test has been developed to 
detect when a person has disease X. Every time the test is given to a person who 
has the disease, the test comes out positive. But sometimes the test also comes 
out positive when it is given to a person who is completely healthy. 
Specifically, out of every 1000 people who are perfectly healthy, 50 of them 
test positive for the disease.  
 
Given the information above, on average, how many people who test positive 
for the disease will actually have the disease? "  
 
Interestingly, when the question was rephrased in a frequentist way, as shown above, 
then the Bayesian answer of 0.02!that is, the answer ‘one out of 50 (or 51)’!was 
given by 76% of the subjects. In numerous versions of the medical diagnosis 
problem, it seems that the improvement in subjects’ reasoning is due to the transition 
from a single-event problem to a frequency problem. As AR theorists often put it, 
biases ‘disappear’ when questions are rephrased (cf. Gigerenzer 1991).  
 
The “frequency effect” is now widely assumed to be fairly robust. For instance, 
Newell, Lagnado and Shanks recently wrote that ‘the so-called frequency effect, that 
presenting probability problems in a frequency format often reduces judgmental 
biases, is now well established’ (2007, 85). Moreover, this effect has also been taken 
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to have important applications in crucial domains. Notably, the perspective offered 
by AR theorists has seemingly offered a useful tool to help lay people and experts 
alike to reason the Bayesian way in the medical and legal domain. For example, 
physicians’ diagnostic inferences were shown to improve considerably when natural 
frequencies were used instead of probabilities (Gigerenzer 1996a; Hoffrage and 
Gigerenzer 1998; Hoffrage, Lindsey, Hertwig and Gigerenzer 2000) and judges’ as 
well as other legal experts’ understanding of the meaning of a DNA match could 
similarly be improved by using natural frequencies instead of probabilities (e.g., 
Koehler 1996).  
 
3. Do biases really disappear?  
 
So, is the criticism offered by AR theorists convincing? Before I start to assess the 
plausibility of their critique of the external validity of findings suggesting human 
irrationality, it is important to note that, even if the argument were successful, it 
would not entail that findings in MBR were completely uninteresting. While AR 
theorists may have good reasons for emphasizing the importance of the 
generalizability of findings, this should not lead the reader to think that 
generalizability is the only legitimate goal for psychologists. The reader should 
consider that, as a number of theorists have pointed out, psychologists do not only 
care about the generalization of their results. For instance, in a famous paper, Mook 
(1983) made the point that generalizability is not always (and is in fact rarely) the 
goal of psychologists. Consider the following example offered by Mook. It is found 
that targeted people are judged to be more intelligent when wearing spectacles and 
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seen for 15 seconds; however, if they are observed during five minutes of 
conversation, spectacles made no difference. Adopting an applied perspective, what 
happens during the 15 seconds might be seen as less interesting than what happens in 
five minutes. However, it is still worth knowing that such an effect can occur even 
under restricted conditions: why should a person’s wearing glasses affect our 
judgment of his or her intelligence under any conditions whatsoever? What this 
suggests, on Mook’s view, is that even findings that are not highly generalizable can 
be worthy of interest and empirical investigation. It is nevertheless the case, 
however, that if the argument by AR theorists were correct it would have important 
implications for our discussion, since scholars in MBR have submitted to the view 
that biases are systematic and widespread in the real world. 
 
With this clarification established, I would now like to draw the reader’s attention 
to a first problem with the AR theorists’ argument, namely that, although the 
“frequency effect” is generally taken to be fairly robust, the evidence collected from 
more recent studies on the influence of changing task formats is rather mixed. In fact, 
it now seems that the modification of the information format cannot be seen as a 
panacea. This was noted by Kahneman and Tversky, who point out that the AR 
theorists’ claim that cognitive illusions disappear ‘rests on a surprisingly selective 
reading of the evidence’ and that ‘systematic biases in judgments of frequency have 
been observed in numerous other studies’ (Kahneman and Tversky 1996, 584). In 
particular, while the “frequency effect” seems to be quite effective in reducing the 
base-rate fallacy, the conjunction fallacy seems to be a more robust bias. For 
example, an average of 85% conjunction violations in probability problems and 81% 
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in frequency problems were discovered by Jones, Jones and Frisch (1995), who 
suggest that ‘perhaps the effect of rewording problems in terms of frequencies is not 
as robust as Gigerenzer originally suggested’ (1995, 113). Moreover, Mellers, 
Hertwig and Kahneman (2001) found that the frequency format eliminated the 
conjunction fallacy in only a minority of presented cases, viz. those without filler 
items and where ‘and are’ and ‘who are’ conjunction phrases were included (e.g. ‘of 
100 people, how many are bank tellers and are feminists?’). Further interesting 
findings were reported by Tentori, Bonini and Osherson (2004). The authors invited 
subjects to resolve different problems. One was the ‘Volleyball problem’:  
  
Professional Volleyball players have greatly changed in the course of the last 
decade. In particular, they have become younger yet taller. Women players in 
the first Italian division are on average taller than 1.80 m, ranging from 1.75 for 
some setters to more than 1.90 m for many spikers. Suppose we choose at 
random a female volleyball player from the Italian first division. Which do you 
think is the more probable?   
   
a) The woman is less than 21 years old (A)   
b) The woman is less than 21 years old and is taller than 1.77 m. (A & B)   
c) The woman is less than 21 years old and is not taller than 1.77 m. (A &    
¬B)   
 
Interestingly, Tentori, Bonini and Osherson (2004) presented also a version with 
frequencies: 
 
Suppose we choose at random 100 female volleyball players from the Italian 
first division. Which group do you think is the most numerous?  
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a) Women who are less than 21 years old (A) 
b) Women who are less than 21 years old and are taller than 1.77 m. (A & B)  
c) Women who are less than 21 years old and are not taller than 1.77 m. (A 
& ¬B)   
 
What is particularly interesting in this study is that in this problem (as well as in 
other problems presented to the subjects), Tentori, Bonini and Osherson (2004) did 
not find a statistically significant difference in the magnitude of the bias between the 
frequency and probability format of the task. More precisely, in the probability 
format, 73% of the tested subjects failed to choose the option (A), whereas with the 
frequency format 63% of the subjects failed.34 Interestingly, these results have been 
replicated and confirmed by Wedell and Moro (2008), who stress quite explicitly that 
‘shifting the focus from probabilities to frequencies did not significantly reduce 
conjunction errors’, although ‘it trended in that direction’ (Wedell and Moro, 2008, 
125). More recently, Erceg and Galic have also examined the occurrence of 
conjunction fallacies in Football betting and found that the use of the frequency-
based task format did not reduce this type of bias. In their own words, ‘the 
conjunction fallacy has proven to be resistant to the task format manipulation’ (2014, 
60).  
 
Recently, the case has been made that the impact of frequency formats seems to 
interact with other variables, such as the transparency of the logical relation between 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34!It seems interesting to note, though, that while in Hertwig and Gigerenzer (1999) subjects were 
asked to give a frequency estimate, in Tentori, Bonini and Osherson (2004) subjects were required to 
choose the group with the highest frequency. However, identifying the top frequency option seems to 
require the same type of comparative operations that are required for ranking.!
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conjunction and conjunct (Sloman et al. 2003) and the response mode (Hertwig and 
Chase 1998; Sloman et al. 2003). It has thus been suggested that the “frequency 
effect” previously reported is not due to the information type but to other variables 
instead. In light of this, one could speculate that in some contexts it might be 
possible to enable subjects to solve the task in both probabilities and frequency 
contexts by manipulating some variables. For instance, Girotto and Gonzalez (2001) 
examined subjects’ ability to judge posterior probability, reporting that subjects 
seemed to be able to make correct probability judgments in conditions in which they 
could easily represent all the pieces of information in the same set of possibilities.35 
The study by Sloman et al. (2003) is more relevant to our present discussion. 
Interestingly, researchers in this study examined the impact of different variables on 
violations of the conjunction rule, reporting better performance when filler items 
were introduced and when subjects were asked to rate instead of ranking.  
 
The issues I have touched upon here are important but intricate, and they point to 
open empirical questions about the nature and scope of the so-called “frequency 
effect”. I will not discuss these issues any further, but I would nevertheless like to 
make a quite general point: as already clarified by Kahneman and Tversky (1996), 
conditions exist under which the correct answer is made more transparent. However, 
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35 It is interesting to note, however, that!Girotto and Gonzalez (2001) introduced a representation in 
terms of number of chances as a way of translating natural frequencies into a language that looks like 
single-event probabilities. Their method has been the target of criticism, though. For example, 
consider the words of Hoffrage, Gigerenzer, Krauss and Martignon (2002), who point out that ‘it is 
confusing that number of chances are called probabilities throughout the paper, because unlike 




this does not mean that the biases are not robust. In particular, with regard to the 
conjunction fallacy, the contexts in which it occurs are rather numerous. Conjunction 
errors have been documented with various kinds of subjects, such as children (Fisk 
and Slattery 2005), students enrolled in different kinds of programs, and statistically 
sophisticated individuals (Tversky and Kahneman 1983). Furthermore, they appear 
in several different tasks, such as choice (Tentori et al. 2004; Wedell and Moro 
2008), ranking (Kahneman and Tversky 1983; Sloman et al. 2003), betting on events 
(Bonini et al. 2004), and in different estimation procedures (Wedell and Moro 2008; 
Nilsson and Anderson 2010). What seems important for the purpose of my reply is 
that the findings previously discussed show that, in a number of contexts, subjects 
seem to be prone to conjunction fallacies in both contexts (namely, under the 
frequency format condition and the single-event condition), resulting in problems for 
the external validity argument suggested by AR theorists. Further research is needed 
if we are to reach a conclusive verdict on the issue. But since AR theorists’ claims 
about the robustness of the effect rest on an open empirical issue, their validity 
cannot be taken for granted.36  
 
4. Are the formats representative of the real world? 
 
Having shown that key biases discussed in MBR do seem to be generalizable, I 
would now like to discuss a second important problem with the AR theorists’ 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 In addition, a remark is in order here: the discovery of even significantly different performance in 
the two conditions is not sufficient to support the claim that cognitive illusions ‘disappear’ 
(Gigerenzer 1991). Specifically, it is hard to concede that biases ‘disappear’, as long as one person out 
of three still tends to commit such biases.   
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argument. In fact, even if the “frequency effect” were as robust as AR theorists 
claim, it would still be possible to reject the implications of their argument. 
Specifically, there is another important reason why the AR theorists’ argument does 
not seem to be as compelling as its advocates suppose. In particular, for the argument 
to go through, AR theorists need to show that single probabilities are not 
representative of the real world, while natural frequencies are. But this is 
problematic, or so I contend.  
 
AR theorists do not even try to provide support for the claim that only natural 
frequencies formats are representative of the real world, as they seem to take this to 
be quite obviously the case. However, the charge that single probability formats are 
unrealistic seems difficult to hold. One author who has criticized this assumption 
most clearly is cognitive psychologist Keith Stanovich, who has researched 
judgement and decision-making in the heuristics-and-biases tradition. On 
Stanovich’s view, much of what we currently know about the world does not come 
from our perception of actual events, but rather from abstract information processed 
and condensed into symbolic codes such as probabilities, percentages, tables and 
graphs. He states explicitly that: 
 
Banks, insurance companies, medical personnel, and many other institutions of 
modern society are still exchanging information using linguistic terms like 
probability and applying that term to singular events. (2004, 136) 
 
Stanovich’s point seems correct: we do often encounter information expressed in 
! 65 
terms of single probabilities. The medical domain is certainly a case in point. For 
example, people are typically informed about the probability that someone will 
develop a disease given a positive test using single probabilities. It seems hard to 
deny that, at least to a significant extent, single probabilities are part of our “real 
world”.37   
 
It is also worth mentioning, however, that for AR theorists the view that 
probability formats are unrepresentative of realistic environments does not seem to 
be viable. This comes out quite clearly when we notice that, according to AR 
theorists, single-event probabilities are not an effective way of communicating 
statistical information: AR theorists have blamed statistical innumeracy for human 
error, suggesting an ameliorative project to improve statistical reasoning by replacing 
problems formulated in terms of probability with problems in terms of frequencies. 
According to AR scholars, single-event probabilities can create significant problems 
when they are, for example, used by medical organizations to communicate the risks 
of some treatments (Gigerenzer 2002) or by an expert witness required to explain 
DNA evidence in court (Koehler 1996). As such, the AR theorists’ proposal is to 
replace probability problems with frequency problems, suggesting that doing so will 
foster statistical reasoning and help us avoid many errors.38  However, since AR 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 Some scholars have complained that the notion of “real world” is rather obscure. For instance, 
Hammond writes that ‘Gigerenzer and Todd spoil their discussion of ecological rationality by using 
the journalistic term “real world” in place of a meaningful theoretical term describing the ecology, or 
the environment’ (2007, 220). Here I will preserve AR theorists’ use of the term “real world”, 
acknowledging, however, that this is by no means fine-grained. 
38 Curiously, Lee claims that, while ‘the heuristics-and-biases project identifies the tasks in which 
human reasoning needs to be improved’, AR scholars ‘identify the conditions that actually improve 
and debias judgments’ (2008, 64). This presentation seems misleading, since Richard Thaler and other 
scholars within the heuristics-and-biases framework have suggested a list of de-biasing methods (e.g. 
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theorists stress the importance of translating probability formats into frequency 
formats, an implicit rationale must be that in real-life situations people have to cope 
with probability formats: indeed, if subjects did not cope with probability formats an 
ameliorative project would not be needed. Therefore, probability problems are 
representative of the environment after all, and their claim that the probability format 
is not a feature of the environment is not feasible for AR.  Here I am simply pointing 
to an inconsistency in the AR project, and this is an ad hominem argument: they 
cannot hold both that MBR designs are unrepresentative and that extensive de-
biasing is required.39  
 
5. Into the wild: in search of field data 
 
Thus far, I have shown that the “frequency effect” is not as robust as AR theorists 
suppose and that there are reasons to consider single probability formats as 
representative of the “real world”. In this final section, I will stress instead that, in 
order to address AR theorists’ concerns, other evidence ought to be analysed, which 
has so far been overlooked by AR theorists. Specifically, my third line of reply runs 
as follows: while it is true that MBR has grown in the lab!so to speak!researchers 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Thaler and Sunstein 2008). Yet, for some discussion of possible differences between the approaches 
towards de-biasing offered by AR theorists and those by scholars in the heuristics-and-biases 
tradition, see Grüne Yanoff and Hertwig (forthcoming).!
39 Before considering a third and last line of criticism of the AR theorists’ argument, I would like to 
stress that there are other interesting directions of research on the mitigation of biases that I cannot 
discuss here. For instance, for a study on the effect of reputation concerns on biases see Devetag et al. 
(2013). In particular, however, recent research on group decision-making seems to suggest that groups 
are more likely to make decisions that follow the norms of SPR, while individuals alone are more 
likely to be influenced by biases (Charness and Sutter 2012). However, I believe that the reply I have 
articulated in this section might be applied to such arguments as well: if someone were to stress that 
people’s reasoning improves when they reason in groups, we could reply that many important 
decisions are still individual, such that the research has only limited relevance. 
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have also found evidence of people’s irrationality outside the lab. In particular, field 
experiments are investigations carried out in natural environments, rather than in 
laboratories: evidence coming from these experiments might be useful in assessing 
whether biases do actually occur in the real world. 40  
 
Here it should be noticed that the label “field experiment” is better understood as 
an umbrella term that includes different situations. For example, Harrison and List 
(2004) suggest a taxonomy of experiments that is useful for appreciating the variety 
of studies that come under the label “field experiment”. While “artefactual 
experiments” differ from laboratory experiments only in that they deploy non-
standard subjects, “framed field experiments” do incorporate important elements of 
the naturally occurring environment as well. However, the most interesting situations 
are connected to “natural experiments”, in which subjects naturally undertake certain 
tasks and do not know that they are participating in an experiment.  
 
It is important to stress, here, that even seminal studies in MBR have appealed to 
field experiments. To appreciate this, consider that Tversky and Kahneman (1983) 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 It is true, on the one hand, that field experiments are not necessarily representative of frequent 
situations. Consider, for instance, Blavatskyy and Pogrebna’s (2010) field experiment, which was 
based on the television show Deal or No Deal, where a contestant is endowed with a sealed box 
containing a monetary prize between one cent and half a million euros. In the course of the show, the 
contestant is offered the chance to exchange her box for another sealed box with the same distribution 
of possible monetary prizes inside. This scenario offers a unique natural experiment for studying 
endowment effects under high monetary incentives, where such effects refer to people’s tendency to 
set a significantly higher value for an object if they actually own it than they would if they did not 
own it (Thaler, 1980). But contexts like these might bear only little resemblance to those we 
experience on a daily basis. This is a point that we should not ignore. At the same time, it is also true 
that, generally speaking, field experiments seem to offer powerful and privileged tools for the 
investigation of people’s behaviour in the real world.  
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themselves combined laboratory data and field data in their seminal work, examining 
for example the intuitions of expert physicians. Remarkably, the evidence provided 
suggests an occurrence of conjunction fallacies in natural settings as well. Tversky 
and Kahneman asked practicing physicians to make predictions on the basis of some 
clinical evidence. Subjects were given problems of the following type:   
   
A 55-year-old woman had pulmonary embolism documented angiographically, 
10 days after cholecystectomy. Please rank in order the following in terms of 
the probability that they will be among the conditions experienced by the 
patient (use 1 for the most likely and 6 for the least likely). Naturally, the 
patient could experience more than one of these conditions.   
   
dyspnea and hemiparesis (A&B)   
syncope and tachycardia   
calf pain   
hemiparesis (B)   
pleuritic chestpain   
hemoptysis   
   
What is interesting to note is that physicians appeared prone to make reasoning 
errors. Specifically, dyspnea was considered by the physicians to be representative of 
the patient’s condition, whereas hemiparesis was judged as very atypical. The 
conjunction of an unlikely symptom with a likely one was thought to be more likely 
than the less probable constituent. Therefore, this finding bears on the question of 
whether people are prone to commit biases in the real world: it presents evidence that 
the conjunction fallacy occurs not only in the laboratory, but in the field as well. 
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Still, an objector might argue at this point that the greatest problem with the 
abovementioned example is not whether it is presented in terms of probabilities, 
frequencies, or rank ordering; the problem is that the entire task of ranking 
propositions in terms of likelihood is highly artificial: medical doctors are normally 
not incentivized to state the most likely event, for then in practice they would always 
have to say ‘I do not know’. They are compensated, in terms of pride and reputation, 
as well as in a more material sense, for “getting it right”, and they therefore try to say 
more than they need to in this experiment. A number of comments can be made here. 
In offering this reply, the objector is moving away from the AR theorists’ original 
formulation of the argument, as the objector would no longer be focusing the attack 
on the contrast between single probabilities and natural frequencies. That said, we 
could also offer a rather general reply at this point. Specifically, it should be noted 
that we have recently seen a general trend in the study of judgement and decision-
making towards studying cognition and behaviour “in the wild”, and this evidence 
seems less vulnerable to criticism than Tversky and Kahneman’s seminal work. 
Interestingly, field experiments have gained momentum particularly in experimental 
economics, a field of research criticized since its birth with the claim that its findings 
cannot be applied beyond the laboratory context. Essentially, it is often insisted that, 
whereas laboratory experiments may allow for a relatively large amount of control, 
thus providing a high degree of internal validity, they nonetheless yield a relatively 
low external validity. In fact, it has recently become commonplace to complement 
laboratory data with data gathered via field experiments (List 2008), achieving a 
combination of control and realism that is not usually achieved in the laboratory 
(Camerer 2000; Levitt and List 2009). Data from field experiments are thus taken to 
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be particularly interesting and informative of behaviour in the real world.  
 
To give an example of what this research in the wild might offer, consider recent 
findings on framing effects. Most studies on framing effects describe logically 
equivalent decision situations in either a positive or a negative light. The Asian 
Disease Problem presented in the previous chapter and (originally presented by 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981)) is a well-known example. Describing a choice 
between medical programs in terms of lives to be saved or lives to be lost leads to 
dramatically different answers, although the problems seem to be logically 
equivalent.41 Just to mention an example, consider that Gächter et al. (2009) tested 
for the existence of framing effects within a natural field experiment and found 
framing effects among junior economists, but not among senior ones. In particular, 
the authors tested scholars’ behaviour and vulnerability to bias when registering for a 
conference. In general, it seems that many findings suggesting human irrationality 
that have been reported in MBR have found or are currently gaining further support 
from field data.  Thus, it seems that interesting evidence is available to support the 
claim that biases do not only occur in the lab, since people violate norms of SPR in 
the real world as well. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41 While here we are not questioning that framing effects are instances of irrational behaviour, it is 
interesting to note that framing effects in decision-making have been claimed to be normatively 
defensible both in the economic and psychological literature (e.g., Bourgeois-Gironde and Giraud 
2009; McKenzie 2004; Mandel 2014) and in the philosophical literature (Schick 1991; see also 






In summary, this chapter has discussed and assessed the argument against the 
external validity of findings from MBR that has been put forth by AR theorists. 
According to AR theorists, many effects identified by researchers in MBR should not 
be considered genuine reasoning biases but rather the result of using experimental 
settings that are unrepresentative of the real world. This chapter took these 
reservations seriously and showed that they can be countered. Specifically, I have 
presented three main reasons for believing that this objection is somewhat 
exaggerated. First, contrary to what is claimed by AR theorists, in several cases 
frequency formats do not make biases disappear. Second, single probability formats 
are representative of the “real world”. Third, evidence of violations of the norms of 
SPR comes from field experiments as well, and thus seems to be less vulnerable to 
AR theorists’ concerns than AR theorists believe. Of course, this does not 
automatically license pessimistic conclusions about human rationality. It merely 
means that the AR theorists’ external validity argument cannot be exploited in order 
to justify more optimistic interpretations, and that support must be found elsewhere. 
In demonstrating this, this chapter provides only indirect support for the views 





Chapter 2: Evolution and irrationality 
 
The conclusion of the previous chapter was that people do seem to be prone to 
committing biases in the real world. One might claim, however, that this conclusion 
is at odds with evolutionary considerations: evolutionary pressures would have 
rendered these behaviours extinct if they happened in the real world. In particular, a 
number of scholars have appealed to an evolutionary argument for people’s 
rationality (henceforth EAR), according to which we have good (evolutionary) 
reasons to believe that people’s reasoning is not inaccurate, after all. The goal of this 
chapter is to show that the conclusion of Chapter 1 is not necessarily at odds with 
evolutionary considerations, and that such conclusion can, at least provisionally, be 
accepted. 
 
1. The evolutionary argument against MBR  
 
As we have seen in the introductory chapter, as well as in the chapter above, there is 
an imposing body of evidence suggesting the existence of widespread and systematic 
errors in reasoning and decision-making. This evidence seemingly shows that human 
beings are far from optimally rational. But a number of scholars have tried to oppose 
this view by appealing to evolutionary considerations. This should come as no 
surprise: it is now frequently claimed that by appealing to evolutionary theory we 
can push forward our understanding of key issues in the philosophy of social and 
cognitive sciences (e.g., Prinz and Barsalou 2000; Shapiro 2010; Schulz 2011b). 
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Unsurprisingly, evolutionary considerations have been offered in the attempt to 
better understand rational behaviour and cognition as well.  
 
In particular, here I will focus on what I dub the “evolutionary argument for 
rationality” (henceforth, EAR). According to this popular argument, if organisms 
reasoned and made decisions inaccurately, then they would have failed to navigate 
the world successfully and thus would not have evolved. Therefore, reasoning errors 
cannot be as widespread as psychologists in MBR have supposed. EAR has been 
associated with several philosophers, the most prominent of which are Quine and 
Dennett. For instance, Dennett claims that ‘natural selection guarantees that most of 
an organism’s beliefs will be true’ (1987, 75). However, it is possible to find similar 
points also in older literature on evolutionary epistemology. For example, Simpson 
pointed out that ‘the monkey who did not have a realistic perception of the tree 
branch he jumped for was soon a dead monkey!and therefore did not become one 
of our ancestors’ (1963, 84).  
 
 
These considerations are still debated in philosophical discussions (e.g., Boudry 
and Vlerick 2014; Boudry, Vlerick and McKay 2015; Hazlett 2013; Rysiew 2008; 
Sage 2004), but Stich (1990) and Stein (1996) were the first to carefully reconstruct 
and assess this argument. For instance, Stein (1996) presented EAR as one of the 
main arguments in support of the claim that reasoning experiments cannot 
demonstrate people’s irrationality. While there are different ways to formalize the 
argument, EAR might be summarized in the following way:  
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(1) Natural selection is the key factor driving evolution.  
(2) Natural selection favours traits that increase an organism’s inclusive 
fitness. 
(3) It is more conducive to inclusive fitness to possess accurate reasoning. 
(4) Hence, natural selection favours accurate over inaccurate reasoning. 
(5) Hence, evolution grants that we possess accurate reasoning. 
 
The problem, then, is that in virtue of (5) we now seem to face a conflict between the 
evidence collected in MBR and evolutionary theorizing. On the one hand, 
psychologists in MBR tell us that our reasoning is seriously flawed. On the other 
hand, EAR suggests that our reasoning cannot be inaccurate. There thus seems to be 
a puzzling contrast between evolutionary and psychological considerations. The 
conflict between these perspectives is expressed well by Martie Haselton and her co-
workers, who write that: 
 
The general tendency in psychology is to interpret the supposedly incorrect 
judgment or reasoning as a genuine error or flaw in the mind. […] From an 
evolutionary perspective, however, it would be surprising if the mind were 
really so woefully muddled. (2009, 734) 
 
The existence of this conflict seems be especially problematic for researchers in 
MBR. This comes out quite clearly once you consider that evolutionary theory is 
ubiquitous in the academic as well as in the popular press, and that several areas of 
inquiry have witnessed an especially vigorous degree of “evolutionary 
encroachment”. In fact, allegiance to Darwinism has become a sort of litmus test for 
deciding who does and who does not hold a properly scientific worldview. In light of 
these considerations, dropping a commitment to evolutionary theorizing would seem 




2. Assessing EAR 
 
Prima facie, EAR looks quite plausible. However, commentators in the “rationality 
debate” have often tried to question its premises. For instance, after having 
reconstructed the argument, Stich explicitly takes the side of MBR psychologists, 
claiming that ‘we are safe to assume that the existence of substantial irrationality is 
not threatened by anything that evolutionary biology has discovered’ (1990, 70).  
 
In particular, commentators such as Stich (1990) and Stein (1996) have contended 
that the premises of the argument are not in line with what we know in (and from) 
evolutionary biology. The idea, more precisely, is that EAR relies on an out-dated or 
inaccurate view of evolutionary theory. For instance, consider premise 1: there seem 
to be processes other than natural selection that are well known and discussed in the 
literature. Notably, Gregory Gibson in a book review of Wagner’s Robustness and 
evolvability in living systems (2005) wrote that the book contributes ‘significantly to 
the emerging view that natural selection is just one, and maybe not even the most 
fundamental, source of biological order’ (2005, 237). Importantly, it is now widely 
acknowledged that factors like mutations and drift might have played a significant 
role in the evolution of traits and thus need be taken into account.  
 
Moreover, consider premise 2: can natural selection favour traits that increase an 
organism’s inclusive fitness? There are several problems with the view that evolution 
results in systems that are optimally designed. This comes out quite clearly when we 
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consider that optimal systems may have never been available. Because of this, 
appealing to the adaptive value of a system does not guarantee that this system has 
evolved. For instance, in the words of Stein, ‘if truth-tropic mechanisms are not, in 
general, available, then natural selection will not be able to produce a significant 
percentage of them’ (1996, 198).  
 
With regard to these considerations about the availability of traits, it is important 
to note that these concerns are not at all untethered, as we can see by considering the 
literature on evolutionary biology and its focus on developmental constraints and 
pleiotropic effects. The concept of developmental constraint refers to a ‘bias on the 
production of variant phenotypes caused by the structure, character, composition, or 
dynamics of the developmental system’ (Maynard-Smith et al. 1985, 266). 
Interestingly, because of these developmental constraints, some variant phenotypes 
cannot be generated and thus are not available, even if they would have been 
strongly favoured by natural selection had they arisen. Minelli (2009) provides an 
interesting example to illustrate the abovementioned availability problem. Many 
centipede species of the genus Scolopendra have 21 segments, and many others have 
23, but never has even a single individual with 22 segments been observed in any 
species. He views this general phenomenon of phenotypes with “borders” as pointing 
to developmental rules or laws. Understanding the rules!that is, the developmental 
mechanics!will enable an understanding of the evolutionary basis for the observed 
differences and discontinuities in animal forms. Minelli proposes an analogy to the 
rules of chess: a knight can reach only certain squares by moving from its current 
position!and these moves are the variation upon which natural selection can act. 
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This quite nicely demonstrates the nature of the abovementioned availability 
problem. 
 
We should also consider the phenomenon of pleiotropy, in which one gene affects 
two or more distinct traits or systems. It might happen that a gene has positive effects 
on one system, but negative effects on another. Using a well-known example 
discussed also by Stich (1990, 65), let us consider the genes of albinism in arctic 
animals. The white coats for which these genes are responsible are adaptive. At the 
same time, since the genes are taken to be responsible for serious eye problems, 
albino animals do not see as well as their coloured conspecifics. The optimal genes 
would then provide albinism without bad eyes. But apparently this has never been an 
option that natural selection could select.  
 
This should be enough to show that premises 1 and 2 are currently considered 
problematic by many evolutionary biologists. But this this does not mean that 
presenting considerations about the adaptive value of a trait cannot have any 
evidential significance at all. In fact, it can still be argued that establishing the 
adaptive importance of a trait provides some evidence of its evolution and existence 
(even though that evidence is clearly not conclusive). Moreover, it is worth noting 
that the abovementioned criticisms of premises 1 and 2 do not necessarily entail a 
departure from Darwin’s theory of evolution. Specifically, while some authors do 
believe that the inclusion of factors other than natural selection (such as drift and 
developmental constraints) in the study of evolution is incompatible with Darwinian 
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approaches (e.g., Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini 2010)42 , many others are more 
cautious (e.g., Minelli 2010), and others still refer to an “extended synthesis” 
(Pigliucci and Müller 2010) that encompasses several different factors. For instance, 
considering the relationship between developmental constraints and evolutionary 
theory, Sterelny claims that ‘no very revolutionary shift is needed to incorporate 
developmental insights into an evolutionary perspective’ (2000, 371). While these 
discussions are clearly important, what is most important for the purpose of this 
analysis is just to state that the first two premises are considered problematic in light 
of what we know from current evolutionary biology. It goes beyond the scope of this 
work to analyse the compatibility of this view with Darwinianism.  
 
But there is another important point to discuss here. Notably, commentators in the 
“rationality debate” have generally considered premise 3 to be particularly 
problematic, which ultimately prevents EAR from being successful. Specifically, 
scholars emphasize that it is controversial whether the sort of reasoning and decision-
making that maximizes the survival of the reasoner is that which best approximates 
reality (cf. Stich 1990; Stein 1996; Sage 2004). In attempts to debunk EAR, 
commentators have generally tried to make the point that inaccuracy might pay in 
evolutionary terms. In particular, Stich (1990) described potential cases of cognitive 
processes that, while adaptive, might generate false beliefs. The “Garcia effect” is a 
case in point. In a famous experiment (Garcia, McGowan and Green 1972), sickness 
was induced in rats by exposing them to radiation, after they had eaten distinctively 
flavoured food pellets. These rats then manifested a strong disposition not to eat food 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 For some criticisms of Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini’s (2010) arguments, see, e.g., Pigliucci 2010; 
Futuyma 2010; Sober 2010, Diez and Lorenzano 2013 and Fulda 2015. 
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of that flavour, a disposition not to be found in rats that also ate those food pellets but 
were not exposed to radiation. However, these rats did not manifest a disposition not 
to eat food pellets of the same size and shape as those that they had eaten before they 
were made ill. Thus it seems that these rats associated food-related illness with the 
flavour of food, and not with its size or shape. These results suggest the following 
interpretation: these rats’ cognitive faculties are at least less than perfectly reliable 
because, in this instance, they produced the false belief that food with such-and-such 
a flavour is poisonous. The rats are inferring from the fact that they got sick after 
eating food of such-and-such a flavour that they will get sick again if they eat food of 
the same flavour. The fact that rat cognition is inaccurate in this way does not entail 
that rat cognition does not offer an evolutionary advantage, though. Stich points out 
that: 
 
Strategies of inference that do a good job at generating truths and avoiding 
falsehoods may be expensive in terms of time, effort, and cognitive hardware. 
[N]atural selection might well select a less reliable inferential system over a 
more reliable one because the less reliable one has a higher level of … fitness. 
(1990, 61). 
 
Importantly, it seems that two factors are notable in the case of Garcia’s rats: the cost 
of false negatives, i.e., the risk of illness and death that comes from false negatives 
(Stich 1990, 62), and the cost of less fallible cognition, i.e., the ‘time, effort, and 
cognitive hardware’ (61) that would be required to maintain more reliable cognitive 
faculties. Thus we can speculate that rat cognition evolved in response to selection 
pressures and that these faculties involved in the rats’ inaccurate conclusions are not 
only inaccurate, but also that being inaccurate, in the way they are inaccurate, makes 
these inaccurate faculties adaptive. 
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Unsurprisingly, in light of the discussion above, commentators in the “rationality 
debate” have typically considered EAR to be unconvincing (cf. Stich 1990; Stein 
1996), because the premises of the argument neglect crucial facts about the evolution 
of human reasoning. In particular, the critical discussions of EAR offered by Stich 
and Stein are generally taken to conclusively show that it suffers from serious flaws 
and that the apparent conflict between EAR and MBR should be resolved by denying 
the conclusions of EAR. It is also worth noting that a number of evolutionary 
behavioural scientists have recently begun to provide further support to the 
conclusions drawn by Stein and Stich, showing that!and how!inaccuracy might be 
adaptive. A look at the literature suggests the existence of clusters of adaptive 
misbeliefs, systematic adaptive misbeliefs, and evolutionary tradeoffs. 
 
In particular, evolutionary psychologists have attempted to identify cognitive 
faculties that might be adaptive and yet systematically generate inaccurate beliefs. 
For example, in the past decade Martie Haselton and colleagues have developed a 
mathematical theory dubbed “error management theory” (Haselton and Buss 2000). 
These authors argued that, in certain domains, such as representing certain aspects of 
the visual world, reasonable accuracy is adaptive, whereas in others it might be 
adaptive to systematically misrepresent the world. Biases may be directed by trade-
offs in error costs. In particular, Haselton and Buss (2000) attempted to document the 
existence of some error-management effects. For instance, it has been reported that 
during brief cross-sex interaction men tend to rate women’s sexual interest more 
highly than the women themselves did. Haselton and Buss suggested that this could 
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be due to an evolved sexual over-perception bias in men. They hypothesized that the 
fitness costs of underestimating a woman’s sexual interest and hence missing a 
sexual opportunity were higher on average than the costs of overestimating her 
interest and spending time and effort in useless courtship. The same asymmetry does 
not hold for women’s estimation of men’s interest, because of women’s selectiveness 
in mate choice (Trivers 1972) and men’s willingness to engage in sex. This is just an 
example of the effects that evolutionary behavioural scientists have described. 
Nevertheless, what this suggests is that it is not at all implausible to accept that 
inaccurate reasoning and decision-making might be evolutionarily adaptive. 
 
To be sure, an objector might argue at this point that we should not be too quick 
in drawing such conclusions. In fact, some scholars have stressed that it is crucial to 
explore in detail the range of circumstances in which natural selection might favour 
rational judgement and decision-making. For instance, Stephens argues that: 
 
Neither the proponents nor the sceptics have spent much time examining 
detailed models exploring the conditions under which evolution by natural 
selection would favour various kinds of beliefs and desire formation policies. 
Philosophers have typically answered the question about whether natural 
selection favours rational beliefs in a yes-or-no fashion. My contention is that 
this debate has been pursued at too abstract a level of analysis. (2000, 162) 
 
To be sure, there is some truth in Stephens’s remark, as it is important to quantify 
and qualify the claim that natural selection might result in inaccurate behaviour. As 
Stephens points out, more work is needed to establish and clarify the range of 
circumstances under which evolution might favour false beliefs. At the same time, it 
does not seem that this invalidates the point made before: commentators such as 
Stich (1990) and Stein (1996) seem to be right in claiming that EAR is controversial, 
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and the evidence and arguments provided so far suggest that it is at least possible that 
evolution might lead to the possession of reasoning systems that are inaccurate.  
 
3. Assessing the relevance of EAR 
 
So, one might take the outcome of the analysis presented above to support Stich’s 
contention that ‘we are safe to assume that the existence of substantial irrationality is 
not threatened by anything that evolutionary biology has discovered’ (1990, 70). 
However, I would recommend being careful in drawing this conclusion. The reason 
why I suspect that Stich’s claim is, after all, problematic, is that there is a trend in the 
literature to run together quite different kinds of phenomena and explananda. This, I 
think, is an even more serious problem than the one raised by Stephens and discussed 
at the end of the previous section. 
 
Let me explain in detail the nature of the problem I am referring to. On the one 
hand, when Stich refers to psychological findings presented in MBR, he refers to 
behaviour that seems to violate the norms of SPR. In doing so, he is not alone: as we 
have seen, it is quite common to take biases as instances of behaviour that violates 
the norms of SPR. According to standard interpretations of MBR, what the relevant 
psychological findings suggest is that people are prone to violating those norms.  
 
To remind ourselves of what violations of SPR might look like, it is worth 
considering, here again, a well-known instance of irrational behaviour coming from 
MBR, namely the violation of the axiom of descriptive invariance. McNeil et al. 
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(1982) confronted subjects with two problems concerning choices in therapy against 
cancer. Each time subjects were presented with a choice between surgery and 
radiation. But whereas the first problem was framed in terms of survival rates, the 
second problem was framed in terms of mortality rates. In Problem 1, the following 
information was given: (A) of 100 people having surgery, 90 live through the post-
operative period, 68 are alive after one year, and 34 are alive after five years; (B) of 
100 people having radiation therapy, all live through the treatment, 77 are alive after 
one year, and 22 are alive after five years. In Problem 2, the data were the following: 
(A) of 100 people having surgery, 10 die during surgery or during the post-operative 
period, 32 die after one year, and 66 die after five years; (B) of 100 people having 
radiation therapy, none die during treatment, 23 die after one year, and 78 die after 
five years. These two problems seem to contain the same information, but they frame 
it differently. In violation of the invariance principle, this difference in formulation 
has important consequences: whereas only 18% of the respondents choose the 
radiation therapy in Problem 1, 44% choose it in Problem 2. This is a clear example 
of the framing effects discussed in previous chapters. In MBR, violations of the 
axiom of descriptive invariance have been taken to represent instances of biased and 
irrational behaviour. Notably, what Stich (1990), Stein (1996), and other 
commentators have in mind when presenting key findings from MBR seem to be 
effects like framing effects, conjunction fallacies and the like. 
 
On the other hand, it seems that a different criterion of accuracy is involved in 
discussions about EAR. More precisely, EAR seems to define accurate reasoning by 
appealing to the criterion of empirical accuracy: what defines and constitutes “good” 
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reasoning is whether people’s beliefs represent the world accurately, and irrationality 
is thus identified with the possession of false beliefs. If I am right about this, and 
EAR is not crucially defined by appeal to the norms of SPR, it then seems to follow 
that the conclusions of EAR might not be directly relevant when it comes to 
assessing the compatibility of evolutionary considerations with the conclusions 
drawn in MBR. If researchers want to attack the conclusions of MBR using 
evolutionary considerations, then they should make sure that they are working with 
the same concepts of accuracy and rationality.  
 
4. A new evolutionary argument?  
 
Let us take stock of what we have shown so far. We have accomplished two main 
tasks. First, it has been shown that, contrary to the claims of advocates of EAR, 
evolutionary considerations do not guarantee that people’s reasoning is accurate. 
Second, it has been argued that the psychological findings from MBR that are 
commonly mentioned by commentators on EAR do not seem to involve the same 
criteria of accuracy used in EAR. As a result, supporters of EAR should be careful 
when applying the conclusions of EAR to an assessment of the conclusions of MBR, 
even if EAR turned out to be convincing.  
 
One might wonder, at this point, whether there might not be a new evolutionary 
argument against the conclusions of MBR that, instead of relying on the criterion of 
empirical accuracy, appeals to the norms of SPR. In fact, it might even be argued that 
some scholars sometimes associated with EAR had such picture in mind when they 
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expressed their evolutionary ideas about the possibility of irrational behaviour. For 
instance, Fodor seemed to have such norms in mind when he pointed out that 
‘Darwinian selection guarantees that organisms either know the elements of logic or 
become posthumous’ (1981, 121). It is also worth noting that other theorists in the 
literature have expressed similar considerations. For example, it has been argued that 
evolution results in rational choice as summarized by the laws of logical thought 
(Cooper 2003).  
 
At the same time, a number of authors have recently tried to dismantle this 
approach and to offer instead evolutionary considerations not to oppose, but rather to 
account for the existence of violations of the norms of SPR. 43 It is interesting to note 
that AR theorists themselves are among the scholars who have pursued this avenue. 
For instance, Stevens claims that: 
 
The frequent labelling of behaviours as irrational, anomalies, or biases assumes 
a particular perspective on rational norms. … A broader, evolutionary 
perspective cautions against using these labels, emphasizing instead an 
understanding of the decision goals, selection pressures, and decision-making 
environment. … Natural selection does not favour coherence to rational norms, 
but increases fitness relative to others in the population. (2008, 295) 
 
As the reader can appreciate from this quote, according to AR theorists, evolutionary 
thinking does not necessarily conflict with the discovery of deviations from SPR in 
MBR. How is this possible? 
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43 It is worth mentioning that Cooper (1989) himself offers a discussion of why a probability-matching 
strategy might be fitness-optimizing. More precisely, he argued that ‘optimal fitness not only fails to 
imply behavior that is uniformly rational by classical standards, it logically entails the occurrence of 
behavior patterns that seem clearly irrational. Thus it is evolutionarily predictable that even perfectly 
adapted individuals may sometimes exhibit what could appear (classically) to be blatantly 
unreasonable behavior’ (1989, 479). In other words, Cooper tries to show the selective advantage of a 




In some cases, inaccuracy (defined here as a departure from the norms of SPR) 
might be directly advantageous. For instance, according to AR theorists, ‘in social 
situations […] it can be advantageous to exhibit inconsistent behaviour in order to 
maximize adaptive unpredictability and avoid capture and loss’ (Todd and 
Gigerenzer 2000, 737). For instance, natural selection may favour the evolution of 
counter-strategies that make an organism’s actions more difficult to predict, 
including innate randomization mechanisms that reduce the risk of consistent 
behaviour and predictability.  
 
These considerations might sound quite abstract. It is worth noting, however, that 
some support has recently come from research carried out, in particular, by Trivers 
(2011). According to Trivers, self-deception is supposed to produce incoherence, 
where the latter is defined as the mind holding contradictory beliefs. The goal of this 
form of incoherence is to outwit competitors; it thus serves an adaptive goal. It does 
so because the self-deceiver fails to give the cues that come with conscious 
deception, cues that the opponent may be able to pick up. According to Trivers, self-
deception makes it more difficult for competitors to detect the intention to deceive. 
Specifically, Trivers’s claim is that ‘self-deception evolves in the service of 
deception’ (2011, 4). The holding of contradicting beliefs (e.g., ‘I never lie’ and 
‘white lies are ok’) occurs largely unconsciously and helps one achieve the 
successful deception of others. Trivers’s (2011) theory might thus be able to account 
for the evolution of inconsistency between what we (honestly) believe we will do 
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and what we actually do. On Trivers’s view, the adaptive value of self-deception 
outweighs its costs.  
 
One might claim that the considerations offered by AR theorists (and supported 
by Trivers) help to shed light on at least some interesting psychological findings in 
MBR. In particular, in social psychology systematic discrepancies between what 
people say they will do and what they do are often labelled irrational biases. Notably, 
such an attitude-behaviour gap has been of intense interest to social psychologists for 
decades (e.g., Wicker 1969). What is of particular interest here is that AR theorists 
(and Trivers too) seem to appeal to different criteria of accurate reasoning than those 
defended by scholars commenting on EAR: while the former seem to be interested in 
whether evolution can lead to behaviour that departs from the norms of SPR, 
commentators interested in EAR have focused on whether evolution can lead to 
empirically inaccurate predictions. 
 
But other considerations in support of the evolution of behaviour that violates the 
norms of SPR can be offered, stressing, for instance, that following the norms of 
SPR might be expensive in terms of time, effort, and cognitive hardware. In 
particular, adhering to logical consistency might come at too high a biological cost, 
as checking for consistency among beliefs might be extremely demanding. Since the 
biological resources required to check for consistency among beliefs could be used in 
other ways to confer immediate benefit to the organism, it might follow that natural 
selection favours incoherent cognitive faculties.  
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In addition, strategies that violate SPR might evolve as a by-product of inferences 
that people follow in their decision-making. For example, AR theorist Gigerenzer 
(2000) describes a rule that he calls “minimalist”. When faced with options that 
differ in more than one dimension, an agent using the minimalist rule picks a 
dimension at random and then selects the option that ranks highest on the chosen 
dimension. This rule can result in intransitive choices, but it performs well when 
compared with rules that are more complex and that do not violate transitivity. But 
violations of transitivity can occur also when cues are used in a systematic order. In 
particular, in the strategy that Gigerenzer dubs “Take the Best,” each option has a 
value on each of several cues. For these cues, the values may be “present” (+), 
“absent” (−), or “don’t know”. When choices have to be made between two different 
options, these are first compared to cue 1. If one option has a + and the other has a −, 
then the one with the + is chosen. If cue 1 does not result in a decision, those 
following the procedure attempt to make a decision on the basis of cue 2, and so on 
until a decision is reached. There is evidence that using this strategy might lead to 
adaptive behaviour (cf. Gigerenzer 2000), and this might suggest that strategies that 
violate SPR but lead to accurate predictions might evolve.  
 
Considerations offered by other evolutionary behavioural scientists seem to 
support the case made by AR theorists and their claim that violations of the norms of 
SPR might be a by-product of evolutionarily adaptive behaviour. For instance, 
Houston et al. (2007a) suggested that violations of the axiom of transitivity could be 
a by-product of optimal foraging and result from an optimal state-dependent strategy 
that maximizes the animal’s probability of long-term survival. Foraging options 
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differ in terms of mean energetic intake and risk of predation: some are safer but 
provide only low energy intake; others promise a high yield but at considerable risk. 
Depending on its energy reserve and the necessity of choosing a higher intake option 
as an insurance against starvation, an animal will change its preferences between the 
foraging options: when the energy reserves are high the animal chooses options that 
are safe but have lower yield; when reserves are low, the animal should take risks to 
procure higher intake and to avoid starvation. In the real world of animals, the 
objective of being transitive may thus get into the way of trying to survive. Houston 
et al. (2007b) make a similar argument about intransitivity in humans, claiming that 
it has been mistakenly interpreted as a form of irrationality, and have identified 
environmental structures in which violations of transitivity are adaptive.44  
 
All in all, some considerations offered by AR theorists, as well as by other 
evolutionary behavioural scientists, might be used to account for the presence of 
violations of norms of SPR, rather than to oppose it. However, some important 
remarks are in order here.  
 
First, one might point out that there is something odd in the evolutionary 
considerations offered by AR theorists. On the one hand, as we saw in Chapter 1, AR 
theorists claim that biases ‘disappear’ in realistic contexts, and thus people do not 
seem to violate norms of SPR. On the other hand, their abovementioned evolutionary 
considerations suggest that violations of SPR might have been adaptive and thus 
evolved. One might clearly point out that AR theorists cannot have it both ways. If 
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44 For a recent review of these findings see, e.g., Fawcett et al. (2014).  
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pressed, AR theorists can probably refine their claims and say that they are of 
intermediate strength and therefore compatible. More precisely, they can reformulate 
these claims as saying that the occurrence of biases is not too frequent in the real 
world and that the existence of these biases can be accounted for from an 
evolutionary perspective. Here I will not engage in the detailed exegesis of AR 
theorists’ work that would be necessary to clarify whether such a move is available 
in light of their claims or stated commitments. We have already shown that biases do 
not disappear in the real world, and what is interesting to note here is that AR 
theorists’ appeal to evolutionary considerations in order to account for findings in 
MBR opens up new directions in the study of the links between evolution and 
rationality, suggesting ways to account for behaviour that violates SPR from an 
evolutionary perspective.  
 
Second, one might argue that such evolutionary considerations cannot really 
account for the occurrence of biases, as they are only sketchy and represent nothing 
more than speculations on the adaptive value of strategies that depart from the norms 
of SPR. To be sure, there are several important limitations in such evolutionary 
considerations: as we have argued in the previous sections, we need to be careful 
when drawing conclusions about the existence of traits from their alleged adaptive 
value. As it turns out, evolutionary behavioural scientists have often been charged 
with drawing unwarranted conclusions about the existence of traits from 
considerations about their potential adaptiveness, and with using an inappropriate 
methodology (but see Machery and Cohen 2012 for some critical discussion of these 
charges). This is an important caveat. But this should not prevent us from accepting 
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the rather modest conclusion that I seek to defend in this chapter. Specifically, what I 
want to show here is just that there are no obvious evolutionary reasons that 
undermine the conclusions drawn in MBR. In fact, as we have seen, evolutionary 
considerations have been presented in the literature not only to oppose, but also to 
account for the existence of behaviour that violates the norms of SPR. What I wish to 
conclude is that critics of MBR have not as yet offered a knockdown argument based 
on evolutionary considerations that can undermine the view that people are prone to 
biases. Until critics of MBR come up with a clearer and stronger argument based on 
evolutionary considerations, it is not unreasonable to accept the conclusions of MBR, 
defended in Chapter 1, suggesting that people are guilty of systematic biases. This, 
however, is but a provisory conclusion, and I suggest that more work should be 
undertaken on these topics.45  
 
5. Does this speak against MBR, then? 
 
One might still reply, however, that here I am missing a crucial point, and that I am 
simply misunderstanding the relevance of these evolutionary considerations. An 
objector might in fact ask the following question: if strategies that violate then norms 
of SPR were shown to have evolved because they were adaptive, would not this still 
count as evidence against MBR? After all, one might be tempted to follow Davis 
Sloan Wilson, who points out that: 
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45 I will come back to the claims I make in this chapter. In particular, in Chapter 6 I discuss whether 
research on individual differences in judgement and decision-making is at odds with an adaptationist 
perspective. Moreover, in chapter 7 I will question the idea that biases are best characterized as 
violations of the norms of SPR.  
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Rationality is not the gold standard against which all other forms are to be 
judged. Adaptation is the gold standard against which rationality must be 
judged, along with all other forms of thought. (2002, 228) 
 
There seems to be some tension here. On the one hand, as we have seen in the 
previous sections, one could take the view that evolution might favour violations of 
SPR as evidence supporting the conclusions of MBR that we presented in Chapter 1: 
what these evolutionary considerations suggest is that it is not at all inconceivable 
that biases occur in the “real world”, contrary to what some critics of MBR suggest. 
But one might also take these evolutionary considerations as evidence against the 
conclusions of MBR: on this view, showing that behaviour that departs from SPR is 
evolutionarily adaptive speaks against the normative force of those norms of 
rationality.  
 
Wilson’s quote is representative of a trend: there are a number of scholars who 
take evolutionary arguments to have far-reaching normative implications. For 
instance, a clear expression of this approach has been offered by Cooper, who 
believes that, since tenets of SPR and evolution can be shown to pull in opposite 
directions, ‘the traditional theory of rational choice is invalid as it stands, and in need 
of biological repair’ (1989, 479). This is a bold claim and the question that arises at 
this point is whether considerations about the adaptive value of behaviour that 
departs from SPR speak against the normative force of the latter. Careful analysis is 
needed here. In fact, while there are indeed scholars who take evolutionary 
arguments to have far-reaching normative implications, other theorists have issued 
warnings against deriving such normative conclusions. Take, as an illustration, 
Gilboa, Postlewaite and Schmeidler, who claim that ‘evolutionary arguments cannot 
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serve as definitions of rationality per se’ and that ‘it is when one confronts novel 
situations […] that the evolutionary arguments appear the weakest’ (2012, 27). These 
are important points.  
 
First, whether evolutionary considerations bear on the validity of norms of SPR 
seems to depend on how we define rational behaviour and how we justify rational 
norms. Notably, while AR scholars define as rational behaviour that achieves an 
organism’s goals, scholars such as Gilboa claim that ‘a mode of behaviour is rational 
when a person is not embarrassed by it, even when it is analysed for him’ (2010, 5). 
Moreover, while AR scholars justify normative claims by appealing to the 
consequences that different strategies lead to in the “real world”, other scholars reject 
pragmatic justifications and claim instead that the justification of norms is guided by 
reflection and arises directly through human intuition. However, it is important to 
emphasize that, as we saw in the introductory chapter, it is quite common to take 
considerations about whether a particular reasoning strategy or set of strategies is 
conducive to success to bear on normative issues: this is a widely held commitment, 
and, importantly, it is generally shared by both AR theorists and researchers in MBR.  
 
Second, even if we accept that success matters for the justification of norms of 
rationality, we have to be careful when drawing normative conclusions about the 
validity of SPR based on evolutionary considerations. In particular, scholars such as 
Stanovich seek to reject the relevance of evolutionary considerations by arguing that 
we should not overlook the important distinction between evolutionary adaptation 
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and instrumental rationality (utility maximization given goals and beliefs) (cf. 
Stanovich and West 2003; Stanovich 2004). In Stanovich and West’s words: 
 
The key point is that for […] means/ends rationality, maximization is at the 
level of the individual person. Adaptive optimization […] is at the level of the 
genes. In Dawkins’s terms, evolutionary adaptation concerns optimization 
processes relevant to the so-called replicators (the genes), whereas instrumental 
rationality concerns utility maximization for the so-called, which houses the 
genes. (2003, 660)46  
 
This is certainly a sensible point: what we need to show to make an interesting case 
against the normative value of SPR in an assessment of behaviour and cognition is 
that reasoning strategies violating the norms of SPR can also be successful in current 
environments and in the achievement of people’s personal goals. More precisely, 
even if we accept that strategies violating norms of SPR can be evolutionarily 
adaptive, we then need to show by other means that strategies violating such norms 
can be successful even in solving typical contemporary problems and for the 
achievement of personal goals. In other words, what we need to show is that biases 
are not detrimental to the achievement of people’s instrumentally rational 
behaviour.47  
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46 I would like to emphasize that, on occasion, scholars such as Stanovich seem to fail to distinguish 
between two different objections to AR: i) that AR researchers have focused on the environment of 
evolutionary adaptedness instead of current environments, and ii) that AR researchers have focused on 
evolutionary and not personal goals. For instance, Stanovich and West write that ‘despite their 
frequent acknowledgements that the conditions in the EEA do not match those of modern society, 
evolutionary psychologists have a tendency to background potential mismatches between genetic 
interests and personal interests’ (2003, 172). Notably, one could focus on the attainment of fitness 
enhancing behaviour in current environments, since, after all, natural selection is still a force steering 
our evolution. 
47 These considerations are particularly important, as a common concern is that rational behaviour 
cannot arise from the application of evolutionarily adaptive heuristics, since they are tailored to very 
specific environments and contexts, and are likely to misfire in new and different contexts. As an 
objector might point out, the hallmark of rationality is in fact the ability to deal with novel and 
complex situations, and a truly rational agent should be able to operate successfully in a wide variety 
of environments. This is an important issue. It should be noted, however, that AR theorists have 
argued on several occasions that our heuristics are robust and successful in a wide range of modern 
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This does not mean that evolutionary claims are completely irrelevant to such 
normative considerations. In fact, it seems that evolutionary considerations can still 
be used as a heuristic device to make helpful suggestions about which contexts of 
choice and decision-making are worth exploring further, and to point to some 
overlooked phenomena that it would be helpful to know more about. However, what 
ultimately matters when assessing the validity of the norms of SPR qua benchmarks 
of rational behaviour and cognition is whether following such norms is conducive to 
successful behaviour in contemporary environments and for the achievement of 
personal goals. For these reasons, scholars should be very careful when drawing 
normative conclusions from the evolutionary considerations discussed in the 




In this chapter, I have explored whether evolutionary considerations can be used to 
oppose the conclusions drawn in MBR. I presented a popular evolutionary argument 
against MBR!that I dubbed EAR!and discussed why its premises seem to be 
controversial. I have also shown, however, that it is unclear whether the conclusions 
of EAR are relevant to the verdicts of MBR, given that the criteria used in 
discussions around EAR seem to be different from those used in discussions around 
MBR. I then pointed to recent work on the link between evolution and rationality and 
suggested that there exist other evolutionary arguments in which evolutionary 
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environments as well. For considerations on the robustness of AR theorists’ suggested findings on the 
performance of heuristics, the reader should focus on the discussions offered in Chapter 3 and Chapter 
7.  
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considerations seem to be used not to oppose, but rather to account for the existence 
of behaviour violating the norms of SPR. Finally, I concluded by arguing that 
normative conclusions do not automatically follow from the evolutionary 





















Chapter 3: Blame it on the norm!  
 
In Chapter 2, I showed that there is no compelling evolutionary reason to reject the 
idea that people are prone to systematic and widespread biases. Yet, in discussing 
how biases could be evolutionarily adaptive, I also raised the question of whether 
biases could be “rational”. The goal of this chapter is to further address this question. 
More precisely, in this chapter I seek to defend AR theorists’ contention that 
behavior violating the norms of SPR can be successful and adaptive. In light of this, I 
stress that evaluating reasoning and decision-making according to SPR is 
normatively problematic, and I challenge the view that SPR provides us with 
universal benchmarks of rationality. 
 
1. MBR and SPR 
 
As the reader will recall from our introductory chapter, scholars in the field of 
judgment and decision-making typically justify the norms of SPR by appealing to 
their being conducive to success in the real world. More precisely, most 
psychologists in MBR seem to contend that such norms have normative force only if 
and as long as following them is conducive to successful behavior and cognition. The 
reader might recall, for instance, the words of Jonathan Baron, president of the 
Society for Judgment and Decision-Making. According to him:  
 
If it should turn out that following the rules of logic leads to eternal happiness, 
then it is rational thinking to follow the rules of logic (assuming we all want 
happiness). If it should turn out that, on the other hand, carefully violating the 
laws of logic at every turn leads to eternal happiness, then it is there violations 
that should be called rational. (2000, 53) 
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Researchers in MBR are generally quite convinced that violations of SPR are 
conducive to maladaptive behavior. For instance, Milkman et al. point out that 
‘massive costs can result from suboptimal decision-making’ (2009, 379). But these 
statements are then susceptible to empirical scrutiny. More precisely, we should ask 
the following question: is it really the case that following the norms of SPR leads to 
successful behavior, as scholars in MBR are eager to point out? As we will see in the 
remainder of this chapter, AR theorists seek to resist this conclusion, arguing that the 
evidence suggesting the existence of such a link is less convincing than researchers 
in MBR believe, and that there is, in fact, growing evidence contradicting these 
statements. Specifically, AR theorists try to defend the claim that following the 
norms of SPR is, in a number of contexts and occasions, unnecessary for the 
achievement of successful behavior, and that following norms of SPR can in fact be 
detrimental to the achievement of successful behavior.  
 
2. The problem of the absence of evidence 
 
It might be tempting to think that great achievements of humanity, such as building 
bridges or computers, rest on the application of standard principles of rationality, and 
that this shows, in turn, that there is a strong link between adhering to SPR and 
achieving successful behavior. But AR theorists seem to challenge whether the link 
is really so strong. In particular, they question whether there really is convincing 
evidence available to us suggesting that violating the norms of SPR leads to 
maladaptive behavior. Notably, while money pump and Dutch book arguments are 
often discussed in the literature, it may be argued that the threat of becoming a 
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money pump carries little weight if such scenarios are never instantiated. In fact, on 
26 October, 2011, Gigerenzer, Hertwig and Arkes posted a request on the electronic 
mailing list of the Society for Judgment and Decision-Making (personal 
communication). Specifically, these researchers asked the approximately 1000 
members of the society whether they knew of studies in which violations of the 
norms of SPR resulted in demonstrated costs. The members could generate very few 
examples.  
 
One such study was that by Bonini, Tentori, and Osherson (2004). The issue in 
question was the conjunction fallacy: as the reader will recall from previous chapters, 
this bias is manifested by assigning a higher probability to the conjunction of two 
events than to one of the conjunction’s two constituents. This behaviour appears to 
violate probability theory and, therefore, SPR. In one case discussed by these 
authors, participants could distribute 7 euros among three predictions in a manner 
that reflected their beliefs that the prediction would become true in the future.  Here 
is their example (209): 
 
Thanks to new labour laws throughout Europe:  
 
a) Employment will increase by 5% (p). 
b) Employment will increase by 5% and economic growth will not be less than 
2% (p-and-not-q). 
c) Employment will increase by 5% and economic growth will be less than 2% 
(p-and-q). 
 
In this case, participants bet an average of 1.99 Euros on p and 3.15 Euros on p-and-
q, thus indicating that they believed that the conjunction was more likely than one of 
its constituents. If q were wrong, however, this violation of a norm of SPR would 
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actually cost the participants money. 48  Thus, this study comes quite close to 
demonstrating the costly effects of violating the norms of SPR.  
 
Another candidate was a study by Azar (2011), who modified a study described in 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981), in which people were willing to drive 20 minutes to 
save $5 on a $15 calculator but were unwilling to do so to save the same amount on a 
jacket that cost $125. According to Tversky and Kahneman, the difference in the 
relative amount of the savings (33% versus 4%) should not influence the money-time 
trade-off. According to Azar (2008), people who exhibit this standardly irrational 
behaviour would indeed pay more for a portfolio of goods compared to persons who 
did not.49  
 
What this suggests is that finding clear demonstrations of actual cases of 
maladaptive behaviour caused by violations of the norms of SPR is not as easy a task 
as researchers in MBR seem to believe. Clearly, this does not imply that such 
demonstrations cannot be found. However, it seems that AR theorists deserve credit 
for attempting to raise researchers in MBR from a sort of “dogmatic slumber” and 





48 Otherwise it would not cost money.  
49  One might argue, however, that this behavior does not necessarily violate norms of SPR. 
Specifically, it is not entirely clear why the difference ($5) should count as rational, and not the ratio 
($5/$15 versus $5/$125). After all, theories of expected utility assume diminishing returns.   
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3. A stronger case against SPR 
 
The problem, however, is not only that the evidence documenting the existence of a 
clear link between the SPR and adaptive behavior is limited, but also that, at least in 
some contexts and domains, behavior that seems to violate such norms seems to be 
nevertheless successful and adaptive. 50   
 
The possibility of scenarios in which adaptive and successful behavior is achieved 
in spite of violations of the norms of SPR had been discussed in the literature prior to 
the work of AR theorists. Here I will just present some of the earlier considerations. 
Take, for instance, Sen (1993), who suggested that behaviour that violates the axiom 
of independence of irrelevant alternatives might be successful and rational. He 
offered the following example. Imagine that, at a dinner party, a fruit basket is 
passed around. When this reaches you, one apple is left in the basket. You decide to 
behave decently and pick nothing (x) rather than the apple (y). Yet, if the fruit basket 
had contained another apple (z), you could reasonably have chosen y over x without 
violating standards of good behaviour. Choosing x over y from the choice set {x, y} 
and choosing y over x from the choice set {x, y, z} seems to breach the axiom of 
independence of irrelevant alternatives, even through there is nothing irrational 
about your behaviour given your good upbringing. In fact, had you suspended your 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50 It should also be noticed that considerations analogous to the ones I discuss in this chapter could 
also be made about game theory, although in this work I do not focus on game-theoretic approaches. 
In particular, in some cases heuristic reasoning seems to be quite effective also when it comes to 
strategic interaction. Consider, for instance, the so-called “backward induction paradox” (Pettit and 
Sugden 1989): in a sequence of prisoner’s dilemma, I might do better following a strategy such as tit-
for-tat than applying the standardly rational process of “backward induction”. Moreover, it seems that 
for the assessment of a reasoning strategy we have to consider the goals of people: as literature on 
“social value orientation” reveals (Liebrand and McClintock, 1988), agents can exhibit rather different 
strategic profiles, and what might be rational for an individualistic agent might not be rational for a 
pro-social individual. It should also be noticed that also the normative framework of game theory has 
recently been called into question (e.g., Misyak and Chater 2014).  
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good manners, you would not have violated SPR. Sen (2002) concludes that the idea 
of internal consistency of choice ‘is essentially confused, and there is no way of 
determining whether a choice function is consistent or not without referring to 
something external to choice behaviour (such as objectives, values, or norms)’ (121-
2). For our purposes here, what seems important is the suggestion that, if researchers 
in MBR had applied the norms of SPR when assessing behaviour and cognition, they 
would have mistaken sensible and adaptive behaviour for irrationality.  
 
But Sen is not the only author to point out that violations of the norms of SPR can 
result in benefits on the part of the decision-maker. 51 Another example, perhaps more 
controversial, has been suggested by Nozick (1993, 21-25). He asks us to consider 
the following scenario. An individual is strongly tempted to cheat on his spouse. If 
he does so, he will come to regard this act as a mistake for the rest of his life. The 
individual ultimately refrains, and does so in part because he reflects on how much 
he has invested in his marriage financially, emotionally, and temporally. These 
investments are, of course, sunk costs. But because he allows such allegedly 
irrelevant considerations to influence his decision-making, he is ultimately better off 
than he would be if he had ignored them and succumbed to temptation.52  
 
The cases illustrated above seem to suggest that, if researchers in MBR try to 
assess behaviour against the norms of SPR, they run the risk of mistaking adaptive 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
51 I want to emphasize that this overview is not meant to be exhaustive. As it turns out, other 
philosophers have discussed similar problems when debating whether acting irrationally might pay off 
(e.g., Parfit 1984, 12). 
52 Research in MBR has shown that people often fall prey to the sunk cost effect, where honouring 
sunk costs is taken to represent a violation of SPR. It is, more precisely, a departure from the theory of 
rational choice, and occurs when people consider past investments of money, effort, or time when 
making their decisions. 
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and successful behaviour for irrationality. These considerations are important, and in 
line with the case mounted by AR theorists.53 However, AR theorists have also tried 
to substantiate such claims further by providing actual empirical evidence on 
people’s thinking and decision-making. 
 
3.1 Fast, frugal and accurate heuristics 
 
Let us introduce AR theorists’ discussion of how behaviour that violates the norms 
of SPR can be adaptive. Specifically, let us begin by presenting AR theorists’ 
research on fast-and-frugal heuristics. Human and non-human animals make 
decisions that go beyond the available information to make predictions about the 
state of the world. For instance, knowing some features of a fruit, can the decision-
maker infer whether this is dangerous or not? The psychological research carried out 
by AR theorists has revealed that simple strategies that allegedly violate the norms of 
SPR can lead to remarkably successful behaviour.  
 
To appreciate this, let us recall here the idea that human and non-human animals 
alike are endowed with an “adaptive toolbox” (AT) of fast-and-frugal heuristics. 
According to AR theorists’ framework of AT, the algorithms that we use to make 
decisions do not use all the available information. The simple heuristics we use are 
non-compensatory, because only the best discriminating cue determines the inference 
or decision, and no combination of cues can override the decision.54 Previous 
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53 In fact, AR theorists themselves have often referred to Sen’s point when articulating their challenge 
(see, e.g., Todd and Gigerenzer 2000, 771). 
54 Non-compensatory heuristics are taken to depart from traditional standards of rationality because 
they violate the compensatory weighted additive (WADD) rule, which is seen as a component of some 
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research in the field of judgement and decision-making has revealed that people tend 
to avoid making trade-offs among attributes (Kahneman and Frederick, 2002, Gowda 
and Fox, 2002 and Payne et al., 1993). 
 
Yet, when adopted, these strategies can be as accurate as, or more accurate than, 
linear models that integrate more information.55 The recognition heuristic is the 
simplest strategy within our AT. This strategy exploits the fact that people have a 
remarkably effective recognition memory, and make inferences about a criterion that 
is not directly accessible to the decision maker, based on recognition retrieved from 
memory. More precisely, the yes/no recognition response is used here as a frequency 
estimation cue: if one of the two alternatives is recognized and the other is not, it 
should be inferred that the recognized alternative has a higher value. In a famous 
experiment, Americans and Germans had to find out which was the more populous 
city between San Diego and San Antonio (Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996). Many 
Germans recognized the former but had never heard of the latter, and all of them 
chose the former over the latter, potentially relying on the recognition heuristic. All 
the Germans gave the right answer and performed better than the more 
knowledgeable Americans (who recognized both the cities and, therefore, were not 
able, therefore, to use the recognition heuristic).  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
versions of utility theory (Keeney and Raiffa 1976). WADD considers the values of each alternative 
on all of the relevant attributes and considers all the relative importance or weights of the attributes to 
the decision-makers.  
55 It is worth noting, however, that also other researchers before AR theorists had stressed that the use 
of non-compensating decision rules could result in a rational process (Payne et al. 1993). In their 
seminal work on adaptive decision-making, Payne et al. collected evidence that people tend to select 
heuristics in an adaptive way.  
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Apart from the fact that these strategies seem to be non-compensatory, what is of 
particular interest here is that variants of these fast-and-frugal heuristics can also 
violate transitivity, which is a pillar of SPR. The reader might want to recall from our 
previous chapter that AR theorist Gigerenzer (2000) has described a rule that he calls 
“minimalist”. When faced with options that differ on more than one dimension, an 
agent using the minimalist rule picks a dimension at random and then selects the 
option that ranks highest on the chosen dimension. This rule can result in intransitive 
choices, but it performs well, when compared with rules that are more complex and 
produce transitive decisions. Now, selecting a cue at random might not seem 
realistic, but violations of transitivity can occur when cues are used in a systematic 
order. In the procedure that Gigerenzer calls “Take the Best”, each option has a value 
on each of several cues. For each cue, the possible values are ‘present’ (+), ‘absent’ 
(−) or ‘don’t know’. When a decision has to be made between two options, they are 
first compared based on cue 1. If one option has a + and the other has a −, then the 
one with the + is chosen. If cue 1 does not result in a decision, those following the 
procedure attempt to make a decision on the basis of cue 2, and so on until a decision 
is achieved. These strategies seem to perform quite well (Gigerenzer and Goldstein 
1996), and it seems that the main lesson to be drawn from AR theorists’ research is 
that non-compensatory heuristics that sometimes violate transitivity can be as good 





3.2 Linda, Social Rationality and Successful Heuristics 
 
Yet, the world that organisms inhabit is also a social world, and the success of an 
organism also depends on the quality of the interaction with other organisms. It is 
widely believed that reliance on heuristics is particularly problematic in social 
contexts. In particular, philosopher Kim Sterelny has expressed such reservations by 
pointing out that: 
 
It is no accident that the examples of such heuristics in action ignore 
interactions with other intelligent agents, especially competitive agents. For it is 
precisely in such situations that simple rules of thumb will go wrong. 
[…] Catching a ball is one problem; catching a liar is another. (2003, 53) 
 
Sterelny’s argument has been well received in the literature (e.g., Stanovich and 
West, 2003; Buller, 2005, 158-160; but see also Hurley 2005), but Sterelny’s claim 
seems to be off track, not only because AR theorists have considered the nature and 
performance of social heuristics as well (e.g., Hertwig et al. 2013), but also because, 
at least in some social contexts, heuristics that violate the norms of SPR seem to lead 
to successful interactions with others.56  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
56 In the main, Sterelny claims this because he assumes that these heuristics rely on information that is 
subject to deception, since other agents, unlike nature, constantly try to outwit us. Moreover, social 
environments, unlike natural environments, seem to be unstable and to change quite frequently. Since 
social heuristics are supposed to be tailored to rather specific environments, it is believed that they are 
more likely to misfire. Discussing this argument in detail falls beyond the scope of this work. 
However, I still want to stress that there seem to be several problems with this reasoning. A quite 
general one is that the notion of social environment used by Sterelny is not fine-grained. In fact, there 
seem to be quite different kinds of social interactions, leading to quite different social environments, 
and different social environments present remarkably different features. Arguably, only few of these 
seem to be vulnerable to the considerations and reservations expressed by Sterelny. It is also the case 
that researchers have found that simple heuristics can be particularly useful, for instance for 
combining information to make a group decision (Reimer and Katsikopoulos 2004), for finding a 
suitable mate who is also agreeable (Todd and Miller 1999) or for assessing how common a disease is 
in one’s social circle (Hertwig, Pachur, and Kurzenhäuser 2005). 
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To see this, I will first reconsider the conjunction fallacy. Since I already 
introduced this effect in the previous chapters, I will not recall the phenomenon 
again. What I will recall, instead, is that this phenomenon is usually interpreted as an 
indication of irrationality, since it violates the conjunction rule of probability theory, 
which states that the probability of a conjunction is always smaller than or equal to 
the probability of one of its conjuncts. However, exhibiting this behaviour is not 
necessarily irrational. It might be in fact a case of genuinely adaptive behaviour, and 
the conversational goal of being informative may have contributed to that finding 
(Hertwig and Gigerenzer 1999).57 The basic point here is that subjects may be 
interpreting the goal of the task as a request to be as informative as possible. This 
seems plausible, since in normal conversation it is assumed that the speaker is 
cooperative and the cover story might be considered relevant for solving the 
problem. Hence, if participants are trying to be informative, and are thus ordering 
options according to their informational value given that profile, it makes perfect 
sense to choose a conjunction over one of the conjuncts. Usually, the conjunction is 
more informative than the conjuncts, and cover stories seem to be created to produce 
that very effect. In that case, it seems to be more informative to say that the person in 
the story is a feminist bank teller than just a bank teller. It follows from this 
reinterpretation that violating the norms of SPR might be a key condition for 
successful communication with others. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
57 It is important to note, here, that the point made by AR theorists which I am discussing here is 
different from their objection presented in Chapter 1, according to which such effect disappears in the 
“real world”. I will not discuss here whether these objections are compatible or not, and merely focus 
on the plausibility of the scenario described in this section.  
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3.3 Accountability and the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives 
!
But there are other reinterpretations of findings from MBR that deserve attention 
here. For instance, Lenton et al. (2013) have offered another interesting case of 
behaviour that might be successful in social contexts in spite of the violation of SPR. 
Consider, first, a study carried out by Sedikides et al. (1999). The authors of that 
study asked their participants to make a choice between two mates, Eligible A and 
Eligible B, where A and B were described according to the criteria of handsomeness 
and articulation. Specifically, A scored higher than B in terms of handsomeness and 
B scored higher than A in terms of articulation. Notably, whether a third option was 
presented or not seemed to affect the choosers’ preferences. The third option was 
inferior to Eligible A on handsomeness and equal to A on articulation (so that A 
dominates the third option), and it was better than Eligible B in terms of 
handsomeness but worse than B in terms of articulation. Specifically, the 
introduction of the third option resulted in participants’ preferences shifting from 
indifference (50:50) towards Eligible A (the mate that dominated the third option). 
This result is usually considered to be an instance of irrationality, because it involves 
a violation of a norm of SPR!the independence of irrelevant alternatives, in this 
case the dominated third option (Chernoff 1954; Fishburn 1973). However, it is 
unclear whether such behaviour is necessarily irrational. As Gigerenzer and 
Gaissmeier (2011, 471) point out, ‘the goals of social intelligence go beyond 
accuracy, frugality, and making fast decisions. They include transparency, group 
loyalty, and accountability (Lerner and Tetlock 1999)’. Once such goals and factors 
are taken into account, it is possible to reinterpret the abovementioned findings from 
MBR. In particular, Lenton et al. (2013) offered an argument to resist the claim that 
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such behaviour is irrational by appealing to the importance of the goal of 
“accountability”. As the authors of this study point out, consumer research suggests 
that people choose the option that dominates the third option, partly because the 
presence of such options makes the attribute on which the third option is lacking 
(i.e., handsomeness) more salient to the decision-maker. Increasing salience of the 
dominating cue may result in people selecting the option dominating the third one 
because they find it easier to justify this choice to others (Simonson 1989). The goal 
of accountability is a crucial aspect of people’s social rationality, and in light of the 
importance usually placed on social networks and on the flow of mate-relevant 
information through them, it seems to be particularly important to make decisions 
that one can explain to the people around him. As Lerner and Tetlock (1999) point 
out in their discussion of the effects of accountability, choosing the accountable 
option may bring important personal benefits, as it can facilitate social interactions. 
In other words, selecting a mate based on the feature that stands out and is easy to 
justify might not be an instance of irrationality, but rather an instance of adaptive 
behaviour, once we consider that such behaviour may help achieve the goal of 
facilitating social interactions. 
 
3.4 Wrapping up 
 
By looking at recent developments in the study of reasoning and decision-making, 
we have found support for the idea that, if practitioners in MBR rely on norms of 
SPR when assessing judgement and decision-making, they run the risk of mistaking 
adaptive behaviour for irrationality, and that evaluating reasoning and decision-
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making according to SPR can therefore be, and in a number of contexts is, 
normatively problematic. On the whole, this looks, so far, like the most serious and 
potentially damaging objection to research in MBR.  
 
4. Objections and replies 
 
Before this conclusion is fully accepted, however, it is important to address a few 
central objections concerning the existence, interpretation and implications of the 
findings presented in this chapter.  
 
4.1 Challenging the empirical premises 
 
A first objection goes as follows: the empirical results on which AR theorists seem to 
base their challenge are implausible. More precisely, the objector might argue that, 
even if the findings offered by AR theorists could, in principle, have far-reaching 
implications for the study of human rationality, the evidence and considerations they 
provide are controversial.  
 
For instance, consider that, in the case of Linda’s problem, it might be argued that 
there is no compelling evidence showing that subjects are trying to be relevant (cf. 
Moro 2009, 17). Moreover, one may also challenge the evidence suggesting that fast-
and-frugal heuristics are empirically accurate in spite of the violation of the norms of 
SPR. Notably, even the application of the recognition heuristic discussed above, 
which represents a flagship achievement of the AR theorists’ program and is the 
simplest rule in our “adaptive toolbox”, looks controversial. Specifically, in today’s 
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terms, all the Germans would be wrong: according to the 2010 US census 
(http://2010.census.gov), San Antonio is a more populous city.58 So, one might ask, if 
the AR theorists’ claim does not stand in any individual case, how can it be 
plausible?  
 
These concerns are important, but it does not seem to me that they scathe the 
challenge from AR in any particularly serious way. In the main, this is because the 
objection looks plausible on a case-by-case basis, yet it is less attractive from a 
broader perspective. For instance, AR theorists have presented an imposing body of 
evidence for the claim that fast-and-frugal heuristics can be adaptive in spite of 
violations of transitivity and cycles of preferences (for an extensive review of such 
findings see Gigerenzer and Gaissmeier 2011; for some formal analyses of these 
results see Arlò-Costa and Pedersen 2011; 2012). More importantly, however, the 
conclusion of both our analysis and the claim made by AR theorists seem to be 
supported by other studies and bodies of literature too.  
 
Consider, for instance, a hypothesis recently put forward by Mercier and Sperber 
(2011). According to the authors, human reasoning abilities are better suited to 
argument and persuasion than to analysis and consequential thought. Specifically, 
these scholars suggest that human reasoning has an argumentative function, allowing 
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58 In addition to the question of whether simple heuristics can be successful, there is also the question 
of whether people really do use non-compensatory heuristics in their reasoning and decision-making. 
With regard to the second question, a number of scholars have argued against the claim that non-
compensatory simple heuristics are pervasively used (e.g., Newell 2005; Hilbig 2010). As I stated in 
the Introduction, in this thesis I will not discuss in great detail the range, nature and frequency of use 
of the heuristics described by AR theorists. What is important to stress, however, is that it is generally 
accepted in the literature that, at least in a number of contexts, people do rely on non-compensatory 
simple heuristics. 
! 112 
us to win arguments better than we pursue truth. These considerations prompted 
Mercier and Sperber to reinterpret psychological findings such as those concerning 
the so-called confirmation bias, which consists in ‘the seeking or interpreting of 
evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis in 
hand’ (Nickerson 1998, 175). According to Mercier and Sperber, the confirmation 
bias might actually be a case of “social intelligence” at its best. On Mercier and 
Sperber’s “argumentative theory”, having a confirmation bias might actually be 
helpful and adaptively rational: when one is trying to convince someone, one wants 
to find arguments for one’s side, and that is exactly what the confirmation bias might 
help one to do.59  
 
But there are other studies supporting the conclusion defended above. Take, as an 
illustration, the work of Burns (2001, 2004) and Burns and Corpus (2004), who 
suggest that believing in the so-called hot hand (and hence committing the hot hand 
fallacy) might contribute to an adaptive behavioural strategy in basketball, because it 
leads playmakers to pass the ball to a player with a higher scoring average in a 
game.60 The authors have thus reconsidered the hot hand fallacy in basketball, 
according to which a player has a better chance of success following other successful 
shots. Specifically, Burns (2001) used a simulation of ball allocations to two virtual 
players and showed that behaviour based on the hot hand belief resulted in higher 
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59 According to the authors, ‘when we want to convince an interlocutor with a different viewpoint, we 
should be looking for arguments in favour of our viewpoint rather than in favour of hers. Therefore, 
the next prediction is that reasoning used to produce argument should exhibit a strong confirmation 
bias’ (Mercier and Sperber 2011, 61). 
60 Other scholars have also sought to offer an evolutionary perspective on these sorts of behaviour 
(e.g., Scheibehenne et al. 2011).  
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average scores for the team than when the belief was ignored.61 In particular, 
allocating the ball to the hot player would result in a small but important advantage 
of about one point in every seven or eight games. Furthermore, Burns argued that the 
greater the variability in the base rate of a player’s scoring performance, the greater 
the advantage of the hot hand belief. Burns’s mathematical model assumes that 
playmakers cannot detect base rates directly; their belief in the hot hand provides 
another, indirect source of information. 62 
 
Here I do not want to contend that violating the norms of SPR generally or most 
of the time leads to adaptive and successful behaviour. This claim would not be 
empirically supported and would seem to be far-fetched. Instead, what I want to 
argue is that there is growing evidence supporting the contention that, in a number of 
contexts and domains, violating the norms of SPR might lead to adaptive behaviour 
and cognition and that, by relying on such normative perspective, researchers would 
mistake adaptive behaviour for irrationality. This suggests that the task of rejecting 
the empirical evidence in support of AR theorists’ conclusions is more difficult than 
it might seem. But there is also another point to note here. Even if the attack on the 
empirical evidence offered by AR theorists proved successful, exactly what evidence 
provides positive grounds for the objectors’ conviction that violating the norms of 
SPR is costly is still unclear. As we have seen, we do not have many clear empirical 
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61 It is important to note, however, that while Burns (2001; 2004) claims that the hot hand fallacy 
permits successful fast and frugal judgments of the shooting percentage of individual basketball 
players, he does not deny that belief in the hot hand is a fallacy and does not draw normative 
implications from his results. AR theorists go beyond this claim, stressing rather explicitly that 
behavior should not be assessed against standard normative models but measured in terms of 
its adaptiveness. 
62 There are other interesting bodies of literature that might be relevant to the AR theorists’ point, but I 
do not discuss them here. In particular, in formal epistemology there are a number of results showing 
that, for some systems of beliefs, the more coherent they are, the more likely they are to be false (e.g., 
Olsson 2005).   
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demonstrations that repeated violations of norms such as transitivity are costly, and 
the abstract threat of money pump scenarios (exploitation generated by intransitive 
choices between three or more options) carries little weight if they are never 
instantiated.  
 
4.1 People are not violating SPR 
 
At this point, the critic might offer a different objection and question the 
interpretation of such findings by stressing that the norms of SPR are only apparently 
violated in the cases mentioned above. Over the past two decades, some evidence has 
been offered to substantiate this objection. In particular, some reinterpretations of 
previous experimental tasks in MBR have been suggested. For instance, while 
psychologists declared people’s choices in the Selection Task irrational because 
people’s choices deviated from the laws of logic, other researchers applied Bayes’ 
rule to the same problem and rehabilitated people’s choices as rational (e.g., 
Oaksford and Chater 2007).  
 
It is worth clarifying the nature of the task. Wason (1966) invented the selection 
task, also known as the four-card problem, to study the extent to which reasoning 
about conditional statements obeys modus tollens. He focused on the material 
implication P→Q, as defined by the truth table in elementary logic. In his 
experiments, the P and Q were substituted by some content, such as “numbers” 
(odd/even) and “letters” (consonants/vowels). The material implication “→” was 
replaced by the English terms “if … then”, and a rule was introduced, such as:  
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If there is an even number on one side of the card, there is a consonant on the 
other.  
Four cards were placed on the table, showing an even number, an odd number, 
a consonant, and a vowel on the surface side.  
 
People were asked which cards needed to be turned around in order to see whether 
the rule had been violated. Wason assumed that the “correct” answer was given by 
the truth table (modus tollens), which means that one has to turn around the P and the 
not-Q card, and no others. The reason for this is that the material conditional is false 
if and only if P∩¬Q. However, most people selected other combinations of cards. In 
Wason’s and other studies, selections inconsistent with the modus tollens have been 
taken to show a serious shortcoming in people’s ability to reason “rationally”. 
However, this interpretation has been challenged.  
 
According to Oaksford and Chater (1994, 1996), the selection task is better 
understood as a problem of optimal data selection in which participants need to 
decide which of the four cards is likely to provide the most useful data to test a 
conditional rule. Based on the assumption that the required process is one of 
inductive hypothesis-testing rather than deductive reasoning, and on a Bayesian 
model of optimal data selection, Oaksford and Chater (1994) conclude that the 
people’s common selection of the p and q cards and, by extension, their reasoning, 
‘may be rational rather than subject to systematic bias’ (608).  
 
Based on this and similar reconstructions, these researchers have criticized the 
challenge put forth by AR theorists. Chater et al. write that: 
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Advocates of ecological views of rationality […] make much of the contrast 
between everyday human behaviour, the success of which must be judged in the 
context of a specific and complex environment, and abstract classical principles 
of rationality. […] In short, the concern is that classical principles of rationality 
are unecological, and hence inappropriate as standards of real-world reasoning. 
(2003, 69)63 
 
However, in light of considerations such as those presented above in relation to the 
selection task, these scholars argue that: 
 
Norms of classical rationality are crucially involved in explaining why a 
particular behaviour is ecologically successful. Thus, we argue that classical 
and ecological notions of rationality are complementary, rather than standing in 
competition. (Chater et al. 2003, 65) 
 
The framework in which Oaksford and Chater work is referred to as “rational 
analysis” and is intended to signify a radical departure from AR. More precisely, the 
authors tell us that: 
 
The project of providing a “rational analysis” for some aspect of thought or 
behavior has been described by the cognitive psychologist John Anderson (e.g., 
Anderson 1990, 1991). This methodology provides a framework for explaining 
the link between principles of formal rationality and the practical success of 
everyday rationality not just in psychology, but throughout the study of 
behavior. […] According to this viewpoint, formal rational principles relate to 
explaining everyday rationality, because they specify the optimal way in which 
the goals of the cognitive system can be attained in a particular environment. 
(Chater and Oaksford 2000, 106) 
 
 
On the face of it, this might look like a convincing objection to the AR project. After 
all, “rational analysis” might seem to clearly exemplify recent probabilistic 
approaches to cognition that have gained prominence in research in cognitive science 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
63 The reader should recall that, while we use the term AR, other scholars and commentators refer to 
the same framework using the term “ecological rationality”. 
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(for a discussion of the virtues and pitfalls of the Bayesian approach, see Bowers and 
Davis 2012a; 2012b; Jones and Love 2011; for a reply see Griffiths et al. 2012). Yet, 
I think that this strategy suffers from a number of problems.  
 
First, it is important to represent the claims by AR theorists correctly. If AR 
theorists claimed or needed to claim that following SPR is never (or rarely) 
conducive to adaptive behavior and cognition, then the evidence discussed by 
advocates of “rational analysis” would seem to offer a scathing challenge to AR. But 
that is not what they are claiming. What it is claimed, instead, is that the evidence in 
favor of the link between following SPR and adaptive behavior is less convincing 
than generally thought, and that, in fact, there exists some evidence speaking against 
such link.  
 
Second, while the strategy adopted by “rational analysis” theorists and described 
above might look plausible in a number of cases, it is unclear or even doubtful 
whether it could be successful on a broader scale. For instance, in the Linda problem, 
the subject may be applying some norms of SPR to a different construal of the 
problem that takes into account the fact that the experimenter has presented the 
subject with a cover story. But in many other cases it seems that such explanations in 
line with tenets of SPR are more difficult to provide. For instance, in cases such as 
violations of transitivity resulting in fitness maximizing behaviour, or violations of 
transitivity entailed by accurate fast-and-frugal heuristics, this strategy might not be 
easily applied, and thus begins to lose some of its appeal. Here I do not wish to be 
dogmatic and claim that such reinterpretations cannot be offered. What I want to 
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emphasize, instead, is that the burden of providing them falls on advocates of 
“rational analysis”, and that the task seems likely to be a difficult one.  
 
Third, and perhaps more importantly, this would be at best a partial victory for 
advocates of the “rational analysis” movement. Recall, first, that AR theorists argue 
that, if scholars working on rationality are interested in assessing adaptive and 
successful behaviour, then applying the norms of SPR is problematic, as they would 
run the risk of mistaking adaptive behaviour for irrationality. But now it is clear that 
the considerations offered by Chater, Oaksford, and their co-workers could also be 
used to support the AR theorists’ case against MBR and against a mechanical 
application of the norms of SPR. As we have seen, according to these authors, agents 
performing a reasoning task could be applying other norms of SPR to a different 
task. This would still suggest that the norms of SPR could not and should not be used 
as universal benchmarks of rationality: on the perspective of “rational analysis” what 
counts as a correct norm to apply depends crucially on the context and the goals of 
the reasoner. So, both AR theorists and their objectors from “rational analysis” agree 
that the mechanical application of the norms of SPR is problematic. They rely 
instead on considerations about contextual factors and on the importance of the goals 
of the cognizer in the assessment of rational behaviour and cognition.  
 
4.3 Rationality does not always pay 
 
At this point, the objector might accept both the findings presented in support of AR 
theorists’ conclusions and their interpretation in terms of violations of the norms of 
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SPR. Still, the objector can nevertheless reject the suggested implications of such 
findings. 
 
One way to do this is by arguing that we just have to accept that, at least in some 
contexts, being rational does not pay. The problem of rewarded irrationality has 
generally been discussed in the literature with regard to the so-called Newcomb’s 
problem (Nozick 1969).64 Specifically, it is sometimes acknowledged that rationality 
does not always pay and that there may be environments in which being rational is 
“maladaptive”, but this consideration is taken to be unproblematic: we just have to 
bite the bullet. In other words, there may be environments in which being rational is 
“maladaptive”, but if irrationality is rewarded then we can only infer that irrational 
people will be better off: we do not get to infer anything about rationality. 
 
I do not find this reply particularly convincing. As we have seen, MBR 
researchers traditionally justify the norms of SPR by stressing that these are 
conducive to success. From this perspective, however, it seems hard to count as 
irrational violations of the norms of SPR that lead to adaptive and successful 
behavior. AR theorists seem to drive their point home when they argue that, given 
that nature of common justifications of the norms of SPR, we have no grounds for 




64 Notably, Robert Nozick (1969) presented a dilemma for decision theory. He constructed an example 
involving a being that can make preternaturally accurate predictions about one’s future decisions and 
in which the standard normative principle of dominance conflicts with the principle of expected-utility 
maximization.  
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4.4 A pragmatic defence of standard rationality 
 
Another objection follows. We have seen an attempt to resist the implications of 
findings presented by AR theorists. This sought to deny the relevance of 
considerations about whether following the norms of SPR leads to success. The last 
objection I consider here continues to question the implications drawn by AR 
theorists, but does it in a different way. In other words, the objector now wants to 
resist the conclusions of AR theorists while accepting that the standards offered by 
SPR are flawed. In fact, accepting traditional normative standards in spite of the 
acknowledgement of their flaws is not completely uncommon. As Nozick once said 
that ‘of course, our current standards of rationality are not perfect!in what year 
should we suppose they became so?’  (1993: xiii).  
 
Specifically, while the objector here accepts that considerations about which 
strategies are conducive to success might play a role in normative discussions, she 
also sees that other factors do matter for our choice of the right evaluative standards. 
More precisely, while in a number of contexts and domains applying the norms of 
SPR might result in mistaking adaptive behavior for irrationality, it is unclear 
whether there is a genuine alternative normative framework that we can apply to 
investigate rational behavior and cognition. The objector might thus want to offer 
here a pragmatic defense of SPR. As Wendt points out while commenting on these 
considerations I offer, ‘giving up on a universal standard of rationality seems, in 
practice, to mean giving up on any normative model at all’ (2015, 165). But this is 
problematic, as we want to leave room for the assessment of behavior and cognition.  
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More precisely, according to our objector, the framework of AR does not offer 
workable standards of rationality. Normative standards, to be workable, should allow 
us to assess the quality of performance. After all, people are interested in making 
good decisions and choices, and normative standards should allow us to assess our 
choices and decision-making strategies, offering tools for the assessment of decision-
making as and when it happens. It seems safe to state that the norms of SPR 
represent workable standards, as it is shown by the fact that they can be applied to 
virtually any context and task, and still play a prominent role in the assessment and 
regulation of decision-making. From the perspective of AR, on the other hand, in 
order to assess rational behavior and cognition, we need to establish what counts as 
adaptive behavior and then assess whether the behavior exhibited by the agent is 
adaptive.  
 
Sometimes, this can be done quite easily. For instance, when AR theorists asked 
their subjects which city was the more populous between San Antonio and San 
Diego, it was quite uncontroversial that a relevant criterion would be the empirical 
accuracy of the prediction. Moreover, by considering facts about demographics that 
are accessible to them, researchers could easily assess the answers given by the 
subjects.  
 
At the same time, cases like this might seem ideal: the situation seems to change 
rather radically when we move towards more complex situations. Notice, first, that in 
some cases it might be difficult to identify the relevant goal. Stevens (2010, 114) 
argues that the analysis of decision-making carried out by AR theorists supports the 
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continuity between human and non-human minds, but we should nevertheless take 
care not to overlook differences. In the case of animal cognition it might seem 
plausible to describe the organism’s goal as that of maximizing fitness, and assume 
this to be the relevant goal. However, when we move away from this context, and 
start to investigate human rationality through the adaptiveness of behaviour, it 
becomes less clear what would count as adaptive and successful behaviour. When we 
leave the context of animal cognition and explore human rationality, not only does 
the sophistication of the analysis increase, so does the difficulty of establishing what 
the relevant goals actually are. There are other cases, in which it is similarly difficult 
to assess performance against the relevant goals. AR theorists do not seem to be 
aware of this problem, which is probably due to the fact that their research is mainly 
based on contexts where the assessment of behaviour is rather straightforward. In 
particular, a great deal of their empirical research applies the criterion of empirical 
accuracy. Yet, when it is difficult to establish what the relevant goals are or when it 
is unclear whether behavior is successful when assessed against such goals, it seems 
that the perspective offered by AR fails to provide practical tools for the assessment 
of decision-making as and when it happens.65 Consider, for instance, that it might 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
65!Interestingly, Shira Elqayam (Elqayam and Evans 2011; Elqayam 2012) has offered an interesting 
discussion of some problems of MBR by appealing to themes that are, at least in some respects, 
similar to those discussed by AR theorists, as she also takes SPR to be not necessarily linked with 
instrumentally rational behaviour. At the same time, her conclusions also seem to differ from those 
drawn by AR theorists. Specifically, while AR theorists believe that researchers ought to explore 
whether or not behaviour and cognition are successful, Elqayam seems to be less inclined to accept 
the use of normative considerations when exploring people’s thinking and decision-making, 
encouraging instead a merely (or mostly) descriptive approach in the study of judgement and 
decision-making. It seems to me that Elqayam’s scepticism about the possibility of normative 
assessment is due to the fact that she focuses on a number of contexts in which the assessment of 
behaviour in light of people’s goals is rather difficult, whilst AR theorists have mainly focused on 
cases in which such assessment was more easily carried out.!
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prove extremely difficult to say something precise about the effect a particular 
human behavior has on evolutionary fitness.66  
 
It seems to me that this objection is plausible, and that these are legitimate 
worries. But this does not imply that we should refrain from trying and assessing 
whether people’s behavior is adaptive and successful, even if in some cases this kind 
of assessment might prove to be particularly difficult. The conclusion that MBR 
researchers should be careful to analyze the structure of the agent’s environment as 




In this chapter, I have addressed the question of whether biases reported in MBR 
should be seen as instances of irrational behavior and cognition. More precisely, I 
sought to defend the AR theorists’ contention that behavior that violates the norms of 
SPR can be successful and adaptive. In light of this, I have argued that evaluating 
reasoning and decision-making against SPR is often normatively problematic and 
challenged the view that SPR provides us with adequate normative benchmarks for 
the study of rational behavior and cognition.67  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
66 For instance, some of the claims made by AR theorists about the evolutionarily adaptive value of 
particular traits, such as risk aversion (e.g., Hintze et al. 2015), can be challenged and seem to be 
indeed controversial (see, e.g., the points raised by Schulz 2008).!
67 A remark is in order here. So far, I have treated the methodological argument discussed in Chapter 1 
and the normative argument presented in this chapter as independent. However, it can be argued that 
the abovementioned normative claims have methodological implications as well. Notably, AR 
theorists have paid particular attention to the goal of empirical accuracy and assessed how well 
judgements correspond to features in the external environment. This seems to explain, at least in part, 
their interest in formats with natural frequencies, rather than single probability formats. 
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Chapter 4: Adaptive rationality and goal-based rationality 
 
In the previous chapter, I focused on some problems arising from the assessment of 
behaviour and cognition against the norms of SPR advocated by MBR researchers. 
In this chapter, I further elaborate on this topic by examining how we can best 
conceptualize the challenge articulated by AR theorists. In so doing, I prompt AR 
theorists to build their case on more solid conceptual grounds. Firstly, I show that 
AR theorists often appeal to a distinction between coherence and correspondence 
criteria of rationality originally introduced by Hammond to explicate their normative 
challenge. Secondly, I argue that a distinction between rule-based and goal-based 
rationality might better explicate their normative challenge. Thirdly, I point to some 





As we have seen, according to AR theorists what really matters for the assessment of 
behavior is whether this is adaptive, and not whether it complies with a set of 
conventional principles of rationality. Specifically, AR theorists argue against the use 
of norms of SPR as benchmarks of rationality for the study of behavior and 
cognition. The contrast between these different approaches on rational behavior and 
cognition is rarely spelled out in detail, though. In fact, focus on adaptiveness is 
generically contrasted to focus on conformity to SPR. This trend is quite common in 
the literature. For instance, Ayton and Fischer write that:  
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Studying beliefs by comparison with normative models and studying the adaptiveness 
of their associated behaviors can lead to dissociable conclusions about the efficacy of 
cognition. (2004, 1377) 
 
Recently, however, AR theorists have tried to articulate their normative challenge to 
MBR in more detail. To do so, they have appealed to a distinction between 
coherence and correspondence criteria of rationality originally introduced by 
Hammond (1996; 2007). For instance, AR theorist Gigerenzer latches onto this 
distinction when he writes that: 
 
We do not compare human judgment with the laws of logic or probability, but 
rather examine how it fares in real world environments. The function of 
heuristics is not to be coherent. Rather, their function is to make reasonable, 
adaptive inferences about the real social and physical world given limited time 
and knowledge. Hence, we should evaluate the performance of heuristics by 
criteria that reflect this function. Measures that relate decision-making strategies 
to the external world are called correspondence criteria (Hammond, 1996). 
(1999, 22) 
 
The idea here seems to be that what we have dubbed so far SPR represents ‘a 
championing of coherence criteria’, as philosopher Rysiew once wrote (2008, 1165). 
More precisely, it seems that the labels “coherence” and “correspondence” are here 
supposed to capture something deep about the nature of the standards of rationality 
that have been used, and of those that ought to be used, in the assessment of human 
rationality. In this chapter I will try to make clearer to what exactly these labels refer. 
Moreover, I will also seek to show that, how, and why, the coherence - 
correspondence distinction fails to provide a useful conceptual framework to 
explicate the AR challenge to MBR.  
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The first step, here, is to briefly trace the historical development of the coherence 
- correspondence distinction since its original introduction. Notably, Hammond 
(1996; 2007) first introduced the coherence - correspondence distinction to identify 
two strategies available in the study of human judgment. One is called 
correspondence ‘because it evaluates the correspondence between the judgment and 
the empirical fact that is the object of the judgment’ (2007, XVI). Coherence, on the 
other hand, has to do with the fit between people’s judgments. Specifically, 
Hammond (2007, XVI) defines coherence as ‘the consistency of the elements of the 
person’s judgment’. According to Hammond, ‘it is easy to see the difference between 
a judgment that is directed towards coherence!make it all fit together!and one that 
is directed toward the correspondence between a judgment and a fact’ (XIX).  
 
As it turns out, it is not really clear, in Hammond’s work, whether his notion of 
coherence refers only to the fit between beliefs or, rather, whether the idea of 
‘making it all fit together’ includes the fit between beliefs and behaviour as well. As 
a result, it seems quite difficult to characterize the notion of coherence in a clear and 
unambiguous way.  
 
To be fair, Hammond was aware that, while correspondence clearly refers here to 
empirical accuracy, a criterion we are all familiar with, the characterization of 
coherence was more problematic. In trying to make sense of his notion of coherence, 
Here I will try to be as charitable as possible. Since Hammond thought that the 
distinction between coherence and correspondence could prove useful to explain a 
whole slew of phenomena and to make sense of different lines of research in the 
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psychological study of human judgment, it seems that a quite loose and broad 
understanding of Hammond’s “fit together” would be preferable. Specifically, 
according to a loose understanding of the term, even people’s beliefs that fail to line 
up with their actual behaviour seem to violate coherence. After all, a great deal of 
social psychology research has claimed biases by virtue of having identified 
discrepancies between what people say they will do and what they do. On the other 
pole of the distinction is correspondence, as we have seen, and Hammond thought 
that Brunswik’s research on perception, which I briefly described in Chapter 1, offers 
a prominent example of research on correspondence. As the reader will recall, 
Brunswik’s work focused entirely on the empirical accuracy of physical and social 
perception!the correspondence between a judgment and an object.  
 
Recently, however, Hammond’s distinction between coherence and 
correspondence has been used and introduced in a broader context. Specifically, the 
distinction has been used in the study of both judgement and decision-making, and 
not only in the study of judgement. More generally, the distinction has been 
introduced in the “rationality debate” to characterize the two competing perspectives 
on rational behaviour and cognition that we have discussed in the previous chapter: 
“coherence” has been taken to signify adherence to norms of SPR and 
“correspondence” the achievement of adaptive behaviour. More precisely, in this 
context AR theorists stress that this distinction can prove useful to explicate the 
challenge that they have mounted against MBR. Following AR theorists, the 
coherence - correspondence distinction has been quite widely praised as a useful 
conceptual tool in the study of judgment and decision-making and rationality (Baron 
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2012; Lee and Zhang 2012; Adam and Reyna 2005; Mandel 2005; Newell 2005; 
Wallin 2013). Unsurprisingly, given the current popularity of this distinction, this 
distinction has also been celebrated in 2009 in a special issue of the journal Judgment 
and Decision Making. 
 
2. The many meanings of coherence and correspondence  
 
It is also evident, however, that as soon as Hammond’s distinction has been applied 
and used in such broader context, the terms “coherence” and “correspondence” have 
been modified in important ways. What I want to stress, here, is that Hammond’s 
original distinction has not been just adopted, but also significantly adapted in the 
literature. Consider, first, the case of coherence. On Hammond’s view, coherence 
seems to refer to a fit between mental states and between mental states and behavior. 
Yet, with its introduction in a broader debate, the notion of coherence has been also 
conceptualized in different ways. For instance, Newell writes that ‘human judgment 
can be evaluated by the degree to which it coheres with a formal model, such as 
Bayes theorem, and by the degree to which it corresponds with the properties of the 
environment’ (2005, 11). Here coherence does not refer to the fact that judgments fit 
well with each other, but rather that judgments cohere with formal principles. In a 
similar vein, AR theorist Jeffrey Stevens points out that ‘human judgment can be 
evaluated by the degree to which it coheres with a formal model, such as Bayes’ 
theorem’ (2008, 291). Notably, also other different explications of the concept of 
coherence have recently been given. For example, Lee and Zhang write that ‘the 
distinction between the assessment of a process and the assessment of an outcome is 
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presented as a distinction between coherence and correspondence’ (2012, 366). 
These conceptualizations of the coherence – correspondence distinction can hardly 
refer to the very same things and point to the identical alleged contrasts. This should 
show that the concept of coherence has become less and less clear.  
 
One might think that this is just hair-splitting. In fact, however, some phenomena 
that are taken to be instances of coherence in this broader debate seem to bear very 
little resemblance to Hammond’s original characterization. Overall, it seems that 
coherence has now become a rather complex and heterogeneous mixture. To 
appreciate this, consider that AR theorists frame their normative challenge in terms 
of a replacement of traditional focus on coherence with focus on correspondence, 
and much of their empirical evidence to support such a conclusion is about the 
successful performance of non-compensatory heuristics. Notably, while tenets of 
rationality such as transitivity have to do with coherence in the sense of ‘fitting 
together’, compensatoriness does not seem to. In fact, one could even say that non-
compensatory strategies could be perfectly coherent as a matter of logical 
consistency and of coherence of preferences. 
 
To be fair, the situation does not look much better when we consider the case of 
correspondence. Recall that, on Hammond’s view, correspondence referred to 
empirical accuracy only. Now, some authors have preserved Hammond’s 
characterization. For instance, Stevens (2008, 291) claims quite clearly that 
‘correspondence refers to the degree to which decisions achieve empirical accuracy; 
that is, whether they reflect the true state of the world’. But others have used 
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the concept of correspondence more broadly, stressing that ‘there are multiple 
correspondence criteria relating to real-world decision performance’ (Todd and 
Gigerenzer, 2000, 738), where these encompass empirical accuracy, speed, frugality, 
fitness maximization, and successful exchanges with others.68  This is explicit in the 
work of many AR theorists (though not all of them, as the quote of Stevens reveals), 
who tend to stress that behaviour and cognition ought to be assessed against 
correspondence and that correspondence refers to speed, accuracy and frugality 
among other goals. At other times, AR theorists suggest that correspondence just 
refers to the achievement of a goal (cf. Gigerenzer and Gaissmeier 2011, 458). It 
should be clear, therefore, that AR theorists do not typically tend to refer to empirical 
accuracy only when using the label “correspondence”. 
  
Overall, it is evident that both coherence and correspondence have undergone a 
significant conceptual change. This does not automatically imply that we have to 
abandon the distinction. Conceptual change is in fact part of scientific progress, one 
might argue. Moreover, one might claim that these semantic changes do not have to 
be necessarily seen as an oversight or as resulting from a lack of care in the 
application of Hammond’s original concepts. In fact, one might argue that, to some 
extent, it should come as no surprise that these notions have been reshaped. For 
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68 In characterizing the perspective of AR theorists, scholars such as Samuels, Stich and Bishop (2002) 
write that ‘according to Gigerenzer, a central consideration when evaluating reasoning is its accuracy’ 
(255). Similar considerations can also be found in Rysiew (2008, 1161). In light of these 
considerations, these scholars have also established links between reliabilism in epistemology and the 
AR project in psychology. For instance, Samuels, Stich and Bishop write that ‘Gigerenzer’s accuracy‐
based criterion for epistemic evaluation bears an intimate relationship to the reliabilist tradition in 
epistemology’ (2001, 255). However, it is important to keep in mind that, while accuracy does seem 
to be a crucial concern for AR, these scholars are also interested in other goals and standards. 
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instance, Hammond’s original definition of coherence as the internal fit of someone’s 
judgments was admittedly vague and thus allowed for quite flexible use. 
 
However, the problem here is not just that these terms have changed their 
meaning, but rather that it is unclear what these terms are now even supposed to 
mean. When AR theorists and other researchers engaged in current debates over 
rational judgement and decision-making talk about correspondence, it is unclear 
whether they are referring to empirical accuracy or whether they are pointing to other 
goods as well. Moreover, if they are referring to other goods, it is still left 
underspecified what these other goods are. Quite frustratingly, several authors switch 
back and forth between Hammond’s conceptualization of correspondence as 
empirical accuracy and other and more liberal characterizations.  
 
It should come as no surprise that, given this lack of clarity, it is quite difficult to 
answer key questions about the nature of rational behaviour and cognition. For 
instance, is achieving correspondence tantamount to achieving adaptive behaviour? It 
is not clear how to answer. It seems fair to claim that, if correspondence refers to 
empirical accuracy, there can be reasons to avoid answering in the positive. To see 
this, it might be worth recalling some of the considerations expressed in our previous 
chapters. As we have seen in Chapter 2, in some contexts paying heed to empirical 
accuracy only might turn out to be evolutionarily maladaptive. But empirical 
inaccuracy could be not only evolutionarily adaptive. In fact, some scholars have 
also argued that empirically inaccurate judgement might promote other goals as well, 
such as mental health (Taylor 1989).  
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Another implication of this lack of clarity in the characterization of 
correspondence is that it is unclear whether such criteria of accuracy apply to 
preferences as well as to inferences. In particular, Stevens points out that ‘both 
criteria (coherence and correspondence) apply to inferences; preferences, however, 
have no correspondence criteria’ (2008, 291). To be sure, if we take correspondence 
to refer to empirical accuracy, these conclusions seem to follow quite naturally. The 
underlying argument is the following. You might ask, for instance, whether 
someone’s preferences are transitive or not. But preferences cannot be assessed in 
terms of empirical accuracy. In brief, only beliefs can be true of the real world: 
desires and preferences cannot.69 If AR theorists seek to replace focus on coherence 
with focus on correspondence, yet correspondence refers to empirical accuracy, there 
is no room for an appraisal of the rationality of people’s preferences. 
 
It is important to stress, however, that if there are multiple and different 
correspondence criteria!and not empirical accuracy only!it is unclear why 
correspondence would and should apply to beliefs only. After all, the idea that 
rationality applies to preferences as well is not new. Dennett, for example, once 
voiced a concern with traditional approaches to rationality: ‘a system’s desires are 
those it ought to have, given its biological needs and the most practical means of 
satisfying them’ (1987, 49). Moreover, as Hausman puts it, ‘preferences, like 
judgements, are subject to rational scrutiny’ (2011, 117). Also Frankfurt made the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
69 It is worth noting that in much of the philosophy of mind and of the social sciences, the terms 
“desire” and “preference” are used interchangeably. However, there could in fact be good reasons to 
avoid this equation. For instance, preferences are two-place relations, desires only one-place relations. 
For some critical discussion of the relationship between desire and preference, see Schulz 
(forthcoming).  
! 133 
point that we ought to have certain desires!although his argument is related to his 
notion of “caring” (Fankfurt 1982). This matters quite a lot: while it is true that 
empirical accuracy does not apply preferences, other criteria of correspondence 
could apply, so to speak, to preferences. This comes out quite clearly, I think, if we 
consider the criterion of fitness maximization (but other criteria seem to apply too), 
which seems to apply to preferences. Take, as an illustration, the case of mate 
preferences. Evolutionary psychologists have investigated them at length (e.g., Buss 
1989; Kenrick and Keefe 1992). Mate preferences can affect the current direction of 
sexual selection by influencing who is differently excluded; they may also reflect 
prior selection pressures, and exert selective pressures on other components. Overall, 
it seems that preferences can vary in their degree of adaptiveness.  
 
It should come out quite clearly that, by employing the coherence - 
correspondence distinction, researchers have not pushed discussions over human 
rationality forward, and have not promoted clarity in the “rationality debate”. 
Hammond’s original concepts of coherence and correspondence are far too narrow 
tools for the purposes of the AR project, viz. to replace traditional standards of 
rational behaviour and cognition with criteria of adaptiveness. But other attempts to 
extend the scope and meaning of the coherence - correspondence distinction have 
also created confusion in the literature.  
 
There seems to be an interesting consideration to make here. As we have seen, 
AR theorists’ adoption of such an unclear conceptual framework appears to hinder 
progress in the “rationality debate”. This is particularly striking if we consider that 
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the very same AR theorists who have distorted Hammond’s coherence - 
correspondence distinction and explicated their normative attack on MBR so poorly 
have also run important campaigns in defence of conceptual and methodological 
rigor in the study of judgment and decision-making. For instance, AR theorist 
Gigerenzer argued that ‘the heuristics in the heuristics-and-biases program are too 
vague to count as explanations’ (1996b, 553). Specifically, he argues that, because 
Kahneman and Tversky’s heuristics are formulated by means of vague terms like 
representativeness, the appeal to these heuristics as generators of biases has limited 
explanatory power. Moreover, and more recently, AR theorists have also argued 
against recent trends to account for people’s judgement and decision-making by 
adopting dual process frameworks. According to Marewski, Gaissmeier and 
Gigerenzer, ‘a dual process framework is too vague to be useful’ (2010, 178).70 Alas, 
it seems fair to conclude that these scholars have not managed to live up to their high 
standards of rigor when articulating their normative perspective. 
 
3. In search of a better conceptual framework 
 
Granted that appealing to the coherence - correspondence distinction has not helped 
to explain the challenge that AR theorists are talking about, the question that arises is 
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70 In this work I am not going to discuss the nature of dual process frameworks in detail. Suffice it to 
say, for our purposes here, that according to dual process theories there are two different kinds of 
cognitive processes underlying human cognition, and thus two distinct processing modes available for 
a cognitive task. The first process is characterized by low computational expense and autonomy. The 
second one is non-autonomous and computationally expensive. Stanovich (1999) famously dubbed 
these different cognitive processes as System 1 and System 2. According to dual process theorists, 
cognitive biases should be attributed mainly to System 1 processing, although these scholars have 
recently started to refine this claim (e.g. Evans and Stanovich 2013). In particular, Stanovich stresses 
that System 1 was designed for the promotion of narrowly genetic goals, such as reproductive success, 
whereas the more flexible System 2 serves the goals of the individual person and allows up to rebel 
against genetic imperatives. For some critical discussion of dual process theories, see, e.g., Carruthers 
(2012), Osman (2004; 2013), and Kruglanski (2013).  
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whether there are better ways of explicating it.71 It seems to me that the best way of 
interpreting and explicating such challenge is to appeal to a contrast between the 
following two approaches to the assessment of rational behaviour and cognition. One 
based on conformity with rules of rationality, and another one based on the 
achievement of goals and desired outcomes. The best way to conceptualize that 
challenge is, therefore, to claim that behaviour should be assessed in terms of the 
achievement of people’s goals and desired outcomes, and not against a set of rational 
norms. I suggest that we refer to these different approaches as rule-based and goal-
based rationality. Importantly, this distinction should not suggest that following rules 
could not result in the achievement of goals. What this should suggest, instead, is 
that behaviour should be assessed against goals rather than rules.72 
 
Interestingly, contrasts analogous to the one between what I am calling here rule-
based and goal-based rationality seem to underlie several other distinctions that have 
been offered in the literature. For instance, Oaksford and Chater, the advocates of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
71  Note, however, that here I am not claiming that the distinction between coherence and 
correspondence cannot be useful in other debates. For instance, the concepts of “coherence” and 
“correspondence” are employed in epistemology (e.g., Ollson 2005), although there is not necessarily 
one-to-one mapping between Hammond’s use of these concepts and how they are employed in those 
debates.  
72 This does not mean that there cannot be implicit goals in following rule-based rationality. As 
Gigerenzer himself points out: ‘each of the […] systems pictures the goals of human behavior in its 
own way. Logic focuses on truth preservation. Consequently, mental logic, mental models (in the 
sense of Johnson-Laird, 1983), and other logic-inspired systems investigate cognition in terms of its 
ability to solve syllogisms, maintain consistency between beliefs, and follow truth table logic. […] 
Probability theory depicts the mind as solving a broader set of goals, performing inductive rather than 
deductive inference, dealing with samples of information involving error rather than full information 
that is error-free, and making risky “bets” on the world rather than deducing true consequences from 
assumptions’ (2008, 20). Yet, it is worth noting that researchers appealing to rule-based rationality 
typically treat goals such as “consistency” and “truth-preservation” as the relevant goals in all 
domains and contexts, without making sure that these are the goals (or the only goals) entertained by 
the reasoners. Scholars appealing to goal-based rationality, on the other hand, tend to appeal to a 
broader range of goals, and such goals are not taken to apply universally, since the importance of a 
goal seems to be context-dependent.  
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“rational analysis” project presented in our previous chapter, claim that according to 
standard perspectives on rational behaviour: 
 
To be rational is to reason according to rules (Brown, 1989). Logic and 
mathematics provide the normative rules that tell us how we should reason. 
Rationality therefore seems to demand that the human cognitive system 
embodies the rules of logic and mathematics. (1994, 608) 
 
This quote seems to provide a characterization of something similar to what I have 
been calling here rule-based rationality. Notably, at other times the very same 
authors refer to “formal rationality” to signify the perspective on rational behaviour 
characterized by conformity with rational norms. According to them: 
 
If formal rationality is viewed as basic, then the degree to which people behave 
rationally can be assessed by comparing performance against the canons of the 
relevant normative theory. (Chater and Oaksford 2000, 99) 
 
But a contrast between rule-based and goal-based rationality seems to underlie 
several other distinctions that had been offered in the literature. For instance, Evans 
and Over (1996) famously distinguished between personal rationality (rationality 1) 
and impersonal rationality (rationality 2). The authors characterize the former as 
thinking or ‘acting in a way that is generally efficient for achieving ones goals’, and 
the latter as ‘thinking or acting when sanctioned by a normative theory’ (1996, 8). 
Moreover, Samuels, Stich and Faucher (2004) appealed instead to a distinction 
between deontological and consequentialist approaches to rational behaviour. 
According to the deontologist, what it is to reason correctly!what is constitutive of 
good reasoning!is to reason in accord with some appropriate set of rules or 
principles, while another prominent view, which is often called consequentialism, 
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maintains that what it is to reason correctly is to reason in such a way that you are 
likely to attain certain goals or outcomes.73 In addition, Kacelnik, Schuck-Pain and 
Pompilio (2006), in the context of evolutionary biology, have contrasted conformity 
with the consistency axioms of economics with the achievement of organisms’ 
adaptive goals.74 While these distinctions might present some differences, they all 
seem to revolve around a contrast between two different questions: Is the organism 
following the relevant norms of rationality? Is the organism achieving his goal? 
While researchers interested in exploring, say, the conjunction fallacy, seem the be 
interested in the former question, AR theorists seem to be interested in addressing the 
second kind of question when asking whether people are making quick and accurate 
predictions in the real world.75  
 
Now, what I want to suggest is that such a contrast between rule-based and goal-
based rationality could be used to frame the challenge mounted by AR theorists as 
well. I also contend here, however, that this characterization should be seen only as a 
starting point, as it needs further refinement.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
73!It is worth mentioning that the distinction between deontological and consequentialist has been 
applied in the context of the “rationality debate” by Schurz (2014) as well. 
74 Although all these distinctions are binary, these contrasts should not be necessarily seen as 
exhaustive. For instance, one could assess behavior by focusing on intellectual virtues such as open-
mindedness and attentiveness, which are not clearly goals entertained by people or formal rules. !
75 One worry one might have here is that the definition of “instrumental rationality” I offered in the 
Introduction is actually very close to what I am calling here goal-based rationality. Some remarks are 
in order, though. Notably, here I am using the labels of rule-based and goal-based rationality to move 
beyond the coherence - correspondence distinction, and my suggested distinction seems to be rather 
helpful in capturing what the genuine bones of contention in this debate are: should we assess 
behaviour against formal rules or goals? Moreover, in my presentation of goal-based rationality I am 
pointing towards an attitude and stance to be adopted in the assessment of behaviour and cognition: 
behaviour has to be assessed against people’s goals. This methodological aspect was not part of the 
characterization of “instrumental rationality”. 
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First, an obvious worry to have with regard to rule-based rationality is that it 
might be unclear what logic, probability theory, and expected utility theory we are 
talking about.  For instance, if your logic is of some paraconsistent variety, then a 
subset of your beliefs may well be inconsistent. Moreover, consider that some 
theoreticians (e.g., Fishburn 1991; Bordley and Hazen 1991; Anand 1987) claim that 
it could be rational to violate transitivity. In addition, compensatoriness does not 
seem to be necessarily part of rule-based rationality. This is important, as the most 
robust evidence invoked by AR theorists comes from research on non-compensatory 
strategies that can be fast, frugal and accurate. The objection might seem to be an 
important one. Yet, I would like to make a couple of remarks. First, while it is true 
that the characterization cries out for further clarification, it seems that there is some 
general consensus around a set of principles of rationality. For instance, consider the 
conjunction rule in probability theory: the probability of some event A occurring 
cannot be less than the probability of some other event and A both occurring. 
Moreover, consider the principle of descriptive invariance, which states that the 
preference order between prospects should not depend on the manner in which they 
are described. Second, even if there was disagreement on what norms should count 
as a rational principles and be part of rule-based rationality, this would not be 
particularly damaging to my analysis here: what I am trying to claim is just that, 
according to a popular perspective on rational behaviour and cognition, the latter has 
to be assessed against a set of rational norms.  
 
Another worry one might have here is that it is unclear whether rule-based 
rationality requires people to actually use a rule in their conscious reasoning. This 
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does not seem to be the case. If we are looking here for a general characterization of 
the approach applied in research on rational behaviour, it seems that researchers have 
not required people to use norms in their conscious reasoning. In fact, it is worth 
noting that rule-based rationality has been applied quite broadly also to ranges of 
animals and even in cases in which it is unclear to what extent they might display 
conscious reasoning (cf. Stanovich 2013; Alcock 2005; Arkes and Ayton, 1999; 
Dukas, 1998; Fantino and Stolarz-Fantino, 2005; Hurley and Nudds, 2006).76 
 
Moreover, since AR theorists seek to offer the perspective of goal-based 
rationality as an alternative to traditional standards of rationality, or what I have 
called rule-based rationality, this perspective has to be characterized quite in detail. 
The reader should recall here that, according to this view, behaviour and cognition 
should be assessed in terms of the achievement of people’s goals. As I have argued 
in previous sections of this work, ideas similar to the ones expressed by AR theorists 
have recently started to gain popularity. In particular, Elqayam and Over write, along 
similar lines, that if ‘behavior is typically well adapted and people typically achieve 
their personal goals, it can be described in some terms as rational’ (2011, 236-7). An 
appeal to the importance of goals has characterized the project of “rational analysis” 
too: Chater and Oaksford (2000, 93) present their empirical program as ‘attempting 
to explain why the cognitive system is adaptive, with respect to its goals’, although 
they suggest that people’s success at achieving goals is ultimately due to their 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
76 There is an interesting open debate over which animals have consciousness and what (if anything) 
that consciousness might be like (cf. Lurz 2009).  
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following standard rational principles. Thus, it seems that AR theorists are not alone 
in appealing to the relevant notion of “goal”.77   
 
Alas, it also turns out that the characterizations of what goals are which are 
generally offered in the literature are quite unsatisfying. As a result, also the 
perspective of goal-based rationality still seems to cry out for further clarification 
and refinement. Very few theoretical treatments of the notion of goal have been 
offered in the psychological literature. With regard to this point, Castelfranchi 
laments that: 
 
A theory of goals be a prerequisite for a principled theory of decision-making 
might look obvious and already well acknowledged in the literature (van 
Osselaer et al. 2005; Kruglanski 1996), but it is not so. The state of our 
ontology and theory of goals for an adequate description of decision-making is 
really disappointing: a lot of distinctions and of clear process models are still 
needed. (2014, 104) 
 
As this quote seems to reveal, the lack of a theory of what goals are seems to affect 
most psychological research on decision-making that appeals to such construct, and 
not just the AR project. This does not mean, however, that no tentative accounts have 
been offered. For instance, a notable attempt to offer a characterization is due to 
Kruglanski and Kopetz (2009, 28), who point out that: 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
77 Other researchers have recently emphasized the importance of assessing behaviour and cognition 
against goal-based rationality, and a number of authors have suggested a list of outcomes that are 
supposed to be suggestive of adaptive and successful behaviour. In particular, according to authors in 
the “Fundamental Motives Framework” (Kenrick et al. 2010), humans have inherited psychological 
mechanisms for solving a set of specific ancestral social challenges and achieve their goals. These 
fundamental challenges include: (1) evading physical harm, (2) avoiding disease, (3) making friends, 
(4) attaining status, (5) acquiring a mate, (6) keeping that mate, and (7) caring for family. While this 
perspective is motivated by evolutionary considerations, goals such as avoiding diseases seem to be 
highly relevant to people’s instrumental rationality as well.  
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We define “goals” as subjectively desirable states of affairs that the individual 
intends to attain through action (Kruglanski, 1996). The notion that the 
individual intends to attain a goal implies that the goal is perceived as 
attainable, apart from it being perceived as desirable. In other words, adoption 
of a goal entails a process of proof (Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti, Erb, and 
Chun, 2007) in which the individual confronts subjectively relevant evidence as 
to a given state’s desirability and attainability. (2009, 28) 
 
Notably, even if one accepted this characterization, there would still be several 
questions one may want to ask. For example, one question that arises, and that the 
abovementioned definition does not explicitly address, is whether conscious 
decision-making is required for the individual to attain a goal. It is true that most 
theories of goals emphasize the role of conscious choice in the adoption of goals and 
that goal adoption needs to be accompanied by a conscious decision. However, 
according to some recent accounts, goals can be automatically put in place by 
situational cues, and they can guide behaviour without a person’s awareness of the 
operation of these goals (Aarts and Dijksterhuis, 2000; Bargh, 1997; Bargh and 
Gollwitzer, 1994). 
 
But there is an even more important issue lurking here. While the abovementioned 
researchers disagree on whether conscious decision-making is required for the 
individual in order to attain her goals, these researchers share the view that, whether 
conscious or not, goals are still psychological states. Yet, different understandings 
seem available.78 In particular, according to other scholars achieving a goal means 
just doing well on some external performance measure. Notably, whilst on some 
occasions AR theorists have seemed to switch between these two different 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
78 For some recent discussions of different conceptualizations of goal-directed behaviour, please see 
Butterfill and Apperly, (2013, 613-614). 
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understandings, in recent contributions it has been stated quite clearly that goals 
should be conceptualized as the fulfilment of some psychological desire-like state 
(e.g., Gigerenzer and Sturm 2012). Here I just want to draw the reader’s attention to 
an often-overlooked implication of such a characterization. Specifically, it seems that 
a characterization of goal-based rationality that conceives of goals as psychological 
desire-like states would be too demanding to be applied to several non-human 
animals: AR theorists have often tried to apply the normative perspective of goal-
based rationality to non-human animals as well,79 but in many cases concepts such as 
desires or intentions might not be appropriate or applicable. Other moves may be 
available to AR theorists to overcome this impasse. For instance, AR theorists might 
want to offer a bifurcation of what we have called goal-based rationality. When this 
applies to human animals, goals are meant to refer to the fulfilment of some desire-
like state. On the other hand, when it refers to at least some non-human animals, 
goals refer to some external performance measure related to survival and 
reproduction.80 
 
To be sure, these are not trivial issues, and providing a clearer characterization of 
the construct of “goal” and of the relevant notion of “goal attainment” seems to be an 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
79 Given these researchers’ interest in instrumentally rational behaviour, this choice seems, at least in 
some cases, quite plausible. After all, a number of animals in some cases do seem to exhibit 
instrumentally rational behaviour. For instance, Searle (2001) begins a book on the philosophy of 
rationality by referring to the famous chimpanzees on the island of Tenerife studied by Wolfgang 
Kohler (1927). Several of the feats of problem solving that the chimps displayed have become classics 
and are often discussed in psychology textbooks. In one situation a chimp was presented with a box, a 
stick, and a bunch of bananas high out of reach. The chimp figured out that he should position the box 
under the bananas, climb up on it, and use the stick to bring down the bananas. Searle (2001) asks us 
to appreciate how the chimp’s behaviour fulfilled all of the criteria of instrumental rationality!the 
chimp used efficient means to achieve its ends. The “desire” of obtaining the bananas was satisfied by 
taking the appropriate action. 
80 After all, the idea that animals exhibit rationality in different degrees is not new (cf. Bermudez 
2003, chap. 6).!
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important task for the AR project. Acknowledging that more research is needed 
should not mean, however, that researchers should refrain from trying to assess 
behaviour and cognition by focusing on the achievement of goals and desirable 
outcomes. Experimental work on the assessment of judgement and decision-making 
and theoretical work on what counts as a goal and as goal-attainment should proceed 




In this chapter I have focused on how we can best explicate the normative challenge 
to MBR that has been put forth by AR theorists. I have argued that, while AR 
theorists generally appeal to a distinction between coherence and correspondence 
criteria to explicate the challenge they are talking about, there are reasons to avoid 
using such distinction. In fact, the introduction of this distinction in the debate has 
resulted in confusion and hindered progress in the field. I have instead suggested that 
researchers should appeal to a distinction between rule-based and goal-based 
rationality and identify unsuccessful behaviour with failures of goal-based 
rationality. I have also shown, however, that much more work still has to be done in 







Chapter 5: Adaptive rationality and cognitive limitations 
 
I have suggested that, in a number of domains, behavior and cognition seem to be 
adaptive in spite of the fact that they violate what I have dubbed rule-based 
rationality, and that researchers interested in adaptive behavior should try to assess 
performance against people’s goals. However, one might argue that my 
characterization of the AR project has gone amiss, and that the crux of the debate 
over the plausibility of AR lies elsewhere. Or one might simply argue that I have at 
least ignored a key argument for AR here. What specifically would I have missed 
here? The objector might argue here that the main problem with rule-based 
rationality is that there are important limitations hindering rule-based rationality from 
being reasonably applied. The goal of this chapter is to deflect these potential 
criticisms. I do so by first exploring the relationship between literature on so-called 
“bounded rationality” (henceforth, BR) and AR. Specifically, in what follows I start 
by showing that commentators in the “rationality debate” often appeal to versions of 
the ought-implies-can principle to defend the normative significance of research on 
BR, and on occasion interpret the normative challenge mounted by AR theorists by 
reference to such principle. I then argue that such an appeal is not needed. In fact, the 
normative framework of AR offers a straightforward way of interpreting the 
normative significance of literature on BR that does not appeal to versions of the 







In outlining the AR challenge to MBR, I have not as yet appealed to human cognitive 
limitations. But one might wonder, at this point, whether my characterization has 
missed an important part of the debate!perhaps even its very core. After all, some 
authors refer to AR theorists by employing the very label “bounded rationality” (BR)  
(e.g., Sturm 2012). To be sure, AR theorists often offer considerations about the 
bounded nature of human cognition. For instance, Gigerenzer and Goldstein write 
that ‘unbounded rationality is a strange and demanding beast’ and that ‘cognitive 
algorithms need to meet more important constraints than internal consistency: they 
need to be psychologically plausible’ (1996, 665). Moreover, AR theorist Gigerenzer 
stresses that ‘Bayes’ rule and other rational algorithms quickly become complex and 
cognitively intractable, at least for ordinary human minds’ (1996, 277). 
Unsurprisingly, in light of these and similar points, the AR project has often been 
seen to rely on the importance of cognitive limitations. For instance, Newell claims 
that, according to AR theorists, ‘the methods of classical rationality are 
computationally intractable and time consuming, and thus beyond the bounds of 
human decision makers’ (2005, 11).  
 
The reader might find herself rather confused: is it not the very fact that people 
have cognitive limitations and that their reasoning is bounded already an admission 
that they cannot be rational? After all, MBR researchers do seem to accept that 
people’s reasoning is bounded, but from this premise they draw rather pessimistic 
conclusions about human rationality. For instance, Richard Thaler explains that 
‘Kahneman and Tversky have shown that mental illusions should be considered the 
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rule rather than the exception. Systematic, predictable differences between normative 
models of behaviour and actual behaviour occur because of what Herbert Simon 
called bounded rationality’ (1980, 40). 81  
 
According to a number of researchers engaged in the “rationality debate”, 
however, we should refrain from drawing pessimistic conclusions from such 
considerations. Specifically, many scholars have emphasized that normative 
standards need to take into account the resources of real cognizers, and that 
departures from normative standards that are unreasonably demanding cannot or 
should not count as cases of irrational behavior. For instance, Nozick, when 
commenting on the traditional normative perspective on rationality, writes that ‘it 
seems necessary that it be a theory which can be satisfied by someone: that is, that it 
not be a theory which is such that in order to satisfy it a being would have to possess 
powers, capacities and skills far beyond those possessed by humans beings as they 
now are’ (1963, 24). Moreover, Cherniak (1986) has argued that the conception of 
rationality that has been pervasively assumed is too idealized, and that only “minimal 
rationality” is required for an actual theory of cognition. In addition, Good (1993) 
has made allowances for human limitations in his distinction between type 1 
rationality, which demands complete conformity with the axioms of utility theory or 
probability, and type 2 rationality, which takes into account the real cost of 
theorising and requires only that no contradiction is found. But similar concerns 
seem to motivate also the distinction that is sometimes made between normative and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
81 Other scholars have pointed instead towards a tension between the very concepts of boundedness 
and rationality. In particular, in the words of Morton: ‘Do not the boundedness and the rationality pull 
in opposite directions, boundedness lowering standards and rationality raising them’ (2012, 176)? 
! 147 
prescriptive models of rationality (e.g., Baron 1985; Stanovich 1999). While 
normative models show how the thinker would do in specific situations without 
taking into account human limitations and constraints, prescriptive models show how 
the ideal thinker should reason once human limitations and constraints are taken into 
account. Yet the list of authors who have made similar points is rather large, 
including Simon (1957; 1973; 1983; 1990) and Harman (1986; 1995). The general 
idea that characterizes these otherwise heterogeneous sets of perspectives on rational 
behaviour and cognition is that we should not ignore the fact that, whilst God and 
Laplace’s super-intelligence do not have to worry about limited time, knowledge, 
and computational capacities, human beings do.  Human rationality is “bounded”, 
and we have to deal with what Cherniak (1986) has referred to as the “finitary 
predicament” of having limited cognitive resources and time.  
 
In the remainder of this chapter, I will elucidate the nature of the relationship 
between BR and AR. In particular, after having introduced research on BR, I will 
present two distinct ways of interpreting concerns about the demandingness of rule-
based rationality. I will then show how (and why) the framework of AR outlined so 
far does not need to appeal to versions of the so-called ought-implies-can principle to 
vindicate the importance of research on BR. 
 
2. The bounds of rationality 
 
The volume of research that goes under the heading of BR is impressive and still 
growing. Consider, for instance, that a recent special issue of the Journal of 
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Economic Methodology was devoted to the topic Methodologies of Bounded 
Rationality. 82  In this section I introduce the concept of BR and the literature 
surrounding it, showing that!and how!research on BR is rather heterogeneous and 
encompasses several different projects. Unsurprisingly, a number of scholars have 
charged BR research with being unclear and overly vague. For instance, Watts 
pointed out that ‘there are so many ways in which rationality can be bounded that we 
can never be sure we have the right one’ (2003, 66). In later sections I will show that 
normative interpretations of research on BR focus on very peculiar aspects of 
descriptive research on BR.  
 
Since the label BR is closely tied to the work carried out by Simon, it makes 
sense to start our discussion here by looking at his work. Following the presentation 
of Grüne Yanoff (2007, 543), it is possible to claim that, when Simon introduced the 
notion of BR, he referred to the fact that humans, unlike fictional omniscient 
Laplacian demons, have to worry about: 
 
• Limited knowledge of the world; 
• Limited time available; 
• Limited ability to evoke this knowledge; 
• Limited ability to work out consequences of actions; 
• Limited ability to conjure up possible courses of action;  
• Limited ability to cope with uncertainty; 
• Limited ability to adjudicate among competing wants. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
82 I am referring to Volume 21, Issue 4 of 2014.  
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The core of Simon’s proposal was that, besides being physically and biologically 
limited, human beings are also cognitively limited beings: not only can we not be in 
two places at once or live forever, we can also only closely pay attention to one thing 
at a time, and our working memory can only hold the famous 7 ± 2 chunks (Miller 
1956). Simon (1955) himself used the analogy of a physical constraint: consider a 
bird that can only fly at up to 70 kilometres per hour; the set of alternatives available 
to escape from a predator does not include flight at 200 kilometres per hour. 
Analogously, a decision-maker cannot compare more than a certain number of 
alternatives. She must define a boundary for the comparative process and then 
choose within this boundary. Human rationality is constrained, and hence 
“bounded”, since we possess limited computational ability and selective memory and 
perception.  
  
However, other lines of empirical research have been associated with the 
concept of BR. For instance, another dimension of BR was presented in Chapter 1. 
According to research within AR, a problem can be efficiently solved if represented 
one way but not if represented another way. Recall, in particular, Gigerenzer’s 
discussion of the difference between single event probabilities and natural 
frequencies. Let us remind ourselves of the nature of this effect. Suppose your 
insurance company asks you to take an HIV test, and that this turns out to be 
positive. You go and visit your doctor, who tells you that there is a 0.01% chance 
that this result is a false positive and that you are not infected. Moreover, she also 
informs you that the prevalence of such infection within the group to which you 
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belong is 0.01%. Would you feel comforted or not? People tend to not be comforted 
at all. The relevant data about base rates are seemingly ignored by people. However, 
according to AR theorists, things change rather a lot once such information is 
provided in terms of natural frequencies. One woman in 10,000 is supposed to have 
HIV, and her test will be positive. Of the remaining 9,999 women who have the test 
but do not have HIV, one will also get a positive result. Once this information is 
provided, it seems that people fare better at figuring out that, in spite of your positive 
result, there is a 1 in 2 chance that you do not have HIV. What is important to stress 
here is that, according to this line of research, our cognition is bounded by an alleged 
inability to deal with some specific problem representations.  
 
 
It is also worth noting, however, that a number of scholars stress that there 
are obvious bounds on rationality that do not derive from limited thinking power. We 
are all subject to wishful thinking, for example. Recently, for instance, the idea that 
our cognition is bounded was introduced into the moral domain as well, where the 
term of “bounded ethicality” was coined (Bazerman and Banaji, 2004; Chugh, 
Bazerman and Banaji, 2005). This is relevant because of the emphasis this notion 
places on motivational factors. In the words of Chugh, ‘bounded ethicality represents 
a subset of bounded rationality situations in which the self is central and therefore, 
motivation is most likely to play a prominent role’ (2005, 8). More precisely, the 
authors stress that they: 
 
Favor a particular vision of the self in our judgments. Just as the heuristics-and-
biases tradition took bounded rationality and specified a set of systematic, 
! 151 
cognitive deviations from full rationality, we endeavor to take bounded 
ethicality and specific systematic, motivational deviations from full ethicality. 
(...) Ethical decisions are biased by a stubborn view of oneself as moral, 
competent, and deserving […] To the self, a view of morality ensures that the 
decision-maker resists temptations for unfair gain; a view of competence 
ensures that the decision-maker qualifies for the role at hand; and a view of 
deservingness ensures that one’s advantages arise from one’s merits. (2005, 9-
10) 
 
More generally, while traditional research has solely focused on cognitive capacities 
as sources of BR, recent work on the role of affective and emotional processes has 
been included under the same heading of BR (Hanoch 2002). In particular, some 
authors have begun to emphasise the numerous effects of emotions on behaviour. 
The idea that our rationality is bounded has thus been used to account for heuristics 
such as the affect heuristic described by Finucane et al. (2000).  
 
The concept of BR has recently been associated with limitations of our 
willpower as well. As Jolls et al. point out, in addition to BR, ‘people often display 
bounded willpower’ (1998, 1479), where “bounded willpower” refers to the fact that 
human beings often take actions that they know to be in conflict with their own long-
term interests. Consider research on so-called “ego depletion”. What has been 
suggested is that self-control is alike to a muscle (e.g. Baumeister et al. 2007): just as 
muscles demand strength and energy in order to exert force for a period of time, acts 
that demand high self-control also demand strength and energy to be performed. 
Similarly, as muscles become tired after a period of continued exertion and have 
limited ability to employ further force, self-control can also become depleted when 
demands are made of its resources over a period of time.  
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I have given a rather general overview of research inspired by, or associated 
with, BR. One might wonder, given that the notion of BR is used to refer to so many 
different things and projects, whether the concept of BR might still be useful. I will 
leave these issues aside. I merely point out that, when attempting to draw normative 
conclusions from claims about the bounded nature of our rationality, we have to be 
careful and specify which dimension of BR we are referring to.  
 
3. Taking the bounds of cognition (too) seriously 
 
So far, we have shown that there are in fact several lines of empirical research that 
appeal to the concept of BR, some emphasizing the role of computational limitations, 
others appealing, for example, to the impact of motivational factors. It is important to 
note, however, that much of the interest in BR concerns the alleged normative 
implications of such research. Specifically, in light of the bounded nature of human 
rationality, a number of researchers have stressed that rule-based rationality is too 
demanding, as it asks for more than our capacities allow. 
 
But how exactly should we think of the demandingness of rule-based rationality? 
One common way of understanding the normative significance of the existence of 
severe bounds on our rationality is by appealing to the some version of the ought-
implies-can principle. Interestingly, the principle has often been invoked in the 
“rationality debate”. A number of scholars appeal to some version of it when trying 
to challenge the idea that violating rule-based rationality is necessarily irrational. For 
instance, Elqayam (2012) writes that: 
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Simon’s (1957, 1982, 1983) model of bounded rationality refers mainly to the 
way that human rationality is constrained by what Cherniak (1986) calls ‘the 
finitary predicament’; that is, physical and cognitive limitations on processing. 
The fact that humans do not live forever, that our brain capacity is finite, 
dictates that only tractable computations could count as rational. The underlying 
rationale is the age old “ought-implies-can” attributed to Kant (1932/1787). 
(2011, 402) 
 
Moreover, Stich has colloquially pointed out that ‘it seems simply perverse to judge 
that subjects are doing a bad job of reasoning because they are not using a strategy 
that requires a brain of the size of a blimp’ (1990, 27). In addition, appealing to 
similar considerations, Stanovich (1999) introduces!in his contribution to the 
“rationality debate”!a position he refers to as “Apologism”, which seems to 
subscribe to the ought-implies-can principle. More precisely, according to the 
Apologist: 
 
It seems perverse to call an action irrational when it falls short of optimality 
because the human brain lacks the computational resources to compute the most 
efficient response. Ascriptions of irrationality seem appropriate only when it 
was possible for the person to have done better. (2004, 157) 
 
The principle was first used in ethics but has since been applied quite broadly. It has 
also attracted a number of criticisms (see Stern 2004; Vranas 2007; Graham 2011 for 
some critical discussions of the principle). For our current purposes we simply need 
to stress that the relevance of the principle clearly depends on what counts as falling 
within a person’s capacities and on what counts as exceedingly demanding. 
Following Till Grüne Yanoff (2007), we can argue that normative standards might be 
too demanding in the sense that they require us to do things that we find very hard to 
do, things that constitute significant sacrifices. But normative standards might also 
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be demanding also in the sense that they require us to do things that we literally 
cannot do, things that go beyond our capacities. Using Grüne Yanoff’s analogy with 
morality, in relation to which the principle was first applied, it might be argued that 
morality is too demanding because it requires people to devote the majority of their 
income to charity, or because it requires someone to save a person whom it is 
impossible to save. In a similar fashion, norms of rationality might be too demanding 
because following them is laborious or because we literally cannot follow them.  
 
 
Notably, the strength of the principle seems to depend on which notion of 
demandingness we pick. As Grüne Yanoff points, ‘uttering “I can’t do this” when 
faced with the annual tax report, for example, does not usually mean that one does 
not have the capacity to do it and thus should not do it’ (2007, 555). In a similar way, 
while following rule-based rationality might be demanding, in the weaker sense of 
the term, the person who claims this should expect to be told that this is just the 
nature of rationality, and that we just have to accept its demandingness. It seems fair 
to say that many colloquial uses of ‘can’ do not make the principle compelling in this 
context. However, the second and stronger sense of demandingness seems to lend 
more robust grounding to the ought-implies-can principle: it is more difficult to 
accept that someone is irrational when she or he literally could not have done 
otherwise. In fact, as we noted earlier in the chapter, the application of the ought-
implies-can principle in the context of the “rationality debate” seems to be based on 
the stronger sense of demandingness and on a particular aspect and dimension of 
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research on BR. Specifically, the clearest cases of strong demandingness refer to our 
computational limitations.  
 
In the remainder of this section I will discuss this strategy in more detail and also 
mention some of the problems it seems to face. After this, I will present an 
alternative way of thinking about the normative relevance of research on BR.  
 
To appreciate the apparent plausibility of the strategy, it is worth stressing that 
there are cases where concerns about the psychological implausibility of rule-based 
rationality look quite compelling. Consider the consistency preservation principle,83 
which seems to be a tenet of rule-based rationality. We can easily see how some 
tasks in which this principle is involved might quickly become intractable. The 
computational problem will emerge once a person begins to monitor and to check the 
consistency of her beliefs. For instance, consider a person with n beliefs. In order to 
check the pair-wise consistency of n beliefs, n(n-1)/2 pairs have to be compared. But 
is consistency computationally possible? Assuming a person has 150 stable 
relationships and holds 20 beliefs about each partner, she holds a total of total of 
3,000 beliefs. Consequently, she has to check 4,498,500 pairs concerning their 
consistency. Assuming that checking a single pair takes one second, she would have 
to spend 1,562 workdays (8 hours per day) checking the consistency of her beliefs. If 
we assume that a person has many more beliefs about her close social network 
(family, friends and so forth), say 100 times as many, and assume this to consist of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
83 Stein characterizes the principle along these lines: ‘Suppose we have the intuition that before a 
person commits herself to some belief p, she should check to make sure that p is logically compatible 
with all her other beliefs’ (1996, 163).  
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20 people, she has to check a total of 915,898,600 pairs for consistency. This would 
amount to 31,802 years spending eight hours every day on checking the consistency 
of one’s beliefs. Since the number of pairs increases exponentially with the number 
of elements, checking consistency quickly becomes a computationally intractable 
problem when n increases. Arguably, for mere mortals, being fully consistent in 
environments involving larger ns becomes computationally impossible. It thus seems 
that, at least in this case, it is simply impossible, literally impossible, to conform to 
rule-based rationality.  
 
It is also interesting to stress, though, that while commentators on the “rationality 
debate” have often interpreted the normative relevance of research on BR by 
appealing to this application of the ought-implies-can principle, this choice might 
seem to be problematic.  
 
In particular, there are reasons to think that a strategy appealing to cases of strong 
demandingness cannot really apply to MBR and, in particular, to well-known tasks in 
the heuristics-and-biases literature. To see this, consider that, while a person trying 
to follow the consistency preservation principle would never have enough time to 
acquire new beliefs, it does not seem to be the case that following rules such as, for 
instance, the conjunction rule would lead to computational explosion. On the 
contrary, as Stein has convincingly argued (cf. 1996, 248), the conjunction rule that 
we have discussed extensively on several occasions does seem to be a reasonable 
candidate for the implementation in human brains in real time. On the face of it, it 
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does not seem to be true that the norms used in such tasks are not ‘psychologically 
plausible’. 
 
Moreover, the idea that it is not exceedingly demanding to comply with rule-based 
rationality gains support from further considerations that will be explored in the next 
chapter, and more precisely, from the evidence offered by Keith Stanovich and his 
co-workers showing that not everyone violates rule-based rationality in MBR tasks. 
This suggests that it is computationally possible for humans to do so. Specifically, at 
least some people seem to be able to follow those norms, and thus following rule-
based rationality in standard MBR tasks does not seem to go beyond human 
cognitive capacities, or at least beyond the cognitive capacity of some of the 
reasoners. It seems fair to conclude, therefore, that the attack on MBR based on the 
ought-implies-can principle and on a strong understanding of demandingness seems 
to suffer from a serious shortcoming.  
 
One might reply at this point that following those norms goes beyond the 
cognitive capacities of some people, but not of others. More precisely, one might 
insist that people who fail to comply with rule-based rationality do so because of the 
computational limitations they face, which differ from those of people who do not 
violate rule-based rationality. After all, human beings differ greatly with respect to 
the limitations they face!the limitations of children differ from those of adults, and 
the limitations of highly intelligent people differ from those whose intelligence is not 
so high. However, I see some problems with this view. 
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 One problem might be the following: as we will see in the next chapter, for some 
biases there is no direct correlation between cognitive capacity and susceptibility to 
bias, where standard tests of intelligence are often taken to provide an 
operationalization of cognitive and computational capacity. Thus, it might be 
difficult to explain differences in performance on the part of reasoners in terms of 
differences in cognitive capacities. In the words of Stanovich, this strategy: 
  
[w]ill not work for all of the irrational tendencies that have been uncovered in 
heuristics-and-biases literature. This is because some of those biases are not 
very strongly related with measures of intelligence (2011b, 357) 
 
Moreover, and more importantly, it is also unclear whether people with limited 
computational power really cannot do any better and bring themselves to follow rule-
based rationality. After all, cognitive limitations do not seem to be absolute and the 
cognitive load that different tasks place on our brains can be attenuated by using or 
by altering external factors. For instance, although I do not know of any studies on 
how much these reduce the computational load, it is evident that when we are 
coupled with external resources our computational powers can increase in significant 
ways.84 As it turns out, we tend to deposit the contents of our working memory in the 
environment. We do that not solely for the purpose of storing information. We 
deposit such contents in a form upon which we are still able of executing 
computations. We can do multiplication in our heads with numbers up to 10. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
84 As it turns out, while it is true that research on BR has inspired some applications of the ought-
implies-can principle, other research within the framework of BR seems to make the application of 
this principle rather difficult. Specifically, on the one hand, scholars appealing to the ought-implies-
can principle suggest that it is impossible to comply with rule-based rationality. On the other hand, 
research on de-biasing inspired by BR suggests that, at least on a number of occasions, it is possible 
for people to follow rule-based rationality: since ought implies can, but can seems to be possible for 
humans, there does not seem to be any argument against the normative validity of rule-based 
rationality.  
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However, we are unable to go beyond that!and this in spite of the fact that we have 
all learnt a method that transforms the larger problem into a number of smaller 
problems, each of which we are capable of solving in our head (e.g., to multiply 34 
by 78, first you multiply 8 by 4, then you multiply 8 by 3, etc.). Each of these sub-
problems we can easily solve in our heads, but the reason we cannot solve the 
problem as a whole is that the solution to these four sub-problems must be kept in 
working memory in order to resolve the final sub-problem, which involves addition 
of the four products. Moreover, as AR theorists have tried to show, at least in some 
cases (e.g., in the case with the base rate fallacy) it seems possible to make a 
problem easier to compute by modifying the format of information (e.g., by using 
natural frequencies instead of single probabilities).85 If this is correct, it follows that a 
person’s computational power can be improved in some cases. This suggests, in turn, 
that it is unclear whether, when the right resources and conditions apply, people with 
limited computational power really cannot conform to rule-based rationality.  
 
4. AR and the bounds of cognition 
 
So far, we have seen that there is a popular way of interpreting the normative 
significance of research on BR that appeals to versions of the ought-implies-can 
principle. We have also seen, however, that attacks on MBR based on the application 
of this principle do not seem to be particularly scathing.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
85 We have discussed some of the relevant literature in Chapter 1, but see also Goldstein and 
Rothschild (2014) for more recent research on bias mitigation and de-biasing mediated by 
environmental factors.!
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Here I wish to clarify that, whilst it is also rather common to interpret the 
challenge mounted by AR theorists as resting on the application of the ought-implies-
can principle, this attribution does not seem to be appropriate. Hands writes, for 
instance, that ‘ecological rationality86 did seem to win on ought-implies-can grounds’ 
(2014, 13).87 This is a rather popular trend, as if there were no other possible ways to 
think of the normative value of research on BR than by appealing to this principle.  
 
I wish to suggest, now, that there is actually no need to apply this principle in 
order to make sense of the normative relevance of research on BR and of AR 
theorists’ interest in people’s BR. In fact, it seems to me that the framework of AR 
articulated in the previous chapters might offer a different way to do this.  
 
Recall that, from the perspective of AR, what matters is the achievement of 
adaptive behaviour and cognition, and that people’s performance has to be measured 
against their goals and desired life outcomes. According to this framework, even if 
rule-based rationality is not overly demanding in the strong sense required by an 
application of the ought-implies-can principle, it still matters rather a lot whether 
following the norms of rule-based rationality is laborious and demanding. 
Specifically, we agents should be sensitive to the fact that following some norms is 
laborious and costs time, energy, and so forth, because (and as long as) these are 
goods that people value. In other words, if rule-based rationality requires extensive 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
86 It is still worth restating that, as I stated in the Introduction, I stick to the label AR, although this 
perspective is often referred to as “ecological rationality”. 
87 See also Rini (2015, 157) and Carruthers (2006, 229) for similar attributions of this principle to AR. 
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computations, losses of time and huge efforts, it can hardly be seen to be linked to 
adaptive behaviour and cognition. 
 
To see this, let us follow the presentation offered by Schulz (2011a, 1277), who 
has stressed that, from the perspective of AR, the success of an agent’s behaviour is 
determined by an equation like the following: S = aB + cD + eF, where B, D and F 
are the values of a set of relevant goods, and a, c, and e their relative importance. 
According to AR, rule-based rationality cannot be conducive to adaptive behaviour 
and cognition if it overlooks key factors and goals, such as saving time and effort. 
On this view, reasoning rules should thus be ‘psychologically plausible’ or, more 
precisely, they should not be overly demanding. Otherwise, following rule-based 
rationality would end up being maladaptive.  
 
BR has normative relevance, on this view, because cognitive and time limitations 
are part of our epistemic context, and the quality of decision-making strategies 
should be assessed within appropriate epistemic contexts. Given the existence of 
such limitations, behaviour that violates rule-based rationality can be more adaptive 
than behaviour that conforms to it.  
 
These aspects seem to be particularly clear in the studies by Herbert Simon. His 
work on satisficing clearly illustrates the sorts of considerations presented above 
(e.g., Simon 1979). Specifically, Simon famously argued that decision makers 
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typically satisfice rather than optimize.88 A decision-maker normally chooses an 
alternative that meets or exceeds specified criteria, even when this alternative is not 
guaranteed to be unique or in any sense optimal. Simon argues that, instead of 
scanning all the possible alternatives, computing the probability of every outcome of 
each alternative, calculating the utility of each alternative, and thereupon selecting 
the optimal option with respect to expected utility, an organism typically chooses the 
first option that satisfies its “aspiration level”. His concept of satisficing postulates, 
for instance, that an organism would choose the first object (a mate, perhaps) that 
satisfies its aspiration level instead of taking the time to survey all other possible 
alternatives. These considerations might thus be important when considering 
experimental results from, say, consumer or mate choice. 
 
Following rule-based rationality might not just cost time. It might be quite 
effortful and painful as well. Recall that, according to rule-based rationality, people 
should conform to probabilistic norms such as Bayes’ theorem!the idea that the 
probability of a hypothesis should be updated in light of new evidence by weighing 
both the base rate and the diagnostic evidence. Yet, as we saw in Chapter 1, people 
often neglect or underweight base rates. Let us now consider a case suggested by 
Elqayam (2012). Imagine that someone has lower than average intelligence. And 
imagine also that she is not motivated to engage in effortful processing, for she finds 
hard thinking to be particularly painful and not really productive. She might have 
goals that pull in different directions. On the one hand, she might want to give an 
accurate answer to a problem requiring the application of Bayes’ theorem. However, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
88!It is worth noting that Simon also used the term for a specific heuristic: choosing the first 
alternative that satisfies an aspirational level.!
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on the other hand, she might also want to spend as little cognitive effort as possible. 
What is important to stress here is that, for a subject who finds hard thinking rather 
painful, it might be adaptively irrational to comply with rule-based rationality, as this 
would involve significant losses in time and huge and painful cognitive effort. 
 
Notably, the abovementioned example suggests that AR theorists’ concerns about 
the demandingness of rule-based rationality might apply to a broader set of cases 
than those offered by scholars appealing to the ought-implies-can principle, and to at 
least some tasks and examples from literature on MBR.  
 
To conclude this section, let us briefly take stock of what we have achieved here: 
I have shown that there are ways of conceptualizing the normative significance of 
BR that do not appeal to versions of the ought-implies-can principle. In particular, 
from the perspective of AR, we have to take the bounds of cognition very seriously, 
as they characterize the epistemic contexts in which behaviour and cognition occur. 
Because of such bounds, following rule-based rationality might end up being 
maladaptive.  
 
5. BR and optimism about human rationality 
 
Therefore, it seems that, from the perspective of AR, some aspects of research on 
BR, and more precisely a person’s time and cognitive limitations, do have normative 
relevance. In other words, given that these limitations are part of our epistemic 
contexts, following rule-based rationality might not be adaptive. Thus, it might seem 
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that the scenarios described above resemble the cases discussed in Chapter 3, where 
we encountered contexts in which, because of the particular configuration of the 
environment and the goals of the reasoners, following rule-based rationality turned 
out to be maladaptive, and violating rule-based rationality turned out to be adaptive.  
 
 
It is worth reminding ourselves that appeals to the ought-implies-can principle had 
generally been used to question pessimistic views on human rationality: if following 
rule-based rationality is too demanding!it is often said!then its violations should 
not count as instances of irrationality. However, when we consider this alternative 
interpretation of the normative relevance of literature on BR, it becomes clear that 
we should be very careful when trying to draw optimistic conclusions. 
 
 
To see this, consider that, if a reasoner is trying to make an accurate judgement in 
little time and energy, following a strategy that does not lead to accurate predictions 
but allows to save time and effort might be better than spending too much time and 
energy to get a more accurate prediction. However, if heuristics imply major losses 
in accuracy, then such behaviour cannot be seen as optimal or as a clear instance of 
adaptive behaviour and cognition.89 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
89 Here we are suggesting a sort of ranking of different strategies according to their adaptive value. 
With regard to this point, it is important to highlight that the perspective of AR assumes that 
“rationality” is a comparative concept, and this marks a significant departure from traditional 
approaches towards rational behaviour and cognition. In particular, from the perspective of rule-based 
rationality, the assessment of behaviour is achieved quite straightforwardly by checking each norm 
and, if any are violated, irrational behaviour is claimed. The evaluation is binary because rule-based 
rationality is all-or-nothing in nature. As Morton pointed out, it is often claimed that ‘intelligence is 
certainly a comparative concept, but some philosophers have denied that rationality is’ (2012, 141). 
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To be sure, as we have seen in Chapter 3, AR theorists contend that fast-and-
frugal heuristics might violate rule-based rationality and yet be successful, when 
measured in terms of their accuracy, speed and frugality. In Chapter 7 I will come 
back to these claims, examining whether these generalizations are warranted. Here, 
instead, I want to stress that what is often overlooked in the literature is that, in some 
cases, even small losses of accuracy might be quite important. Specifically, the 
importance of a goal seems to vary from context to context. For instance, the passage 
of time is certainly a pressing concern faced by an organism in a variety of dynamic 
environmental situations: organisms may have occasional speed-based encounters 
where the slower individual is placed at a serious disadvantage. Moreover, the faster 
an organism can make decisions and act on them to accrue resources or reproductive 
opportunities, the greater advantage it will have over slower competitors. But at other 
times, accuracy is definitely a more pressing concern. In particular, there are some 
decisions, such as whether to get married to someone, where making accurate 
decisions might be more important than saving time. In these latter sorts of contexts, 
even small losses in accuracy might result in maladaptive behaviour on the side of 
the cognizer. I take these considerations to suggest that, in some cases, saving time 




In this chapter, I have explored the connections between some aspects of BR and the 
normative framework of AR. In particular, I have shown that, whilst several scholars 
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in the “rationality debate” tend to conceptualise the normative relevance of both BR 
and the AR project by appealing to versions of the ought-implies-can principle, the 
framework of AR offers in fact an alternative way of doing so. I have also suggested 
that we take extra care in trying to draw optimistic conclusions about human 





















Chapter 6: Adaptive rationality meets research on individual differences 
 
In this work, we have seen that biases can be instances of adaptive behaviour and 
cognition and that researchers should try to assess performance against the goals 
people entertain and against desired life outcomes. At this point, however, I also 
wish to discuss a reply that seems to be available to MBR theorists. These scholars 
can in fact appeal to other evidence to question the framework on rational behaviour 
and cognition articulated by AR theorists. In particular, in this chapter I consider the 
recent appeal to research on individual differences in reasoning and decision-making, 
which is mainly due to the work carried out by Stanovich. As it turns out, in several 
corners of research on judgement and decision-making it is claimed that such body 
of research has far-reaching implications for our understanding of human rationality 
and for the plausibility of the AR project. Here I reconstruct and discuss two 
different arguments based on this research which are directed at the AR project. 
First, heterogeneity in the use of heuristics seems to be at odds with the adaptationist 
background of the project. Second, the existence of correlations between cognitive 
ability and susceptibility to bias suggests that rule-based rationality is normatively 





In Chapter 3, we discussed and rebutted a number of moves that seemed to be open 
to MBR researchers to resist the conclusions by AR theorists. At this point, however, 
I wish to draw the reader’s attention to a more general strategy to which advocates of 
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MBR research can appeal. Specifically, a group of researchers have argued that a 
crucial body of evidence has been unduly neglected by researchers in the “rationality 
debate” and, in particular, by AR theorists. The evidence I am referring to concerns 
findings on individual differences in reasoning and decision-making. Specifically, in 
a series of publications, Stanovich and his coworkers have argued that their reported 
findings ultimately undermine the AR project (e.g., Stanovich 2011b). The goal of 
this chapter is to assess whether Stanovich’s arguments really undermine the AR 
project. The first argument I discuss is supposed to challenge the adaptationist 
underpinnings of AR. Precisely, Stanovich’s reported findings on heterogeneity in 
the use of heuristics seem to be at odds with the idea that adaptationist pressures led 
to their use: one would expect their use to be far closer to universality if adaptationist 
pressures had led to them.90 The second argument questions instead the normative 
claims made by AR theorists. The fact that people with higher cognitive ability 
follow rule-based rationality seems to suggest that rule-based rationality is 
normatively valid and there to stay, and that AR theorists should not try to replace 
rule-based rationality.91  
 
I argue, however, that Stanovich’s arguments fail to undermine the AR project. 
Not only commitments to adaptationism are not vital to the AR project, but I also 
argue that the actual heterogeneity of reasoning performance seems to be compatible 
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90  My reconstruction of this argument follows Kelman’s (e.g. 2013, 355). I take such reading to 
provide the strongest version of Stanovich’s attack on the adaptationist background of AR (cf. 
Stanovich 2004, chap. 5). 
91 For instance, Stanovich writes that ‘one aspect of this variability that researchers have examined is 
whether it is correlated at all with cognitive sophistication. […] We might take the direction of this 
association as a validation of the normative models’ (2011b, 14).  
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with an adaptationist account, and perhaps even necessary for some plausible 
evolutionary stories. In addition, even the most plausible version of the second 
argument cannot be seen as fully compelling: it might be argued that people who 
score higher at tests of cognitive ability achieve better life outcomes because they do 
not reason heuristically. However, even if we grant that people with higher cognitive 
ability achieve better outcomes, the claim that they do so because they follow rule-
based rationality remains at a hand-waving level and is not empirically well 
supported.  
 
The chapter is structured as follows. In section 2, I discuss Stanovich’s research 
on individual differences. In section 3, I reconstruct and assess the first argument 
based on his research. In section 4, I do the same for the second argument. In light of 
this discussion, I then conclude in section 5. 
 
2. Stanovich’s research on individual differences in judgement and decision-
making 
 
As we have seen in our investigation, research in the field of judgement and 
decision-making has described a variety of heuristics that reasoners seem to deploy 
(e.g., Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996; Gilovich et al. 2002). Familiar examples are 
the availability heuristic (judge an event frequency by the ease with which instances 
of the event can be recalled; Kahneman and Tversky 1973) and the recognition 
heuristic (if you recognize only one item in a set, choose that one; Goldstein and 
Gigerenzer 2002). Yet, while several heuristics have been associated with human 
decision-making and formally modelled, little attention had been paid to the 
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existence of individual differences in their use until Stanovich and his co-workers 
(e.g., Stanovich 1999; Stanovich and West 2008) started to conduct a stream of 
individual differences studies involving reasoning and decision-making. A result of 
their research is that there is remarkable heterogeneity in the use of heuristics. 
Consider, once again, the conjunction fallacy (Tversky and Kahneman 1983). This 
phenomenon is usually interpreted as an indication of irrationality, because it violates 
the conjunction rule of probability theory. While most of the subjects in Stanovich’s 
experiment displayed the conjunction effects, some did not (e.g., Stanovich 1999). 
Stanovich has pointed out that: 
 
What has largely been ignored is that although the average person might well 
display an overconfidence effect, underutilize base rates, violate axioms of 
probability theory, and so forth, on each of these tasks, some people give the 
standard normative response. (2011, 13) 
 
There is systematic variability in all of these tasks: while people have been shown to 
have a strong propensity to use heuristics, not everyone does. In fact, a sizeable 
number of people do not deploy heuristics. Moreover, these people do not just 
randomly fail to use heuristics, but they systematically reason in a very different way 
from other humans. In the main, Stanovich has focused on the cognitive strategies 
invoked in the heuristics-and-biases tradition (e.g., Gilovich et al. 2002; Nisbett and 
Ross 1980), but large individual variability in strategy use has been reported also 
with regard to the heuristics generally modelled within the AR framework, like in the 
case of the recognition heuristic (cf. Richter and Spaeth 2006). The evidence 
available strongly supports a scenario where different types of reasoners, namely 
heuristic and non-heuristic users, coexist. Specifically, for several classes of 
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reasoning and decision-making tasks there are significant cross-task correlations: 
people that do not use heuristics in one context also do not do so in another 
(Stanovich and West, 1998, 2000; West, Toplak, and Stanovich 2008). 
 
Stanovich’s research, however, also shows that there are important correlations 
between the use of heuristics and cognitive abilities. It is useful to briefly introduce 
the concept of cognitive ability. When a diverse range of mental tests (e.g., 
understanding paragraphs, doing arithmetic, following instructions, estimating 
lengths, remembering words, identifying absurdities in pictures) is performed by a 
large group of people, the associations among the test scores form a pattern: no 
matter what type of mental work the tests involve, people who do well on one type of 
mental task tend to do well on all of the others. This phenomenon is known as 
general cognitive ability and it is usually shortened to just a lowercase italicized g.  
 
Using standard measures of general cognitive ability, Stanovich and his 
colleagues examined effects that are among the most known in the literature, such as 
base-rate fallacy, framing effects, and conjunction fallacies, and the result of their 
research was that cognitive ability is associated with performance in those tasks. It 
seemed that people with higher cognitive ability were less susceptible to cognitive 
biases. But the accumulating findings have also resulted in some conflicting results. 
In particular, some evidence collected by Stanovich has more recently suggested that 
these associations between cognitive ability and performance in judgement and 
decision-making are not as strong as initially supposed. Some biases, such as 
overconfidence and hindsight bias, correlate with cognitive ability, but others, such 
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as anchoring and sunk costs effects, do not (e.g., Stanovich and West 2008). 
Moreover, while the existence of correlations between cognitive ability and use of 
fast-and-frugal heuristics proposed by AR theorists is undertested, some evidence 
suggests that in some contexts people who score higher at intelligence tests reason 
heuristically (Broder 2003).92  
 
In light of this mixed evidence about the strength of the links between general 
cognitive ability and performance on judgement and decision-making tasks, 
Stanovich and his co-workers have also investigated other cognitive variables as 
predictors of performance. While cognitive ability might be a predictor of 
performance in judgement and decision-making, there is a better predictor, which is 
the so-called “cognitive reflection test” (CRT; Frederick 2005). Frederick has 
developed such test as a 3-item task shown to predict susceptibility to various 
cognitive biases. Stanovich and his co-workers have praised these measures as 
excellent predictors of performance in judgement and decision-making tasks (Toplak 
et al. 2011). Among the other cognitive constructs that have been explored, 
numeracy seems to hold promise for understanding and predicting behaviour (Reyna 
et al. 2009), where numeracy refers to the ability to understand and use numbers and 
has been shown to predict quite well susceptibility to a variety of biases and fallacies 
(Peters et al. 2006). While these other cognitive constructs might be better candidates 
for the prediction of cognitive biases, Stanovich has nonetheless highlighted that ‘it 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
92 Notably, however, Broeder (2003) used the Berlin Intelligence Structure (BIS) test, as it is common 
in German speaking countries. It is not entirely clear, however, how performance at this test relates to 
performance at other tests used to assess intelligence in Anglo-American research (Beauducel and 
Kersting 2002).  
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is never the case that subjects giving the non-normative response are higher in 
intelligence than those giving the normative response’ (2011b, 15). 
 
3. The argument from the heterogeneity in the use of heuristics 
 
First, Stanovich’s findings seem to be at odds with the AR project’s adaptationist 
background and, more precisely, with attempts to understand the way people reason 
and make decisions by looking at human evolutionary history and appealing to the 
effect of natural selection. Specifically, Stanovich’s reported heterogeneity in the use 
of heuristics seems problematic, as one would expect the use of heuristics to be far 
closer to universal if adaptationist pressures had led to their use. This argument is 
thus supposed to create troubles for the AR project’s evolutionary underpinnings. 
 
Notably, evolutionary psychologists often stress that the psychological mechanisms 
that evolved to solve Pleistocene adaptive problems now constitute ‘an arrow of 
psychological mechanisms that is universal among homo sapiens’ (Symons 1992, 
139). Indeed, there seems to be a straightforward link between adaptationism and 
universality. The underlying reasoning seems to be that Pleistocene humans 
possessing a psychological mechanism that effectively solved an adaptive problem 
would have enjoyed a reproductive advantage over population members not 
possessing it, and that there was ample opportunity for selection to drive each 
beneficial psychological mechanism to fixation in early human populations.  
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Stanovich’s argument can be summarized as follows. (1) There is heterogeneity in 
the use of heuristics. (2) If heuristics were the result of adaptationist pressures, then 
there would not be heterogeneity it the use of heuristics. (3) Heuristics are not the 
result of adaptationist pressures. The argument is thus based on two main premises; 
for the argument to go through, both of them have to be true. The truth of premise (1) 
can be granted relatively easily. Even AR theorists have accepted that individual 
differences in judgement and decision-making ought to receive more attention in 
future research, since ‘in virtually every task we find individual differences in 
strategies’ (Gigerenzer and Brighton 2009, 133).  
 
Before I analyse premise 2, it is worth stressing that it is unclear whether the 
argument, even if sound, would turn out to be particularly damaging to AR theorists. 
To be sure, in Chapter 2 we did present some adaptationist considerations offered by 
AR theorists to account for people’s violations of rule-based rationality in their 
reasoning and decision-making. But it is unclear whether a commitment to 
adaptationism is necessary for AR theorists.93 With this clarification in place, now I 
want to argue that, whatever reason we may have to question an adaptationist 
perspective, this should not be based on Stanovich’s research on individual 
differences in judgement and decision-making. Notably, this is only limited support 
for an adaptationist perspective. More specifically, whilst adaptationist 
considerations may offer some interesting suggestions or provide some support for 
some particular hypotheses, in Chapter 2 I also stressed the influence of factors 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
93 One might want to emphasize that in fact AR theorists do not completely exclude the importance of 
factors beyond natural selection. In particular, it is interesting to note that, while Stanovich argues that 
AR theorists completely ignore the role of culture (2004, 132), at some times AR theorists do seem to 
appeal to cultural learning to explain people’s behaviour (e.g. Hutchinson and Gigerenzer 2005; see 
also Arnau et al. 2014 for a discussion of the topic).  
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beyond natural selection, showing that they may result, for instance, in the evolution 
of non-adaptive traits and behaviour. The goal of this section is merely to show that 
there are moves available to adaptationists to accommodate Stanovich’s findings, 
and I will briefly discuss some of the mechanisms that might result in actual 
heterogeneity. Moreover, I will show that a number of researchers have already 
started to link adaptationist models to actual heterogeneity in decision-making 
performance. Thus, I suggest that the argument reconstructed above does not work 
mainly because premise (2) is false.  
 
3.1 Universally distributed heuristics and individual differences 
 
Even if all humans exhibited no genetic differences, differences in the use of 
decision-making strategies could still occur as a result of different situational 
assessments. Consider the theory of evolutionary socialization, which seeks to 
establish a causal link between the perception of early childhood living conditions 
and later reproductive strategies (Belsky Steinberg and Draper 1991). According to 
the hypothesis, the degree of environmental stress experienced during childhood can 
be an indicator of adult reproductive conditions (e.g., the prevalence of monogamy 
and paternal investment). This hypothesis proposes that humans possess a 
conditional adaptation that uses childhood stress as a cue to channel maturation and 
psychosocial development so that they fit the demands of the predicted optimal 
reproductive strategy in adulthood. Individuals growing up in father absent homes 
during the first five to seven years of life develop the expectations that parental 
resources will not be reliably provided. Accordingly, insecure and unsupportive 
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family relationships would accelerate pubertal development and, in particular, 
females with such relationships would be enabled to initiate mating and reproduction 
earlier than females in secure and supportive family relationships. This effect would 
be advantageous in environments in which survival and thereby reproduction could 
be compromised. The opposite effect would occur in secure and supportive family 
relationships: pubertal development would decelerate, and females with such 
relationships would be able to delay reproduction and mating.  
 
Moreover, conditional shifts can be due to adjustments to one’s own physical 
phenotype. Tooby and Cosmides (1990) coined the term “reactive heritability” to 
describe evolved psychological mechanisms designed to take as input heritable 
qualities as a guide to strategic solutions. Any feature of the individual’s world, 
including one’s personal characteristics, that influences the successful attainment of 
those goal states may be assessed and evaluated by psychological mechanisms. 
Evolved mechanisms in this view are not early attuned to recurrent features of the 
external world, but can also be attuned to the evolution of the self. Suppose that all 
men have an evolved decision-rule of the form: pursue an aggressive strategy when 
aggression can be successfully implemented to achieve goals, but pursue a 
cooperative strategy when aggressions cannot be successfully implemented. Given 
this simplified rule, those who happen to be muscular in body can more successfully 
carry out an aggressive strategy than those who are skinny or endomorphic. If these 
individual differences in body build are at least partly heritable and provide input 
into the decision rule, they may produce stable individual differences in aggression 
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and cooperativeness that are adaptive and not directly heritable. They are rather 
based on a self-assessment of heritable information. 
 
3.2 Heterogeneity in the distribution of heuristics and individual differences 
 
Adaptive individual differences in the use of strategies might arise from genetic 
differences as well. In particular, balancing selection occurs when genetic variation 
is maintained by selection and might be a crucial mechanism maintaining genetic 
variation. The basic idea is that, if selection pressures vary over time or space, then 
selection may favour different levels of a personality trait in these different 
environments and consequently different strategies. For example, some environments 
might favour a risk taking personality, while others might favour a more cautious 
risk-averse personality. A recent natural experiment provides some support for the 
speculation that heterogeneity might be explained by appeal to balancing selection. 
Camperio Ciani et al. (2007) reported findings that indirectly support a role to 
balancing selection in sustaining genetic variance of personality. They studied 
average personality differences of Italian coast-dwellers compared to Italians living 
off the coast on three small island groups. They studied islanders from three different 
archipelagos isolated from each other. After matching populations for cultural, 
historical and linguistic background, and controlling for age, sex and education, they 
found that islanders from three distinct archipelagos isolated from each other share 
consistent, distinctive personality profiles. They differ from their respective 
mainlanders in being more conscientious and emotionally stable, and less extraverted 
and open. As expected, these differences were not very large; however, they were 
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significant and consistently observed in all the archipelago/mainland population pairs 
studied. This pattern makes cultural or developmental explanations for the 
population differences unlikely and suggests change on the genetic level. Even 
though individual fitness consequences of these traits were not measured directly, the 
apparent recent evolution of genetic differences between populations in these two 
traits suggests that the fitness payoffs of these two personality traits were historically 
distinct in these different environments.  
 
Heterogeneity in the use of cognitive strategies might also be due to frequency-
dependent selection, which is strictly speaking a particular case of balancing 
selection by environmental heterogeneity, concerning the composition of the social 
environment over space and time. Frequency dependent selection occurs when two 
or more strategies are maintained within a population at a particular frequency 
relative to each other, such that the fitness of each strategy decreases as it becomes 
increasingly common. For instance, Gangestad and Simpson (1990) tried to show 
that negative frequency-dependent selection could maintain heterogeneity in the 
context of mate choice. Their model is a very early and simplistic one, but it 
nonetheless provides a quite useful illustration. The central assumption is that 
women’s mating strategies should centre on two qualities of parental mates: the 
parental investment a man could provide, and his genetic fitness. Yet, there may be 
trade-offs between selecting a man for his parenting abilities and selecting him for 
his genetic fitness: men who are highly attractive to women, for example, may be 
reluctant to commit to only one woman, resulting in a woman seeking a man for his 
genetic fitness having to settle for a short-term relationship without parental 
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investment. These two different goals are supposed to produce two alternative female 
mating strategies. Women seeking a high-investment mate are predicted to adopt a 
“restricted” sexual strategy marked by delayed intercourse and a prolonged 
courtship. Women seeking a man for the quality of their genes, on the other hand, 
have less reason to delay intercourse. Indeed, if the man is pursuing a short-term 
sexual strategy, any delay on her part may deter him from seeking sexual intercourse 
with her. Importantly, competition tends to be most intense among individuals 
pursuing the same mating strategy, and the two mating strategies of 
women!restricted and unrestricted!evolved and are maintained by frequency-
dependent selection. As the number of unrestricted females in the population 
increases, the number of sexy sons also increases, and hence the success of the 
unrestricted strategy decreases. On the other hand, as the number of restricted 
females in the population increases, the competition for men who are willing to 
invest exclusively in them and their children increases, and the fitness of that strategy 
commensurably declines.  
 
It is important to note, however, that appealing to frequency-dependent selection 
could be coming at a cost for AR theorists. Specifically, if AR theorists were willing 
to analyse human decision strategies in terms of optimal fit to some environmental 
factor, their attempt would then be (virtually by assumption) somewhat 
misguided!after all, people’s strategies would then be shaped by the decision 
strategies other humans were using. However, this would only modify the details of 
AR theorists’ account, leaving a general adaptationist project unscathed. As it turns 
out, adaptations, in the purest evolutionary sense, can be quite local. As soon as there 
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is an ecological niche, defined by selection pressures (which can well be the structure 
and characteristics of conspecifics, as in the case of frequency-dependent selection), 
some individuals can be fitter than others, and in that sense they are better adapted to 
this niche, even if it is spatially or temporally limited.  
 
3.3 Concrete models for the evolution of heterogeneity 
 
In this section I want to emphasize that, in fact, a number of scholars have already 
started to attempt to link evolutionary models to the heterogeneity in the use of 
strategies that is found in the lab (by appealing to frequency-dependent selection). 
The models I refer to seek to account for findings in behavioural economics, where 
people have been shown to exhibit individual differences in the ability to infer what 
other players will do, in their social emotions, and in guilt, anger, and reciprocity.  
 
Consider the case of reciprocity and cooperative behaviour. People show 
consistent differences in their strategic approaches to cooperative economic games, 
with subjects exhibiting a range of strategies from completely trusting and 
trustworthy to tactical cooperation and free riding (e.g., Fischbacher et al. 2001; Fehr 
and Fischbacher 2003). For instance, while in public good games experiments one 
typically observes that people cooperate much more than predicted by standard 
economic theory assuming rationality and selfishness, observed cooperation is 
heterogenous (Goeree and Holt 2002). McNamara et al. (2009) have tried to account 
for these findings from an evolutionary perspective. Their suggested model predicts 
consistent variation between individuals in trustworthiness. Using evolutionary 
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simulations of an economic game, they suggested that individual differences in 
trustworthiness (i.e. cheating) could select for and maintain individual differences in 
trust, even if this brings a fitness cost. Notably, these results might well generalize to 
other traits, for example to costly social awareness and aggressiveness, and this study 
is particularly remarkable because it shows that the mere existence of socially 
relevant individual differences can foster the evolution of further individual 
differences.  
 
Another interesting example concerns people’s accuracy in the representation of 
what others are likely to do. An important result of research on behavioural game 
theory is that subjects do not seem to generally choose strategies as prescribed by 
mathematical game theory (Camerer 2003). Interestingly, an account that fits 
experimental findings quite nicely is “cognitive hierarchy” (CH; Camerer 2003) 
theory of strategic reasoning, which takes that there exists a hierarchy of player 
types, which corresponds to the different numbers of steps that players reason ahead 
in a game. CH modelling assumes that players have different levels of accuracy in 
their representations of what others are likely to do, which may vary from heuristic 
and naïve to highly sophisticated and accurate. Some people (level 0 players) just 
play at random. Other people (level 1 players) reason assuming that people play 
randomly in that way, and they then play the optimal strategy in light of this 
assumption, and other thinkers still (level 2 players) reason that some fraction of 
players are using a random strategy and that the remainder players are level 1 
players, so they play the optimal strategy in light of this assumption, and so on. From 
an empirical and experimental perspective, most subjects seem to behave as type 1 
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and 2 players, and individuals of type 3 and above are quite rare (Costa-Gomes and 
Crawford 2006; Camerer 2003). Interestingly, Mohlin (2012) presented an 
evolutionary model of bounded strategic reasoning, stressing that an evolutionary 
process based on payoffs learned in these different games may lead to a 
heterogeneous population where most individuals belong to relatively low types. An 
important result of this evolutionary model is that it seems to offer support for CH 
and for the existence of bounded and heterogeneous theory of mind abilities. 
 
4. Cognitive ability, individual differences, and heuristic reasoning  
 
Stanovich’s second argument against the AR project rests on his reported 
correlations between cognitive ability and people’s susceptibility to bias and seems 
to be potentially more damaging to the prospects of the AR project, as it would call 
into question the very normative part of the AR challenge. The argument can be 
summarized this way: (1) people with higher cognitive ability follow rule-based 
rationality, (2) if people with higher cognitive ability follow rule-based rationality, 
then rule-based rationality is normatively adequate, and thus (3) rule-based 
rationality is normatively adequate. If the argument were correct, it would have 
important implications for the plausibility of the proposal I have been articulating so 
far. As it turns out, I have stressed that measuring behaviour against rule-based 
rationality is normatively problematic, whereas Stanovich stresses that rule-based 
rationality still offers the benchmarks of rational behaviour and cognition. Let us 
have a look at the proposal in more detail. 
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The plausibility of premise (1) depends on how we interpret it. On a broad 
understanding, the claim says that there is a strong correlation between performance 
on tests of cognitive ability such as IQ tests and CRT tests (but also numeracy tests), 
and the tendency to comply with rule-based rationality. In general, it seems true that 
these cognitive constructs supposed to measure people’s ability to understand and 
solve different sorts of problems correlate quite well with people’s susceptibility to 
biases. On a narrow understanding, however, the claim is that scores on standard 
intelligence tests correlate well with susceptibility to biases. This narrower claim is 
more problematic. As we have seen, it is true that negative correlations between IQ 
tests and susceptibility to bias have not been reported, but the evidence is still mixed: 
in some cases the connection is strong, in others it is tenuous (e.g., Stanovich and 
West 2008).  
 
More controversial, however, is the plausibility of premise (2): how would the 
fact that people with higher cognitive ability comply with rule-based rationality 
provide support for the latter? This question raises a number of concerns. In making 
such an argument, Stanovich is accepting the view that intelligence is a stable trait 
and reasonably well measured by standard IQ tests, and that early-life manifestation 
of cognitive ability (i.e., IQ scores) follow people throughout their lives into better 
life outcomes. This view, however, is controversial. Few topics in psychology are as 
old and controversial as the study of human intelligence (see Mackintosh 2011 for a 
review) and several people!AR theorists included (e.g., Raab and Gigerenzer 
2001)!contend that IQ tests do not measure anything at all. Here I want to make a 
non-trivial concession to Stanovich and leave well-known criticisms of cognitive 
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ability tests aside. Importantly, while this concession is not trivial, it is not 
unreasonable either. For instance, whilst critics of intelligence tests (e.g., Gardner 
1983; Sternberg 1997) are eager to point out that there tests ignore important parts of 
mental life!many largely socio-emotional abilities, empathy and interpersonal 
skills!the predictive value of traditional cognitive ability tests has recently received 
important empirical support. It is quite difficult to state that those tests do not 
measure anything at all (‘except performance on IQ tests’, as people say), since test 
performance is strongly linked not just to education and income (Strenze 2007), but 
also to occupational success (Kuncel and Hezlett 2010), health (Gottfredson and 
Deary 2004), mortality (Calvin et al. 2010), as well as to various brain measurements 
(Jung and Haier 2007), and genetics (Haworth et al. 2010).  
 
4.1 Cognitive ability and expert intuition 
 
But why exactly would better cognitive ability have normative relevance here? I will 
briefly consider a first way to understand Stanovich’s argument, which is in terms of 
an appeal to the intuitions of people with higher cognitive ability in order to justify 
norms of rule-based rationality. According to this reading, normative justification is 
based on intuitions and on the consensus of an elite of reasoners (see, e.g., Cokely 
and Feltz 2014 for a discussion of different appeals to experts’ intuitions). We are 
thus looking at people with higher cognitive ability because their intuitions are more 
reliable, as they are more likely to track the truth, and this is the reason why their 
answers bear normative significance. In particular, Stanovich (1999; Stanovich and 
West, 2000) has appealed on some occasions to the understanding / acceptance 
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principle: the more one understands the normative principles involved in an 
inference task, the more likely one is to endorse these principles. This means that the 
more cognitively gifted reasoners are more likely to respond in congruence with the 
“appropriate” normative model!such as it is!for a particular problem set. 
Stanovich reverses the principle and maintains that we should accept as normative 
whatever is congruent with responses given by higher ability reasoners. Here the 
higher score on intelligence tests confers enhanced reliability to people’s intuitions in 
virtue of their capacity to comprehend a particular case better. 94 On this view, tests 
of cognitive ability are important because they allow us to identify the most reliable 
intuitions. It thus seems clear that, while Stanovich has generally appealed to scores 
on IQ tests when substantiating his argument, the understanding / acceptance 
principle underlying claim (2) is consistent with a broad understanding of claim (1). 
In short, the fact that different operationalizations of cognitive abilities (not only 
those offered by IQ tests) correlate with susceptibility to biases matters because 
people who perform better in these different tests fare better at understanding and 
solving different problems. For instance, consider the case of numeracy tests, which 
is particularly interesting, since there have long been intelligence researchers who 
have speculated that mathematical ability is at the very core of general intelligence, 
and that the former sustains the ability to think clearly.95 This application of the 
understanding / acceptance principle is not damaged by the fact that the “cognitive 
reflection test” is a better predictor of rational thinking than IQ tests. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
94  For instance, Stanovich writes that ‘the direction that performance moves in response to increased 
understanding provides an empirical clue as to what is the normative model to be applied’ (1999, 63). 
95 The idea that mathematical ability is at the heart of intelligence goes back to Vernon (1964). More 
recently, it has been shown that IQ and numeracy (mathematical ability) are both phenotypically and 
genetically correlated (Hart et al. 2009).  
! 186 
While this is a potentially interesting argument, I will not discuss it here any 
further. The appeal to the understanding / acceptance principle has been discussed 
and attacked in commentaries on Stanovich and West’s (2000) BBS target article. 
Here I will just claim that there are important problems with it, even if we sidestep 
the traditional concerns with tests of cognitive ability. 96 There seems to be a problem 
of at least partial circularity in this justification: we know a normative system is 
adequate because the brighter participants comply with it, but some of the normative 
assumptions of those systems are incorporated into the intelligent tests used to 
determine who are brighter. In addition, the idea that intuitions can serve as a ground 
for normative justification has been criticized (e.g., Kahneman 1981; Baron 2000; 
Weinberg, Nichols and Stich 2001). It is often emphasized that what matters for the 
assessment of norms of reasoning and decision-making is their conduciveness to 
success in the real world. As we have shown in the introductory chapter, the idea that 
there is a crucial link between rationality and adaptive behaviour is widely shared in 
the literature on judgement and decision-making. Notably, Stanovich himself seems 
to believe that rule-based rationality ought to be justified pragmatically, by appealing 
to success in the real world (cf. Stanovich 2011a). For instance, Stanovich and West 
write that ‘adaptive decision making is the quintessence of rationality’, that ‘to think 
rationally means taking the appropriate action given one’s goals (instrumental 
rationality)’ (2014, 81), and that ‘a set of responses that leads to intransitivity hence 
leads to disastrous money pumps’ (2004, 108). This results in this version of the 
argument ringing somewhat hollow: if what ultimately matters is success in the real 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
96 Although discussing this evidence in detail falls beyond the scope of this work, it is worth stressing 
that a number of researchers have shown that experience and expertise do not always improve the 
quality of judgements and decision-making. For instance, Witteman and Tollenaar (2012) have shown 
that experienced mental health clinicians often do not outperform novices in diagnostic decision-
making.  
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world, it is hard to see how an appeal to the better understanding of people with 
higher cognitive ability might help settle the debate, unless those people are also 
shown to be more practically successful.   
 
4.2 Cognitive ability and success in the real world 
 
I will now articulate a more promising version of the argument for the view that 
responses given by those with higher cognitive ability matter, which avoids charges 
of circularity and appeals instead to people’s success in the real world. The basic 
idea is that we know that people with higher cognitive ability achieve better life 
outcomes, and the best explanation for this is that these people achieve these 
outcomes because they reason according to rule-based rationality and avoid biases. 
This would show that, pace AR theorists, following rule-based rationality is 
generally conducive to desired life outcomes, whereas following heuristics is not. 
While this argument has not been assessed so far in the literature, this formulation is 
still in line with Stanovich’s pragmatic view of normative justification and with his 
idea that IQ tests are imperfect but nevertheless important measurements devices. 
Stanovich has explicitly stressed that cognitive ability tests are significant predictors 
of real life outcomes. According to him: 
 
Many evolutionary theorists have mistakenly downplayed cognitive constructs 
that are heritable (intelligence, personality dispositions, thinking styles) and that 
have demonstrated empirical relationships to behaviour that relate to utility 
maximization for the individual (job success, personal injury, success in 
relationships, substance abuse). (2004, 133) 
 
! 188 
Notably, the abovementioned quote might look odd, as expected utility theory 
actually makes no claim about the rationality of individual preferences. In fact, 
Becker and Murphy have developed some arguments that ‘addictions, even strong 
ones, are usually rational in the sense of involving forward looking maximization 
with stable preferences’ (1988, 675). There is, I think, a clear way to make sense of 
Stanovich’s claim: as a matter of fact, most people do care about job success, health, 
and other life outcomes. This does not mean that we can easily come up with a clear 
ranking of such life outcomes. When deciding to buy, say, insurance, the problems 
related to such a ranking might come out quite clearly. For instance, health is good, 
but fun is good too. This is an important caveat, but I still think that we can grant that 
the goods Stanovich refers to are widely regarded as good life outcomes, and that it 
is interesting to ask whether cognitive ability is a good predictor of those, and what, 
in case it is, mediates its effect on these outcomes.97  
 
My point here is that, even if we accept that people with higher intelligence 
achieve better life outcomes, the rub comes when one seeks to explain this by 
appealing to the fact that these people reason in compliance with rule-based 
rationality. In part, this is because these correlations are more tenuous than Stanovich 
might want: it is not true that IQ is always such a strong predictor of susceptibility to 
bias. Other operazionalizations of cognitive abilities are stronger predictors (such as 
the cognitive reflection test), but since the well-established correlations between 
cognitive abilities and real life outcomes are based on IQ scores, the evidence we 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
97 Here I am not claiming that these are normatively and objectively “desirable” outcomes. Otherwise, 
this would actually look like a possible reductio of the perspective of “instrumental rationality” that I 
have accepted in this work. Here I am just claiming that, even if what matters is that these outcomes 
are subjectively desired, it seems that behaviour could still be usefully assessed against such goals, as 
people tend to treat goods such as health as important.  
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need to take into account is about the correlations between IQ scores and 
susceptibility to bias. Yet, there are even more serious difficulties here, as 
Stanovich’s research might just appeal to correlations and does not bring out the 
relevant causal connections. Thus, we lack the needed details to fully secure the 
causal story, and his hypothesis rests on little more than sketchy speculation.  
 
To show that these concerns are not at all untethered, I will focus on the 
discussion of the domain of health. The reasons for analysing this domain is that it 
will make the discussion of these key problems more tractable and that it has been 
the focus of a great deal of interest from AR theorists as well (e.g., Gigerenzer and 
Gray 2011). This discussion can serve as something of a cautionary tale about the 
care that must be taken in developing causal explanations of associations between 
cognitive ability and success.  
 
The field of study of intelligence and health outcomes is called “cognitive 
epidemiology” (e.g., Deary, Weiss and Batty 2010). Cognitive epidemiology grew 
out of, essentially, Deary’s conception of cognitive ability, which is strongly rooted 
in the tradition of thinking of intelligence as a stable, genetically influenced trait that 
is measured well by IQ tests. More precisely, a lot of work has been dedicated to 
providing evidence that early-life manifestation of IQ follow people throughout their 
lives into better health outcomes. Intelligence was inversely related to the risk of 
alcohol disorders, depression, generalized anxiety disorder, and posttraumatic stress 
disorder (Gale et al. 2008). But intelligence is also strongly correlated with physical 
health. For instance, the hazard of being involved in a fight or a brawl is over eight 
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times greater for the lowest versus highest IQ group, and an elevated risk of lung 
cancer has been reported in adult men and women who had lower intelligence test 
scores in childhood (Hart et al. 2003).  
 
One might want to posit the following story as an explanation of the correlations 
between IQ and health outcomes: more intelligent people achieve better health 
outcomes because they avoid biases. After all, health self-care is a complex set of 
tasks that require knowledge, decision-making, planning and engagement. It is thus 
tempting to argue that one’s level of cognitive ability will be related to health 
outcomes and ultimate survival because of the better understanding and decision-
making (Gottfredson and Deary 2004). More intelligent people have better health 
and numeracy literacy, and are thus less vulnerable to biases. It is quite clear that 
poor health literacy and numeracy can come at high cost. In the words of 
Gottrfredson, ‘misreading a map or a train schedule may be nuisance, but misreading 
a prescription label might be an hazard’ (2004, 180). Also, the effectiveness of 
cancer treatments is expressed as survival rates (e.g., the percentage of treated 
patients who survive for five years), the benefits of lifestyle changes as reductions in 
cardiovascular risk, and the side effects of medications as probabilities of death, 
discomfort, and disability. Thus, the story goes, people with higher intelligence 
manage health care more effectively, and ultimately achieve better health outcomes 
because they tend to engage in rational thinking and avoid biases. People with lower 
intelligence might be victim of framing effects, overconfidence, and other sorts of 
biases, and this explains the achievement of worse health outcomes. Now, I do not 
want to argue that the idea that differences in reasoning and decision-making explain 
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different health outcomes is somewhat misguided or could never be made to work, 
but rather that the posited story lacks the needed support.  
 
To assess the plausibility of the hypothesis we need to consider both the empirical 
evidence available and the rival hypotheses. Notably, there is slim evidence for the 
claim that people with higher cognitive ability achieve better outcomes because they 
are less susceptible to biases. Not many studies have investigated the mediators of 
the impact of intelligence on health behaviours. For instance, Di Matteo (2004) 
found that higher income and education were associated with better compliance, but 
the review lacked information about intelligence. Interestingly, Deary et al. (2009) 
have investigated whether higher intelligence predicted long-term compliance with 
medication for up to two years in individuals who knew themselves to be relatively 
at high risk of cardiovascular disease, finding some important effects. Moreover, 
supporting evidence from self-reports shows that people with higher childhood 
intelligence tend to exercise more and have diets that accord better with health 
information, are less likely to smoke or to be obese or overweight, and have fewer 
hangovers from drinking alcohol (Batty, Deary and Macintyre 2007). Yet, while 
these studies might show the impact of intelligence on health behaviour, they are not 
informative about whether this is due to compliance with rule-based rationality. 
What is needed here is evidence that what mediates the impact of intelligence on 
desired outcomes is the tendency to comply with rule-based rationality.  
 
Moreover, there are alternative frameworks and explanations for the predictive 
value of intelligence and IQ tests, which do not appeal to different strategies in 
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reasoning and decision-making. For instance, intelligence is associated with more 
education, and thereafter with more professional occupations that might place the 
person in healthier environments. It might be that more intelligent people get better 
jobs, and that disparities in material resources, work environment, and access to 
medical health care result in different health outcomes. According to this view, it is 
still the case that intelligence is responsible for different health outcomes, but 
material resources are posited as mediators of this influence. Alternatively, brighter 
people might be “hardier” and have stronger immune systems genetically to begin 
with, so they can take more “lifestyle health abuse” along the way without ill effects 
(Deary 2012). While controversial, this is a fascinating and interesting hypothesis: 
health and cognitive ability are seen as two indicators of an individual’s system 
integrity. The theory of general body integrity posits that the inverse association 
between premorbid cognitive ability and health outcomes can be explained by 
underlying physiological make up, and childhood mental ability is an indicator of 
system integrity.98  
 
The issues touched upon in the previous paragraphs are obviously intricate and 
there is more to be said than space allows for here. What emerged, however, is that 
there are different hypotheses about the role of intelligence for the achievement of 
desired life outcomes. There is no clear theory yet as to what really explains the 
impact of intelligence on health outcomes. While there is no reason why different 
hypotheses cannot co-exist, the main problem stems from the difficulty of 
disentangling them and establishing their relative importance. Quite clearly, Deary 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
98 Interestingly, this view seems to support Juvenal’s centuries-old dictum to pray for a healthy mind 
in a healthy body (mens sana in corpore sano).  
! 193 
claims that ‘although intelligence plays a part in health behaviours and health 
outcomes that contribute to specific causes of death, a clear chain of causation from 
intelligence to health outcomes and then to death has not emerged’ (2008, 456).  
 
Thus, as matters stand, we should refrain from inferring that compliance with 
rule-based rationality is what explains the achievement of successful outcomes by 
people with higher cognitive ability. But this is exactly the causal story Stanovich 
has to provide to get his argument off the ground. The verdict of this section, 
however, has been merely that the argument cannot be seen as compelling until the 
hypothesis becomes further substantiated. This is not, however, a structural 
limitation of the argumentative strategy, and this section should be seen as a call for 
more, not less work, in the attempt of disentangling different causal hypotheses and 
explaining what mediates the impact of intelligence on desired life outcomes. If it 
turned out that judgement and decision-making that conforms to rule-based 
rationality makes a major contribution to the achievement of desired life outcomes, 
then there would be some interesting evidence at odds with tenets of the AR project. 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, I have tried to show that Stanovich’s appeal to his research on 
individual differences in reasoning and decision-making to undermine the AR project 
is not particularly compelling. First, I argued not only that commitments to 
adaptationism are not vital to the AR project, but also that the actual heterogeneity of 
reasoning performance is compatible with an adaptationist account, and perhaps even 
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necessary for some plausible evolutionary stories. Second, the existence of 
correlations between measures of cognitive abilities and susceptibility to biases does 
not provide much support to rule-based rationality. In particular, the hypothesis that 
more intelligent people achieve better outcomes because they comply with rule-




















Chapter 7: Adaptive rationality, biases, and the divide et impera strategy 
 
As we have seen, AR theorists have shown that biases reported in the MBR literature 
can be instances of adaptive behaviour and cognition, and that researchers should try 
to assess performance against the goals people entertain. Moreover, in the previous 
chapter I also sought to show that AR theorists’ challenge is not, as yet, scathed by 
recent research on individual differences in reasoning and decision-making. But does 
this mean that we should accept AR theorists’ optimistic claims about human 
rationality? In this chapter, I show that there are reasons to be sceptical about such 
claims. In the main, here I focus on a new strategy to resist AR theorists’ 
revolutionary rhetoric by taking issue with their claim that the biases reported in the 
MBR literature should be conceived of as violations of rule-based rationality. As I 
try to show here, several important families of biases are not just violations of rule-
based rationality, and do not seem to be clearly vulnerable to the challenge mounted 
by AR theorists. In fact, it seems that many biases reported in the literature have 
been assessed against prudential and epistemic goals, and that these findings do not 
sit well with AR theorists’ claims about human rationality. I argue that AR theorists 
have not made clear how, in light of such evidence, they could hold optimistic views 




In Chapters 3, 4 and 6 I discussed the plausibility of the AR project from a normative 
standpoint. In this chapter, I will look at the AR project from a different perspective. 
Specifically, the AR project has often been presented as attempting to show ‘how 
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people are able to achieve intelligence in the real world’ (Todd and Gigerenzer 2012, 
3), and provocative book titles such Adaptive thinking: Rationality in the Real World 
(Gigerenzer 1999) or Ecological Rationality: Intelligence in the Real World (Todd 
and Gigerenzer 2012) illustrate quite clearly the general aims of their project.99 But 
are AR theorists’ optimistic claims about human rationality warranted? Here I raise 
some problems for the claim that the acceptance of the AR’s normative challenge 
licenses optimistic verdicts on human rationality.  
 
This chapter details my reply to AR theorists. First, in section 2, I present some 
initial considerations that suggest that we should avoid overly optimistic conclusions 
about human irrationality. In particular, I suggest that, at least in several contexts, 
violations of rule-based rationality correspond also to failures from the perspective of 
goal-based rationality. Later, in sections 3-7, I substantiate my divide-et-impera 
move by discussing families of biases that do not seem to be vulnerable to the 
challenge to rule-based rationality mounted by AR theorists and, at least prima facie, 
look instead like cases of unsuccessful behaviour assessed against epistemic and 
prudential goals. In section 8, I rebut three objections, and in section 9 I discuss the 
relationship between my conclusions and evolutionary considerations. Section 10 




99 Moreover, Gigerenzer argues that we need not worry about human rationality (1997, 280), that ‘the 
rationality of the adaptive toolbox is not logical, but ecological’ (Todd and Gigerenzer 2012, viii), and 
that ‘often what looks like a reasoning error from a purely logical perspective turns out to be a highly 
intelligent judgment in the real world’ (Gigerenzer 2008, 107). 
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2. Rule-based and goal-based rationality do not always diverge 
 
First, I would like to stress that it is not clear to what extent assessments based on 
rule-based rationality might diverge from those relying on goal-based rationality. As 
we have seen in Chapter 3, in a number of contexts violations of rule-based 
rationality might be instances of successful behavior from the perspective of goal-
based rationality. In light of this evidence, AR theorists tend to glorify heuristic 
reasoning, and some of their studies showing that heuristics violating rule-based 
rationality lead to successful behavior have gained a sort of mythical status. Yet it is 
still unclear to what extent this effect might be generalized, and there are reasons to 
think that, at least in several contexts, violations of rule-based rationality correspond 
also to failures from the perspective of goal-based rationality. 
 
To see this, consider the evidence on fast-and-frugal heuristics presented in 
Chapter 3. It is true that fast-and-frugal heuristics that neither look up nor integrate 
pieces of information might be as accurate as (and even outperform) compensatory 
strategies that do not violate transitivity. However, while one is probably convinced 
when reading AR theorists’ material that strategies like the recognition heuristic are 
efficacious in some situations, it is also natural to worry about how this relates to 
many other contexts. The reader will probably recall from Chapter 3 that the yes/no 
recognition response is used by the recognition heuristic as a frequency estimation 
cue: if one of the two alternatives is recognized and the other is not, it should be 
inferred that the recognized alternative has a higher value. In a famous experiment, 
Americans and Germans had to find out which was the more populous city between 
San Diego and San Antonio (Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996). Many Germans 
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recognized the former but had never heard of the latter, and all of them chose the 
former over the latter, potentially relying on the recognition heuristic. All the 
Germans gave the right answer and performed better than the more knowledgeable 
Americans (who recognized both the cities and, therefore, were not able to use the 
recognition heuristic).100 What I would like to stress, however, is that if AR theorists 
had run experiments asking people, for instance, to choose which of two large (but 
not extremely large) Asian cities is more populous, or asked subjects to compare the 
size of nearby tiny towns and unknown state capitals, these scholars would have 
probably demonstrated a sort of recognition bias, which would look like an instance 
of maladaptive behavior discovered through goal-based rationality. Moreover, if 
subjects were to assess the relative population size of different animals or the relative 
safety of two airlines based on recognition, the correlation between recognition and 
the criterion value would be in fact weak (cf. Richter and Spath 2006). For a clearer 
illustration of this point, consider the paper by Borges et al. (1999), which aimed to 
compare different stock-picking strategies. The fast-and-frugal strategy was simply 
the strategy of picking the most familiar companies (an application of the recognition 
heuristic). The experimenters constructed portfolios of companies recognized by 
“laypersons” selected at random from passers-by in Chicago and Munich and 
compared the performance of these portfolios against the comparison strategies. 
Given that for the six-month period of study the recognition heuristic outperformed 
the other strategies, the authors have suggested that ordinary people (who are 
disposed to naturally use the recognition heuristic) can perhaps do better on the stock 
market than mutual fund managers and market indices. All this resulted in an arousal 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
100 As I stressed in Chapter 3, the answer was correct at the time of the study, but it would not be 
correct anymore.  
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of enthusiasm for the recognition heuristic, because this simple algorithm seems to 
perform well in real-life. However, there is some evidence that the success of the 
recognition heuristic was due to some luck, because the study by Borges et al. (1999) 
was carried out during a historically strong rising market. Boyd (2001) tested the 
recognition heuristic on a bear falling market, finding that the simple rule gave 
below average returns this time.  
 
This is just to illustrate that, while the heuristics described by AR theorists might 
be successful in a number of cases and contexts, in other cases they seem to lead to 
unsuccessful behavior. 101 AR theorists seem to overlook these downsides, and thus 
they seem to have oversold their case in favor of human rationality. In other words, 
there are reasons to think that, for a number of biases that are violations of rule-based 
rationality, behavior that exhibits such biases will also be a failure of goal-based 
rationality. 
 
3.  Taking the descriptive issue seriously: the divide et impera strategy 
 
But the reader might wonder, at this point, whether there are not other and perhaps 
more convincing strategies we could adopt in trying to resist AR theorists’ most 
ambitious and optimistic claims about human rationality. In this section, I will detail 
a stronger reply to AR theorists. Specifically, I try to show that several areas of MBR 
do not seem to rely merely on the normative perspective of rule-based rationality. In 
fact, it turns out that different criteria of accuracy have been used in the scientific 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
101 Note, however, that here I am not claiming that it is clear how to get good outcomes by applying 
rule-based rationality to the stock market. I am simply stating that the merits of fast-and-frugal 
heuristics in this context have been probably overstated.   
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study of reasoning and decision-making. In light of these considerations, I suggest 
that several families of biases do not seem to be vulnerable to the challenge to rule-
based rationality mounted by AR theorists. In fact, I also show that several important 
families of biases have been assessed against epistemic and prudential goals and 
argue that AR theorists have not explained clearly why these biases should not be 
considered to be instances of adaptively irrational behaviour or how these findings 
could be accommodated within an optimistic framework on human rationality. Since 
my strategy consists in emphasizing that the category of bias refers to a range of 
heterogeneous phenomena and violations of different standards of accuracy, I will 
refer to as the divide-et-impera strategy. In offering this strategy, I draw attention to 
a set of overlooked descriptive issues.102   
 
In what follows, I articulate and substantiate this reply to the AR project. It is 
worth highlighting that AR theorists are eager to claim that MBR has relied on norms 
of logic, probability theory, and rational decision theory or, to use our own term, 
rule-based rationality. For instance, AR theorists Wilke and Mata claim that in MBR: 
 
Participants were presented with a reasoning problem to which corresponded a 
normative answer from probability theory or statistics. Next, participants’ 
responses were compared with the solution entailed by these norms, and the 
systematic deviations (biases) found between the responses and the normative 
solutions were listed. (2012, 531) 
 
As the reader will recall, AR theorists are certainly not alone in providing such a 
characterization!this picture is quite widely accepted. For instance, psychologists 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
102!Notably, other authors have suggested that biases seem to be heterogeneous (e.g., Arkes 1991; 
Stanovich 2011). But while they argue for this claim by pointing to the different cognitive processes 
involved in different types of biased reasoning, I focus on the evaluative standards against which such 
biases have been assessed. !
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Nisbett and Ross write that they ‘follow conventional practice by using the term 
“normative” to describe the use of a rule when there is a consensus among formal 
scientists that the rule is appropriate for the particular problem’ (1980, 13). 
Alternatively, consider Baron, who writes that  ‘the major standards come from 
probability theory, utility theory, and statistics. These are mathematical theories or 
“models” that allow us to evaluate a judgment. They are called normative because 
they are norms’ (2004, 19). Moreover, Tversky and Kahneman (1986) describe their 
project as relying on the normative rules of ‘the modern theory of decision making 
under risk’ (S252). They consider transitivity of preferences, dominance, invariance, 
and cancellation. Overall, it seems quite clear that, if we look at the literature on 
judgment and decision-making, researchers in different groups agree that the biases 
reported in the psychological literature are violations of rule-based rationality and 
that have been identified by relying on such a normative perspective. 
 
Whilst the descriptive claim that MBR relies on rule-based rationality has 
generally been accepted at face value, it is also quite inaccurate.  It should be stated 
clearly, here, that I do not mean to deny that the characterization of biases as 
violations of rule-based rationality nicely fits some parts of research on judgment and 
decision-making, and we have discussed quite in detail some of these cases in this 
work. For instance, the influential Wason selection task presented in Chapter 3 was 
invented to explore the degree to which human thinking matches the laws of 
deductive logic and propositional calculus (Wason, 1966). And consider violations of 
the conjunction rule of probability theory or of the axiom of descriptive invariance, 
which have attracted a great deal of attention in the heuristics-and-biases tradition. 
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Wason selection tasks, conjunction fallacies and other overdiscussed studies have 
been taken to be representative of the phenomena investigated in MBR. But this is a 
misleading trend, or so I contend. 
 
It turns out that the characterization of MBR as entirely relying on rule-based 
rationality is exceedingly narrow, and that there are many important families of 
biases documented in both cognitive and social psychology that do not seem to fit 
well with such characterization.  
 
Before I demonstrate this, it is worth considering once again the words of AR 
theorists. According to Gigerenzer and Sturm, ‘while ecological rationality is broadly 
defined in terms of success, and thus involves looking for means suited to certain 
goals, we do not maintain that reasoning is only about satisfying desires, without 
caring what is actually true or correct’ (2012, 255). Now, interestingly enough, in 
many areas of research on judgement and decision making inaccurate behaviour has 
been assessed specifically against epistemic and prudential goals.  
 
More precisely, in many areas of research on biases, researchers have not assessed 
behaviour by relying on rule-based rationality alone: in the case of several important 
families of biases, violations of rule-based rationality are neither necessary nor 
sufficient conditions for their occurrence. In fact, what seems to constitute a number 
of biases is that reasoning and decision-making violate other criteria of accuracy. 
Here I want to suggest that AR theorists are targeting a limited group of biases.  
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Notably, a small number of researchers seem to have noticed this point. For 
instance, Kruglanski and Ajzen argue that:  
 
Contemporary research on bias and error in human judgment is decidedly 
empirical in character. It lacks a clearly articulated theory and even the central 
concepts of “error” and “bias” are not explicitly defined. Nor is it easy to find a 
clear characterization of the objective, or unbiased inference process from 
which lay judgments are presumed to deviate (Kruglanski and Ajzen, 1983, 2) 
 
In the remainder of this chapter, I wish to show that in several areas of MBR scholars 
do not seem to have heavily relied on rule-based rationality. I will focus, in 
particular, on a number of biases that do not seem to have been identified using rule-
based rationality or to be constituted by violations of rule-based rationality. Some of 
the families of biases that I will discuss go under the headings of overplacement, 
overestimation, and mental contamination. I want to emphasize that the phenomena 
in which I am interested are not minor ones, but rather main effects explained in 
terms of biases and associated with irrational behaviour in research on judgment and 
decision-making. Moreover, at least prima facie, the biases I consider look like 
instances of unsuccessful behaviour measured against standard epistemic goals and 
people’s individual desires and preferences. Besides these findings, I will also point 
to recent research on happiness psychology and to research on the detection of lies, 
where behaviour and cognition have been seemingly assessed against people’s goals. 
In light of my discussion, I suggest that AR theorists have not as yet explained why 
these instances of behaviour and cognition should not count as plausible cases of 
irrational behaviour from the perspective of AR and why these findings should not 
be taken to be worrying. After this, I will also discuss some possible replies coming 
from AR theorists.  
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But before I start with my presentation of the divide-et-impera strategy, I wish to 
emphasize that there are several other areas of research that bear on the plausibility 
of the AR theorists’ position on human rationality and that have been widely 
overlooked.  
 
In particular, there has recently been a great deal of interest in the science of false 
memories (Brainerd and Reyna 2005). With false memories, one remembers events 
as having happened at some moment in one’s life, although in fact the particular 
events did not happen then, or ever. False memories can be harmless!as when one 
thinks she has served a bottle of Sauvignon and it was actually Gewürztraminer. In 
fact, some scholars have also argued that false memories can offer important benefits 
for an agent (e.g., Fernandez 2014; Conway and Loveday 2015). But there are also 
many other circumstances in which such errors seem to be far from beneficial. 
Consider, for instance, a doctor prescribing treatments based on false memories of 
the symptoms of patients (Reyna and Lloyd 1997). Yet, it is in the legal realm, where 
one meets perhaps the most frequent cases of harmful false memories. Not 
surprisingly, studies of known cases of false conviction have suggested that a 
number of prototypical forms of legal false memory, like in the case of false 
identifications of innocent suspects (e.g., Wells et al. 1998) and false recollections 
during interrogations (e.g., Kassin 2005), are the leading cause of false convictions 
(Brainerd and Reyna 2005). These seem to be cases of factually “inaccurate” 
judgments in which memory judgments are evaluated in terms of correspondence 
with past events. More should be said about the costs and benefits of these kinds of 
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inaccurate judgements. However, what I want to highlight here is just that there are 
many more findings than the ones I can cover in this work which seem to have 
bearing on the assessment of people’s rationality and on the plausibility of AR 
theorists’ conclusions.103 
 
4. Mental contamination 
 
I will start to substantiate the divide et impera strategy by introducing research on so-
called mental contamination. Wilson and Brekke distinguished between two different 
types of biases. Specifically, according to them: 
 
In the last 20 years, cognitive and social psychologists have documented 
numerous errors in reasoning, bias in judgment, and flawed heuristics. […] We 
suggest that the numerous instances of biases in human judgment are of two 
general types: the failure of rule-knowledge or application and those that result 
from mental contamination (cases whereby a judgment, emotion or behaviour is 
moved by unconscious or uncontrollable processes). Wilson and Brekke (1994, 
118) 
 
The distinction offered by Wilson and Brekke (1994) is probably not exhaustive, as 
we will see in the following sections, but it is nonetheless useful for the present 
discussion. Cases of mental contamination have generally been taken to be biases 
and instances of irrational behaviour in MBR, but it does not seem that researchers 
interested in such phenomena have heavily relied on rule-based rationality in the 
identification of such flawed behaviour. In particular, it does not seem to be the case 
that what constitutes these biases is that they are violations of rule-based rationality. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
103 For other lines of research in which people’s judgements have been assessed against empirical 
accuracy and seem to be quite often empirically inaccurate, see, e.g., Perilloux (2014; Perrilloux et al. 
2012).  
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What research on mental contamination has shown in the past three decades is rather 
that people are often influenced by such unconscious and unwanted factors 
(unwanted by the subject, not by others or by society) in a broad range of contexts.  
 
4.1 Mental contamination and implicit biases 
 
To appreciate one particular manifestation of mental contamination, we should 
consider the extensive literature on the implicit bias. In the words of Brownstein:  
 
Implicit bias is a term of art referring to relatively unconscious and relatively 
automatic features of prejudiced judgment and social behavior. While 
psychologists in the field of ‘implicit social cognition’ study ‘implicit attitudes’ 
toward consumer products, self-esteem, food, alcohol, political values, and 
more, the most striking and well-known research has focused on implicit 
attitudes toward members of socially stigmatized groups, such as African-
Americans, women, and the LGBTQ community. (2015) 
 
 
One of the remarkable features of implicit bias is that people might not be aware of 
being influenced. Interestingly, the implicit-association-test has been used to show 
that a great many people who profess to be racially impartial and explicitly disavow 
any form of racial prejudice display signs of racial bias in controlled experimental 
settings. Such biases may affect not only our beliefs, but also the way we perceive 
the world. A study by Payne showed that participants were able to more quickly 
identify guns (as opposed to non-gun tools) when they were primed with a black 
face, as compared to when they were primed with a white face. In this experimental 
set up, the ‘presence of Black faces facilitated the identification of guns relative to 
the presence of White faces’ (2001, 185). In these cases, it might be that unconscious 
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and unwanted processes influence people’s cognition. If this situation occurs, the 
resulting bias looks like an instance of mental contamination and not, strictly 
speaking, a clear example of a violation of rule-based rationality.104  
 
4.2 Mental contamination and anchoring 
 
Moreover, consider now the following seminal study on the so-called anchoring 
effect. A wheel of fortune is spun and stops at the number 65. You are then asked if 
the percentage of African countries in the United Nations is above or below that 
number. Could this exercise actually influence your estimate of the percentage? 
Although it may seem unlikely, the evidence is that such anchors have an effect: in 
fact, groups who received larger numbers determined by a wheel of fortune gave 
higher estimates than groups who received lower numbers, demonstrating that 
irrelevant anchors influenced such estimates (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Yet 
these numbers are in no plausible way related to the actual number of African 
countries. The idea, then, is that people’s behaviour is biased by unconscious factors. 
Moreover, it seems that these factors are also unwanted, as they interfere with the 
subjects’ goal and attempt to make accurate predictions. This is important: while talk 
about percentages in this example might suggest that MBR scholars focusing on 
anchoring are just relying on rule-based rationality, I want to emphasize that 
researchers trying to identify these biases have been seemingly relying on goal-based 
rationality. Specifically, anchoring refers to a rather general phenomenon in which 
people’s attempts to give accurate estimates (e.g., about the height of a tree, the cost 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
104 It is worth noting that the extent to which implicit biases are unconscious is controversial (e.g., 
Hahn et al. 2014). For a critical discussion of literature on the effects of unconscious factors on 
decision-making, see Newell and Shanks (2014).  
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of a house or the length of a river) are supposedly compromised by automatic and 
unconscious processes. The claim that scholars in MBR have just relied on rule-
based rationality in their assessment of behaviour and cognition can be challenged, 
by pointing to these situations in which people simply make inaccurate predictions.  
 
What seems to emerge by considering these important families of biases is that 
the characterization of MBR in terms of an assessment of behaviour and cognition 
against rule-based rationality is just too narrow and inaccurate. By considering cases 
of mental contamination, I have suggested that several biases have not been 
identified relying on rule-based rationality, and that they are not necessarily 
constituted by violations of rule-based rationality. This suggests, I think, that these 
families of biases are not clear targets of the AR theorists’ challenge. In fact, at least 
some of them seem to be plausible cases of unsuccessful and irrational behaviour 
from the perspective of AR, since there is a clear appeal to the agent’s goals in the 
individuation of each bias. Specifically, for such biases to occur, automatic and 
unconscious factors need to interfere with the agent’s fulfilment of her desires and 
goals. And what is particularly interesting, here, is that a pillar of AR is the very the 
idea that we should take into account the agent’s goals and preferences when 
assessing her behaviour.  
 
5. Flawed self-assessments 
 
I will now move on to a different line of research on biases. More precisely, I will 
now consider the literature on flawed self-assessment. This strand of research does 
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not seem to rely on rule-based rationality either. In these cases, subjects’ 
unsuccessful behaviour is measured against empirical accuracy. In a much-cited 
paper, Taylor and Brown (1988) show how people’s beliefs seem to lack an objective 
grasp of reality: in the cases reviewed by these authors, people’s judgments and 
predictions about themselves and the world are systematically flawed.  When it 
comes to this kind of mental error, we are dealing with inaccurate beliefs about the 
world. This literature on flawed self-assessments is huge. Sometimes, this extensive 
literature is referred to using the general term of overconfidence, but we should be 
more precise about the nature of this kind of bias. Here, I will use the terminology 
introduced by Moore and Healy (2008, 52) and distinguish between overestimation 
(an overestimation of one’s actual ability, performance, level of control, or chance of 
success) overplacement (where people believe themselves to be better than others, 
such as when a majority of people rate themselves better than the median), and 
overprecision (excessive certainty regarding the accuracy of one’s beliefs). It is 
interesting to note that, while AR theorists often discuss research on overprecision, 
they have not paid much attention to cases of overestimation and overplacement. 
This is important: overprecision concerns people’s confidence in the accuracy of 
their judgments, and not the accuracy of their judgments. In other words, 
investigating whether my belief is true or false is different from investigating how 







One class of flawed self-assessments comes under the heading of overestimation. 
People seem to overestimate their skills, beliefs and performance. Consider the 
planning fallacy (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), which is the tendency to hold a 
confident belief that one’s project will proceed as planned, even while knowing that 
the vast majority of similar projects have run late. As Buehler, Griffin and Ross point 
out: 
 
Anecdotal evidence of the planning fallacy abounds. The history of grand 
construction projects is rife with optimistic and even unrealistic predictions, yet 
current planners seem to be unaffected by this bleak history. (2002, 252) 
 
 
A great deal of evidence has been offered to demonstrate that people consistently 
overestimate how easily they can complete a task (as measured by time or money) 
(e.g., Buehler, Griffin and Ross 2002). For example, the amount of time students 
take to finish their senior thesis is three weeks longer than their most realistic 
estimate of how long it will take!and a week longer than what they describe as their 
worst case scenario.  
 
Another interesting case of inaccurate prediction is offered by the so-called 
illusion of control, which occurs when people overestimate their control over events. 
In a series of experiments, Langer and colleagues (1975) found that people often act 
as if they had control in situations that are actually dominated by chance. But similar 
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effects have been replicated in several contexts (e.g. Thompson, Armstrong and 
Thomson 1998).  
 
The abovementioned biases seem to be instances of factually erroneous beliefs. In 
these cases, behaviour has been assessed against the goal of empirical accuracy, 
under the assumption that people are trying to make empirically accurate 
judgements. This suggests quite clearly, I think, that biases such as the planning 
fallacy are not sensitive to the challenge on rule-based rationality mounted by AR 
theorists. In fact, since AR theorists generally claim that we should measure 
behaviour against epistemic goals and prudential goals (they themselves have 
actually quite often assessed people’s behaviour against empirical accuracy), and the 
behaviour discussed above seems to involve empirically inaccurate beliefs, it is not 
clear how AR theorists could, in light of such evidence, hold their optimistic claims 




When people have unrealistic views about their position with regard to others, they 
are also subject to overplacement. Consider for instance the better-than-the-average 
effect. The classic example of this tendency is a 1981 survey of automobile drivers in 
Sweden, in which almost 90% of the people described themselves as above-average 
drivers. These effects have been shown to be widespread: for instance, motorcyclists 
believe that they are less likely to cause an accident than the typical biker (Rutter, 
Quine and Albery 1998). Moreover, business leaders tend to believe that their 
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company is more likely to succeed than is the average firm in the industry (Cooper, 
Woo and Dunkelberg 1988). People tend to have similarly unrealistic views about 
their position with regard to others also when they look at the future. People are in 
fact prone to the optimism bias. They seemingly perceive of their future as more 
positive than that of the average person. Most college students, for instance, tend to 
believe that they will have a longer-than-average lifespan.  
 
Notably, what goes wrong in cases of overplacement is that our beliefs depart 
from reality. But how can we establish that people are committing a bias? After all, 
subjective beliefs do not admit easy verification, and one might really be better than 
the average. The obvious problem with the beliefs that guide our conception of our 
competence over that of others is, of course, that we cannot all be above average. 
Consequently, a significant proportion of us must be mistaken about our own relative 
insusceptibility to bias, suggesting that the relevant self-other asymmetry in fact 
reveals a tendency for overplacement in the accuracy of our judgments. In some 
cases, however, researchers have also tried to link these assessments with more 
objective measures. For instance, even people who have been hospitalized for 
accidents tend to believe that their driving skills are better than the average (e.g., 






6. Happiness research and goal-based rationality 
 
It is also important to remember that other research projects besides that articulated 
by AR theorists have started to explore people’s ability to achieve their goals rather 
than their ability to conform to rule-based rationality. In particular, in recent years 
decision scientists have started to directly study the contexts in which decisions 
succeed and fail to maximize happiness. They assess whether behaviour is adaptive, 
moving beyond coherence and consistency. For instance, Hsee and Hastie write that: 
 
For decades behavioural decision researchers have studied inconsistencies of 
choice. In recent years, however, researchers have studied directly when 
decisions fail to maximize happiness. (2006, 36) 
 
Important methodological and theoretical issues arise from this psychological 
research (see, for instance, Haybron 2000; Alexandrova 2012; Angner 2013), but 
discussing them seems to fall beyond the scope of this section. Here I will just 
highlight two important points of which we should take note. First, it seems that this 
strand of research might be legitimately integrated into the AR project, because 
subjective well-being could be seen as one of the relevant goals: other than those that 
meet basic survival needs, or that adequately correspond to the external world, many 
decisions are motivated by the pursuit of subjective well being. The second relevant 
consideration here is that, pace AR theorists, most psychologists and behavioural 
researchers working in this field do not think that people make choices and decisions 
that maximize their happiness. So far, scholars have examined two general reasons 
for failure in this regard: (i) prediction biases and (ii) failures to follow predictions. 
As an illustration of the former, consider the so-called impact bias. People often 
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overestimate the impact (both intensity and duration) of an affective event. Junior 
faculty members typically overestimate the joy of getting tenure and the misery of 
being turned down (Gilbert et al. 1998). One cause of this impact bias is 
focalism!predictors pay too much attention to the central event and overlook 
context events that will moderate the central event’s impact. For example, college 
football fans overpredicted the joy that they would experience in the days following 
the victory of their favoured team, because they failed to consider that the victory 
was only one of a myriad of events that would affect their future hedonic state (for 
more on this, see Kahneman 1997; Hsee and Hastie 2006; 2008).  
 
7. Catching liars and “truth biases” 
 
So far we have discussed a number of systematic biases mentioned in the 
psychological literature on judgment and decision-making that do not seem to have 
been identified or defined by relying on rule-based rationality. But now I want to 
stress that, if AR theorists want behavior and cognition to be assessed against goal-
based rationality, other psychological evidence has to be considered that does not sit 
very well with their optimistic claims about people’s rationality. In particular, I refer 
to psychological research on lie detection. This line of research is worthy of attention 
for two main reasons. First, the alleged ability to detect cheaters has attracted a great 
deal of attention from AR theorists, since they seem to consider this ability to be an 
important aspect of our “adaptive rationality” itself.105 More precisely, according to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
105 Most discussions of these topics by AR theorists have focused on literature from experimental 
research on social exchange: interactions in which one party provides a benefit to the other 
conditional on the recipient’s providing a benefit in return (e.g. Cosmides 1985; Cosmides and Tooby 
1989; 1996).  
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them, as well as to several evolutionary behavioral scientists, humans have evolved a 
cognitive system that directs attention to information that could reveal 
cheaters. Second, as we saw in Chapter 3, critics of AR!such as Sterelny!have 
emphasized that heuristics cannot help us achieve goals such as catching liars.106 
While AR theorists often stress that we are remarkably good at detecting cheaters, 
here I want to draw attention to some overlooked findings from social psychology 
literature on people’s inability to detect deceptive behavior accurately. In so doing, 
however, I do not aim to defend Sterelny’s claim that simple heuristics cannot 
perform well in social environments. In fact, as I mentioned in Chapter 3, there are a 
number of problems with Sterelny’s claim.107 Instead, I merely claim that, in this 
particular context, it seems that people’s performance does not support!and does 
not sit well with!the rather optimistic assessments of human rationality suggested 
by AR theorists. 
 
So, what interests us here is that in several studies carried out by psychologist 
DePaulo and her co-workers, subjects were shown videotapes of people talking, 
where only the experimenters knew whether they were lying or telling the truth. The 
goal was to determine whether people could separate truth from lies (cf. DePaulo 
1994).108 The topics of these lies and truths varied widely. For example, sometimes 
the people on the tape talked about their feelings about other people they knew. At 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
106 Specifically, as the reader will recall, Sterelny claims that ‘it is no accident that the examples of 
such heuristics in action ignore interactions with other intelligent agents, especially competitive 
agents. For it is precisely in such situations that simple rules of thumb will go wrong […] Catching a 
ball is one problem; catching a liar is another’ (Sterelny, 2003, 53).106 
107 Here one might actually want to emphasize also that what is unsuccessful behaviour for the subject 
trying to detect lies is at the same time an instance of successful behaviour from the perspective of the 
liar.  
108 This contemporary work has been shaped in important ways by Paul Ekman’s original work on the 
detection of lies and emotions. For an overview of Ekman’s research see, e.g., Ekman (1996).  
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other times, they gave their opinions on controversial issues; in still other studies, 
they talked to an artist about their preferences for various paintings, some of which 
were the artist’s own work. When researchers showed people (“judges”) these tapes, 
they asked them to decide, for each segment that they watched, whether they thought 
the person on the tape (the “speaker”) was lying or telling the truth. Researchers also 
asked them to indicate, on a scale, just how deceptive or truthful the speaker seemed 
to be. 
 
As it turned out, one consistent observation was that people’s ability to detect 
deception is only slightly better than chance at just below 54%(Bond and DePaulo 
2006). In particular, Kraut (1980) offered a statistical summary of results from ten 
such experiments. Finding a mean accuracy rate of 57%, Kraut concluded that the 
accuracy of human lie detection is low. In a summary of 39 studies published after 
1980, Vrij (2000) replicated Kraut’s findings, discovering that subjects achieve an 
average of 56.6% accuracy. These summaries have inspired a consensus: ‘it is 
considered virtually axiomatic […] that individuals are at best inaccurate at 
deception detection’ (Hubbell et al. 2001 115). Overall, such research suggests that 
people struggle to detect deception and the prevalence of truth-bias (Bond and 
DePaulo 2006), where the truth-bias is the tendency to believe other people 







The evidence mentioned above seems to suggest that AR theorists should be more 
careful in licensing optimistic claims about human rationality. Here I discuss three 
objections to my claim. 
!
8.1 Sometimes we are adaptively irrational!so what? 
 
The objector might claim that being optimistic about human rationality does not 
commit AR theorists to the claim that judgment and decision-making are always 
successful. In fact, it would be odd if AR theorists claimed that we are perfect 
decision-makers and that our reasoning was always successful. And, of course, they 
do not claim this. Thus, the objector can argue, evidence of unsuccessful reasoning 
and decision-making might not be seen as particularly problematic. This is an 
important point, but some remarks are in order. This consideration does not, in itself, 
justify AR theorists’ failure to discuss the findings presented above, and it seems that 
these researchers have been overly selective in their discussion of empirical findings 
suggesting optimism about human rationality. Moreover, this omission is particularly 
important, since the biases discussed in this chapter do not seem to be just occasional 
failures of goal-based rationality, but rather systematic and widespread, and so 
worthy of special attention. In addition, it seems reasonable to ask these scholars to 
state more clearly how much unsuccessful reasoning and decision-making they can 
tolerate before dropping their optimistic claims about human rationality. In 
particular, while it is right to say that, of course, people’s reasoning and decision-
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making cannot be always successful, this should not become an excuse to overlook 
their failures and poor performance in some contexts and domains.  
 
8.2 Biases are adaptive 
 
One could also seek to resist my conclusions by arguing that such biases are in fact 
adaptive once measured in terms of conduciveness to well-being and fitness-
maximization. In particular, during the past 15 years there has been an intense debate 
about the impact of unrealistic self-views on mental health (for a recent review of 
some literature on accurate cognition and mental health see, e.g., Bortolotti and 
Antrobus 2015). The dominant assertion in the debate is that overly positive views 
are actually beneficial for coping and psychological adjustment when people face 
extreme adversity (Taylor and Brown 1988), such as the aftermath of a civil war 
(Bonanno, Fiedl, Kovacevic and Kaltman 2002). There are, however, some problems 
with this objection.  
 
A first consideration is that it is unclear whether we should accept this view as 
empirically well grounded. In fact, this research on the pragmatic benefits of flawed 
self-assessments is also controversial (Colvin and Block 1994). And people seem to 
agree that, if overrating one’s self is advantageous, it is desirable only in moderate 
doses. In addition, the claim that misbeliefs can promote well-being and be 
evolutionarily adaptive is generally made with regard to only some of the biases 
discussed so far, namely unrealistic optimism and the better than the average effect, 
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and similar considerations do not seem to apply to other phenomena, such as the 
planning fallacy and anchoring. 
 
Second, even if we assume that this research on adaptive misbeliefs is empirically 
well grounded, it is unclear what conclusions would follow from that. For instance, 
let us accept that, as McKay and Dennett (2009) suggest, some sets of misbeliefs are 
evolutionarily adaptive. The objector also needs to show that, in that case, it is fitness 
maximization, and not empirical accuracy, the relevant goal, and this seems to be 
problematic. Consider now the claim that, since some empirically inaccurate beliefs 
supposedly help manage negative emotions, these misbeliefs are psychologically 
adaptive. Notably, if empirical accuracy were at least one of the relevant goals of the 
cognizer, such misbeliefs would still count as suboptimal. Most plausibly, we should 
see an agent’s success as resulting from a combination of goals and their relative 
importance, and it is not straightforward to deny that accuracy is at least one of the 
relevant goals here.  
 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, by adopting this objection AR theorists 
would have to revise key tenets of their project. In the first place, they would have to 
acknowledge that their original diagnosis of the sins of MBR was inaccurate: while 
AR theorists have traditionally claimed that bias researchers have mistakenly 
assessed behavior against rule-based rationality, according to the objection presented 
above the problem is, instead, that bias researchers have assessed behavior against 
the wrong goals (empirical accuracy). More importantly, AR theorists have typically 
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assessed behavior against its empirical accuracy and maintained that empirical 
accuracy and agential success overlap. By stressing the adaptive value of empirically 
inaccurate beliefs, AR theorists would have to redefine and significantly amend core 
assumptions of their framework. 
 
8.3 Biases are violations of rule-based rationality 
 
Finally, the objector might argue that, after all, the abovementioned families of 
biases are at least suggestive of violations of rule-based rationality since these biases 
might involve an error over inductive or abductive reasoning. More precisely, while 
in the abovementioned cases subjects’ behaviour was ultimately assessed against 
epistemic goals and people’s desires and preferences, in committing these biases 
subjects have probably violated some norms of rule-based rationality. This might 
seem problematic for my argument. More specifically, it might be taken to show that 
biases are, after all, violations of rule-based rationality!where this is precisely the 
claim that I have been trying to attack.  
 
The objection, however, does not seem to be particularly strong: even if we grant 
that such biases are really suggestive of reasoning that violates rule-based rationality, 
it does not seem that they have been individuated by relying on rule-based rationality 
or that they are constituted by the latter. Moreover, it is not clear that those biases 
really are suggestive of processes that violate rule-based rationality. This point 
becomes clearer when we consider a different and opposite reaction.  
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Let us move on to the second possible response. An objector might claim at this 
point that the families of biases considered in this chapter are instances of rational 
behaviour according to rule-based rationality, as people may arrive at such biases 
through standardly rational information processing. For instance, Dawes (1989) 
made such an argument with regard to the so-called false consensus effect (Ross, 
Greene and House 1977). This bias refers to a particular phenomenon: people who 
exhibit a particular view (performers) believe that this behaviour or view is more 
common overall than do people with different behaviour or view. Different 
explanations of the phenomenon have been given, but what is interesting for the 
present purpose is Dawes and Mulford’s (1996) view that false consensus is in line 
with a Bayesian analysis that assumes a uniform prior distribution and one’s own 
view as the only evidence. The idea is that the false consensus effect might be a 
consequence of a standard normatively appropriate strategy of generalizing from one 
indisputable datum!namely one’s own response (Dawes 1989). On such view, 
rational information processing strategies might thus contribute to these biases: 
although demonstratively false (both groups cannot both be right), the belief is 
precisely what one would expect when people quite sensibly use what they know 
(their own belief or action) to inform what they do not know (the belief and actions 
of others). Note, however, that reinterpretations of other kinds of biases along similar 
lines are available (e.g., Benoit and Dubra 2011; Benoit, Dubra and Moore 
forthcoming; Lieder et al. 2012; Harris and Osman 2012). In light of such 
reinterpretations of these findings, one might think that we should consider these 
biases as instances of rational behaviour, or so the objector contends: we have biases 
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only in the sense that the observed beliefs do not match the actual distribution of 
outcomes, but these biases result from standardly rational processing.  
 
Here I will offer a few considerations. First, it is controversial to what extent these 
models are psychologically realistic. For instance, it is hard to ignore the 
psychological evidence in the heuristics-and-biases tradition suggesting that 
individuals do not use Bayes’ rule and, for that matter, may not even understand 
simple probability. There is a more important concern, however, which stresses that 
this kind of reply is not available to AR theorists. To see this, consider that, whilst 
AR theorists have launched their project as a radical normative departure from the 
perspective of rule-based rationality, by offering such reinterpretations they would be 
proposing a problematic resurrection of the normative perspective of rule-based 
rationality. What I want to suggest in this section, instead, is that the families of 
biases considered in this paper are compatible with processes that violate rule-based 
rationality as well as with those that conform to it.  
 
9. Evolution and inaccurate reasoning 
 
Finally, before I conclude this final chapter, there seems to be one important task left 
for us to accomplish. Specifically, the reader might now wonder how the outcome of 
the analysis carried out here relates to the considerations about the relationship 
between evolutionary thinking and psychological biases explored in Chapter 2. In 
particular, there I stressed that AR theorists had presented some considerations about 
the adaptive value of behavior that violates rule-based rationality in an attempt to 
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account for the evolution of some biases in MBR. But in this chapter I have shown 
that several biases discussed in MBR should not be characterized as mere violations 
of rule-based rationality, but rather as instances of mental contamination, empirically 
inaccurate beliefs and the like. So, one might still find it puzzling how such biases in 
MBR evolved. Here I seek to provide the reader with some thoughts and 
considerations on this topic.  
 
First, whilst keeping in mind the limitations of the adaptationist account described 
in Chapters 2 and 6, it is important to highlight that in Chapter 2 I also presented 
some considerations regarding the adaptive value of empirically inaccurate beliefs. 
With regard to this point, I want to stress here that some models for the evolution of 
the instances of empirically inaccurate behavior described in this chapter have 
already been offered in the literature. For instance, Dennett himself, one of the 
authors generally associated with the main evolutionary argument discussed in 
Chapter 2 (EAR), seems to have moved away from his previous positions by 
challenging the presumption that true self-assessments are generally evolutionarily 
adaptive (McKay and Dennett 2009). In so doing, he discusses some clusters of 
misbeliefs, including unrealistic positive self-evaluations, exaggerated perception of 
personal control or mastery, and unrealistic optimism about the future. This is 
important: as we have seen in this chapter, there is a widespread tendency for most 
people to see themselves as better than most others in a range of aspects. Dennett 
suggests that manifestations of the better than the average effect might be not only 
pervasive but also evolutionarily adaptive. But other models for the evolution of such 
phenomena have recently been offered (e.g., Johnson and Fowler 2011).  
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It would be desirable to have evolutionary accounts for the other kinds of biased 
behavior reported here. Specifically, most debates on the evolution of rational 
behavior focus either on violations of axioms such as transitivity or on the evolution 
of true and false beliefs. But in acknowledging that there are other forms of 
“adaptive irrationality” and biased behavior besides violations of transitivity and 
empirically inaccurate beliefs, we thus call for more work on the evolution of these 
other sets of phenomena. Just to give an example here, consider that, as we have seen 
in this thesis, people are not very good at predicting what will make them happy. 
Notably, Buss suggested an evolutionary perspective on such forms of biased 
behavior, stressing that happiness is seen as ‘a common goal toward which people 
strive, but for many […] remains frustratingly out of reach’ (2000, 15). According to 
his view, there are plausible evolutionary reasons why humans do not excel at 
achieving happiness.  In particular, Buss stresses that ‘an evolutionary psychological 
perspective offers unique insights into some vexing barriers to achieving happiness 
and consequently into creating conditions for improving the quality of human life’ 
(15) (see also Grinde 2002 and Ahuvia 2008, 502). I want to suggest that discussions 
about the evolution of human (ir)rationality should take into account the different 




In this chapter I have articulated a reply to the challenge that AR theorists have 
raised to MBR. I have argued that, even if AR turned out to represent a plausible 
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normative perspective on rational behaviour, the challenge mounted by AR theorists 
seems to be less damaging than its advocates believe. First, there are reasons to think 
that, at least in several contexts, violations of rule-based rationality correspond to 
failures from the perspective of goal-based rationality as well. Second, I have called 
into question the claim that scholars in MBR have relied on rule-based rationality 
alone when individuating biases, and that what constitutes biases in MBR is that they 
are violations of rule-based rationality. I showed that, in fact, the category of bias 
refers to a rather heterogeneous class of phenomena and that the characterization of 
biases in terms of violations of rule-based rationality does not seem to fit several 
well-known families of biases. In light of this, I have argued that these families of 
biases do not seem to be vulnerable to the attacks on rule-based rationality mounted 
by AR theorists. In fact, many instances of biased behaviour look like instances of 
unsuccessful behaviour assessed against prudential and epistemic goals, and this 
does not seem to sit well with AR theorists’ rather optimistic claims about human 
rationality. I concluded that either AR theorists explain clearly how these findings 
could be accommodated within an optimistic picture of human rationality, or they 










It always takes longer than you expect,  
even when you take into account Hofstadter’s Law. 
Hofstadter’s Law 
 
As we reach the end of our investigation, a recap of the main themes and 
achievements of this work will be useful. The following (probably containing some 
overlaps, repetitions and omissions) is a list of the main achievements and the core 
claims made in my dissertation. 
 
This work started by observing that, while for several decades it has been 
commonplace in empirical debates on people’s thinking and decision-making to 
think that humans are irrational, several research groups have recently started to 
question this view. In this work I have focused on the AR project and attempted to 
evaluate its scientific viability. 
 
It became clear in our investigation that the question “Are humans rational?” 
should be broken down into two quite separate questions: “What does it mean to be 
rational?” and “Are humans rational?” With regard to the first question, AR theorists 
argue that people should not be assessed against norms of logic, probability theory or 
decision theory (or what I referred to in this work as rule-based rationality), but 
rather against the goals they entertain (or what we have dubbed goal-based 
rationality). With regard to the second question, AR theorists maintain that the 
conclusion that people are irrational is unsupported: people are often remarkably 
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successful once assessed against their goals and given the cognitive and external 
constraints imposed by the environment.  
 
As I have tried to make clear, there are reasons why the challenge mounted by AR 
theorists is particularly important. Whilst other critics of MBR have focused mainly 
on methodological arguments related to the robustness of biases (cf. Chapter 1) or on 
evolutionary arguments against the very possibility of human irrationality (cf. 
Chapter 2), AR theorists have offered a more radical challenge: they have taken issue 
with some of the normative commitments of MBR, although they still share some of 
them!since they are interested in adaptive behaviour and cognition and in 
instrumental rationality.  
 
This thesis sought to provide a qualified defence of such a program. On the one 
hand, I argued that there is room for a conceptual and methodological revolution in 
the study of rationality. Specifically, while it is commonly argued that to be rational 
means to reason according to formal principles of rationality (or rule-based 
rationality), I stressed the importance of assessing behaviour against the goals that 
people entertain (goal-based rationality). However, contra AR theorists, I also 
pointed to evidence suggesting that people are often remarkably unsuccessful at 
achieving epistemic and prudential goals, and argued that AR theorists have not 
made clear how these findings could be reconciled with their optimistic view of 
human rationality. Therefore, I concluded that, while AR theorists have indeed made 
significant progress in the “rationality debate”, they have hitherto failed to provide 
compelling evidence or arguments in support of their most ambitious theses.  
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Now, I am aware that one should not derive momentous implications from 
literally interpreting isolated statements, and that some exaggerations on the side of 
AR may be explained in light of a need to obtain public attention and funding. Even 
so, one would expect AR theorists to advance much more measured claims in the 
future, for their propensity to overstate their own achievements has generated a lot of 
unnecessary confusion in the literature, leading many scholars interested in the 
“rationality debate” to be needlessly sceptical about the prospects of AR. 
 
At this point, it is worth taking a closer look at the structure of my general 
strategy. The main claims that I have just summarized have been reached through a 
careful examination of a number of arguments, and the core of my defence of AR 
theorists’ attack on reliance on rule-based rationality was offered in Chapters 3, 4 
and 6. First, I noted that emphasis on the importance of adaptive behaviour and 
instrumental views on rationality is extremely popular in the psychological literature 
on judgement and decision-making and, importantly, generally advocated by AR 
theorists and MBR researchers. Second, I showed that in several contexts and 
domains behaviour that violates rule-based rationality can be adaptive and 
successful. This outcome raises a non-trivial problem for MBR researchers: if what 
ultimately justifies rule-based rationality is the promise of success, it seems hard to 
count as irrational violations of these norms that lead to successful and adaptive 
behaviour. Later, in Chapter 6, I looked at research on individual differences in 
decision-making and examined whether people who score higher in cognitive ability 
tests are more likely to achieve desired life outcomes because they are less prone to 
violating rule-based rationality. Prima facie, such research could represent an 
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interesting large-scale project in judgement and decision-making and show that 
following rule-based rationality is, after all, conducive to successful behaviour. 
However, I concluded that, as the matter stands, we are unable to draw causal 
conclusions about whether conformity to rule-based rationality is conducive to 
successful behaviour.  
 
My arguments concerning AR theorists’ case for optimism about human 
rationality were presented in Chapter 7. Specifically, in Chapter 7 I provided reasons 
to resist AR theorists’ optimism about human rationality. In the main, my strategy 
consisted in showing that a great deal of research on biases and irrational behaviour 
is in fact unscathed by AR theorists’ arguments: numerous families of biases cannot 
be described as mere violations of rule-based rationality, and in several cases it 
seems that behaviour has been assessed against epistemic and prudential goals after 
all. As it turns out, this evidence does not seem to sit well with the conclusions about 
human rationality drawn by AR theorists. In particular, AR theorists have not made 
how, in light of this evidence, they could still hold their optimistic picture of human 
rationality. 
 
I hope that my journey into AR will constitute a step forward for the study of 
(ir)rational behaviour. Admittedly, several issues still remain unsolved, and for a 
number of questions that have been answered in this work, a whole new set of 
questions has arisen. But a further goal of this thesis was precisely to draw attention 
to some previously overlooked issues. In particular, I sought to prompt AR theorists 
to build their case on more solid conceptual foundations. I argued that AR theorists 
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(but scholars in judgement and decision-making more generally) have not articulated 
in enough detail the notions of “goal” and “goal attainment”. As I tried to show in 
Chapter 4, AR theorists, as well as other scholars engaged in the “rationality debate”, 
tend to appeal to such notions, but also tend to switch back and forth between 
different understandings of them. Whilst I illustrated some possible ways of 
articulating the relevant perspective of goal-based rationality, I also emphasized that 
further refinement and more work are needed if AR theorists wish to present their 
framework as a convincing alternative normative framework for the assessment of 
rational behaviour and cognition.   
 
Finally, the reader might also draw from this work a number of more general 
lessons. For instance, a general consideration made here was about previous 
discussions of the evolution of rational and irrational behaviour that have been 
offered in the literature. I argued that scholars interested in the “rationality debate” 
had not paid enough attention to the actual details of results suggesting people’s 
irrationality given by MBR scholars. One way in which these discussions have 
generally mischaracterized the psychological phenomena in question is by 
overlooking the existence of individual differences in judgements and decision-
making. In light of the discussion offered in Chapter 6, however, it should be clear 
that it is not sufficient to provide an evolutionary model for the fact that people are 
biased with regard to some particular task or behaviour. What needs to be explained 
is that, in most cases, some people are biased and others are not. But there is also 
another way in which discussions of the evolution of irrational behaviour have gone 
astray. Specifically, commentators have typically failed to appreciate that the range 
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of phenomena classed as biases is rather heterogeneous. In particular, researchers 
interested in offering accounts of the evolution of biases have typically either 
focused on a set of empirically inaccurate beliefs or on violations of some principles 
of rule-based rationality, quite often violations of transitivity. In so doing, however, 
they have focused on a rather narrow class of biases. In light of the considerations 
offered in Chapter 7, it is clear that, if researchers are interested in accounting for the 
evolution of biased behaviour, a broader range of phenomena must be taken into 
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